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Kurzfassung
Basierend auf technologischen Trends sollte das Zugbeeinflussungssystem den Anteil der
Bodenanlagen reduzieren und den Zügen mehr Eigeninitiative geben als in der Vergangen-
heit, da so die funktionale Sicherheit und die Flexibilität des Zugbeeinflussungssystems er-
höht werden können. In dieser Arbeit wird ein verbessertes System vorgeschlagen, das
die Vorteile der zugbezogenen Kommunikation mit den aktuellen Fahrbefehlsmechanismen
kombiniert. Um die notwendigen Daten des Zugabstandsintervalls zu erhalten, werden die
Bordausrüstung und ein neues Zug-zu-Zug-Entfernungsmesssystem (TTDMS) als normale
bzw. Backup-Strategien angewendet.
Während verschiedene Ortungstechnolgien zur Zugdatenerfassung genutzt wurden, bleibt
die Entwicklung und Validierung neuer Systeme eine Herausforderung. In dieser Arbeit
werden formale Ansätze zur Entwicklung und Verifikation von TTDMS vorgestellt. Zur
Unterstützung der Systementwicklung werden CPNs zur Formalisierung und Bewertung der
Systemstruktur und ihres Verhaltens eingesetzt. Basierend auf dem CPN-Modell wird die
Systemstruktur validiert. Zusätzlich wird eine Methode vorgeschlagen, mit der eine Code-
Architektur aus dem formalen Modell generiert werden kann. Die Systemleistung wird im
Erfassungsbereich und in der Genauigkeit beurteilt. Daher werden sowohl eine mathema-
tische Simulation als auch eine praktische Validierung der Messungen implementiert. Die
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass das System in der Lage ist, Entfernungsmessungen in Metro- und
Eisenbahnlinien durchzuführen. Zudem sind die formalen Ansätze bei der Entwicklung und
Verifikation anderer Systeme wiederverwendbar.
Die Abstandsmessung mit TTDMS basiert auf einem Frequenzspreizungsverfahren. Die
Messung wird durchgeführt, indem die Ankunftszeit angewendet wird, um den Abstand
zwischen zwei Zügen zu berechnen. Dieses Verfahren erfordert keine Synchronisierung der
Zeitquellen der Übertragung. Der Zeitunterschied kann damit berechnet werden, indem
die Autokorrelation des Pseudo-Random-Noise-Codes verwendet wird. Im Unterschied zu
Systemen im Luft- und Seeverkehr benötigt dieses System keine andere Lokalisierungseinheit
als die Kommunikationsarchitektur.
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Um zu gewährleisten, dass ein System wie vorgesehen funktioniert, muss es validiert wer-
den. Nur wenn das Systemverhalten validiert wurde, sind Bewertungen anderer relativer
Leistungen sinnvoll. Aufgrund ihrer eindeutigen Definition kann das TTDMS mit formalen
Methoden viel klarer beschrieben werden als mit ausführbaren Codes.
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Abstract
Based on the technology trends, the train control system should weaken the proportion of
ground facilities, and give trains more individual initiative than in the past. As a result,
the safety and flexibility of the train control system can be further improved. In this the-
sis, an enhanced movement authority system is proposed, which combines advantages of
the train-centric communication with current movement authority mechanisms. To obtain
the necessary train distance interval data, the onboard equipment and a new train-to-train
distance measurement system (TTDMS) are applied as normal and backup strategies, re-
spectively.
While different location technologies have been used to collect data for trains, the devel-
opment and validation of new systems remain challenges. In this thesis, formal approaches
are presented for developing and verifying TTDMS. To assist the system development, the
Colored Petri nets (CPNs) are used to formalize and evaluate the system structure and its
behavior. Based on the CPN model, the system structure is validated. Additionally, a pro-
cedure is proposed to generate a Code Architecture from the formal model. The system
performance is assessed in detection range and accuracy. Therefore both mathematical sim-
ulation and practical measurements validation are implemented. The results indicate that
the system is feasible to carry out distance measurements both in metropolitan and railway
lines, and the formal approaches are reusable to develop and verify other systems.
As the target object, TTDMS is based on a spread-spectrum technology to accomplish dis-
tance measurement. The measurement is carried out by applying Time of Arrival (TOA) to
calculate the distance between two trains, and requires no synchronized time source of trans-
mission. It can calculate the time difference by using the autocorrelation of Pseudo Random
Noise (PRN) code. Different from existing systems in air and maritime transport, this system
does not require any other localization unit, except for communication architecture.
To guarantee a system can operate as designed, it needs to be validated before its application.
Only when system behaviors have been validated other relative performances’ evaluations
make sense. Based on the unambiguous definition of formal methods, TTDMS can be
described much clearer by using formal methods instead of executable codes.
11 Introduction
In this chapter, first, the purpose of this thesis is discussed, which applies Colored Petri
Nets (CPNs) to assist the development and analysis of a train to train distance measurement
system (TTDMS). This system, which together combines the train-centric communication
technology, intends to enhance the movement authority and improve the train operation
safety. Second, the structure of thesis is introduced.
1.1 Purpose of the Dissertation
The development of system leads to a progressively complex system structure. The well-
structured and concise descriptions of procedures should be involved in the assistance of the
system’s development. An efficient strategy to solve this issue is to apply formal methods.
The higher the formalization level used to describe the system, the greater the possibility
to formally verify the formalized concept of the system. Hence, high-level Petri nets, CPNs
are suitable for the development and representation process. The system structure is for-
malized in a CPN model. After confirming the safety of the model by means of model based
validation, the model can provide a framework for the programming of the code structure.
The overall purpose of this thesis is to assist the development of a new railway signaling
assistant system, and to analyze the safety and availability of it using Petri nets. This new
system development starts from the requirements analysis, and then it will be involved in
existing systems as an overlay system, the overlay system’s safe and availability is also con-
sidered. The model is validated with a case study of a train-centric communication signaling
system with different scenarios. This purpose can be decomposed into five objectives, as
shown in Fig. 1.1.
The first objective is analyzing the system requirements and feasibility. By investigating the
weakness of the current system, the improvement direction can be obvious. Before the new
system is applied, evaluation of the safety improvement is the next task. In particular, this
objective tries to answer: what kinds of problems can be solved?
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Figure 1.1: The relations of the objectives and thesis
The second objective is to evaluate the system performance. To improve the system function,
different kinds of technologies are available to be applied. This objective is aiming to answer
the questions: Which kind of technology to be chosen to carry out the system function,
and how to design the system structure? What is more, how the efficiency of this system is
estimated?
The third objective is the advancing of the system development and analysis procedure.
Since CPN method is chosen as the formal analysis methodology, this objective is going to
answer the questions: how to integrate the system development and formal method together?
First, the second objective has to be reflected in a CPN model, which can be used to carry
out the validation and verification. Second, with proper parameters, the system performance
can be evaluated by using simulation.
The fourth objective is the assessment of the overall system performance. When the system is
developed, we have to evaluate the overall system performance. Time-related system states
can be used to evaluate the dependability of complex systems which are widely analyzed
with the fault tree. As the Fault Tree is limited to many commercial products, the CPNs
are applied to represent and evaluate the fault tree, and to estimate the overall system
performance.
The last objective is the practical implementation of the system. After the aforementioned
four objectives are achieved, this objective shows the actual industrial applications. The
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system has been applied in metro lines, and the feasibility of implementing in railway systems
is analyzed.
1.2 Structure of the Dissertation
This thesis consists of 11 chapters, both methodologies and numerical analysis results are
provided. The whole structure of the thesis is shown in Fig. 1.2. The first two chapters
contain previous experience and preliminaries, which involve the state of the art and relevant
basic knowledge.
Chapter 1 describes the purpose and structure of this thesis.
Chapter 2 investigates the state of the art and challenges of different sorts of train control
systems. As the most advanced and widely applied train control system, the European Train
Control System level 2 (ETCS-2) preliminaries are introduced. After that, the distance
measurement methods in railway are presented. With this background, the train collision
accidents and the methods to prevent them are described. Additionally, the train-centric
communication control system and its associated challenges are presented.
Chapters 3 to 10 are my original personal work. These chapters:
• propose a train-centric based train distance measurement system, and analyze the
performance improvement by involving this system;
• establish a procedure for the development, validation and verification of TTDMS by
means of CPN models;
• represent and evaluate the fault tree in CPN models to assess the overlay system
performance;
• discuss the system’s practical implementations in metro and railway, analyze both the
simulation and actual measurement data.
Chapter 3 discusses the necessity of involving the new system to improve the overall railway
system safety. The overall system safety improvement is calculated based on the system
structure. For detailed analysis, a train to train collision failure model, which will be evalu-
ated by means of CPNs in the chapter 8, is introduced.
Chapter 4 illustrates the enhanced movement authority system (MA+), which is a train-
centric based system. The system principle, structure, and algorithms are introduced. MA+
has two strategies to obtain the train distance interval data. The normal strategy is based on
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the existing onboard data to carry out the distance calculation. While, the backup strategy
is implemented by TTDMS, which uses the Time of Arrival (TOA) method to implement
the distance estimation. What is more, the reliability of an actual prototype machine is
estimated. With this system involving and combining it with the ETCS-2, the train safe
distance is shorter than it in the ETCS-2 and ETCS-3.
Chapter 5 is going into detail about the development and analysis of TTDMS by using CPNs.
First, evaluation methodologies are discussed. Second, in order to assist the development
and analysis of a new system, the CPN based methods are involved. The basic definitions of
CPNs, which are chosen as the means of the description of the system design in this thesis,
are introduced. Besides, different Petri net tools are compared, and the CPN Tools and
pi−Tool are applied in the following chapters. The basic instructions, such as referring to
the items in a state space and data value, are introduced briefly. Finally, the task is divided
into four steps and four different levels, and further discussed in the following chapters.
Chapter 6 presents the formal modeling, validation and verification process of the TTDMS.
The system property concept is used to build the CPN model. Model validation and func-
tional safety verification are implemented through the model checking method. For the
performance evaluation, the parameterization process is introduced, and the simulation data
is obtained by Monte-Carlo-Algorithm testing.
After the system structure and performance is validated and evaluated at the model level,
chapter 7 proposes the procedure for the code framework generation and model based exe-
cution time estimation.
Chapter 8 depicts the improvement of the new system in the train collision prevention.
Because fault tree analysis is limited to assess dynamic systems without event-repair opera-
tions and probability-related attributions, its analysis and evaluation can not satisfy actual
requirements. Hence, in this chapter, the CPNs are applied to represent and evaluate the
fault tree. With the methodology introduced in this chapter, the collision model introduced
in chapter 3 is analyzed in the CPN model.
Chapter 9 illustrates the implementation of TTDMS in operational metro lines. A speed
based distance warning strategy is proposed. The system availability is evaluated by the
stochastic Petri nets. The detection distance is validated in both simulation model and
actual scenarios.
Similarly, the proposal of applying MA+ in the high-speed railway is illustrated in Chapter
10. As limited by the hardware and experiment requirements, only simulation results are
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available for the reference. Additionally, an application demo on the DMI is proposed, even
though further validation and analysis are required.
With the methodologies and numerical results, chapter 11 concludes the thesis and indicates
the further work. The system proposed in this thesis has been applied in actual metro lines,
which can be referred for the further development.
1. Introduction: five objectives
2. State of the art 
and challenges 
3. System safety improvement 
by involving train-centric 
communication
4. Enhanced movement 
authority system (MA+)
5. System development and 
validation by means of Petri 
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8. Evaluation of the collision 
fault tree by means of CPNs
9. Practical implementation in 
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10. Practical implementation in 
the railway
11. Conclusions and further work
Objective 1 
Objective 2 
Objective 3 
Objective 4 
Objective 5 
6. Formal modeling of TTDMS
7. Model based code generation 
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Figure 1.2: Structure of the dissertation
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In this chapter, first, the different train control systems and the preliminaries of ETCS-2
are discussed. Second, the distance measurement methods in railway are proposed. Third,
the train collision accidents, as well as the avoidance system are presented. Finally, as
the emerging technology, the train centric communication control system and associated
challenges are introduced.
2.1 Train control system
Train control systems have gone through a rapid evaluation since the first high-speed train
started operation in Japan in 1964 [2]. Take the European Train Control System (ETCS) as
a case study, which is specified at four levels:
• Level 0 requires train driver to observe the trackside signals, and the maximum speed
is monitored by the onboard equipment.
• Level 1 is a cab signaling system, which can be superimposed on the existing signaling
system. It involves track-side signals, balises, and track circuits. Radio information
and balises transmit the signal to the vehicle as a movement authority together with
route data at fixed points.
• Level 2 is a digital radio-based system. The Movement Authority (MA) and other
signal aspects are displayed in the cab for the driver. It involves balises, track circuit,
and GSM-R.
• Level 3 is currently under development. It relies on the onboard equipment to carry out
the train location detection and integrity supervision, but no the trackside equipment
such as track circuits or axle counters in level 2.
Among these four different solutions, the ETCS level 2 (ETCS-2) is widely applied in nowa-
days especially in high-speed lines. This section seeks to show some preliminary notions that
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are necessary for the discussion that will be conducted in the following chapters. We as-
sume that the reader has some basic knowledge of ETCS, otherwise, ERTMS/ETCS system
requirements specification [3] are highly recommended for starters.
The basic components of ECTS-2 are shown in Fig. 2.1. The train is moving based on the
MA, which is transfered from the Radio Block Centre (RBC) to the train. The MA in ETCS
can be depicted in Fig. 2.2. From the current train position to the End of Authority (EOA),
the distance is composed of several sections [3]. The MA details can be obtained from the
Packet 15 in wireless Message 3. Table 2.1 indicates the practical definition of Packet 15,
which contains the details of Level 2/3 Movement Authority. Message 3 is the movement
authority in the radio message, and its standard definition as shown in Table 2.2.
CTC
Waysides
Interlocking
Radio block center
GMS-R GMS-R
Figure 2.1: The basic components of ETCS-2
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Figure 2.2: Structure of an MA in ETCS
For each section composing MA the following information shall be given [3]:
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Table 2.1: Packet 15 (partial)
Variable Comment Value
NID_PACKET Packet ID 15
Q_DIR Validation direction 0/1
L_PACKET Packet length depends on content
Q_SCALE Distance length 1(1 m)
V_LOA LOA speed 0
L_SECTION(k) Section(k) length depends on operation details
L_ENDSECTION End section length depends on operation details
Table 2.2: Message 3: movement authority
Field No. Variable Comment Value
1 NID_MESSAGE Message ID 3
2 L_MESSAGE Message length depends on the message content
3 T_TRAIN On board equipment time depends on the message sending time
4 M_ACK Feedback confirmation 1
5 NID_LRBGE Last Reference Balise Group the last NID_LRBG in the train lo-
cation report
6 Level 2/3 MA Movement authority Packet 15
7 Optional packets Optional Relevant packets (15, 5, 21, 27, 3, 41,
65, 68, 80)
• length of the section, presented in Packet 15 as L_SECTION(k) and L_ENDSECTION ;
• optionally, section time-out value and distance from the beginning of Section Time-out
stop location.
Hence, the MA length can be calculated with the variables of L_ENDSECTION and
L_SECTION(k), as shown in equation (2.1).
LMA =
n∑
k=1
Section (k) + EndSection (2.1)
where Section(k) and EndSection denote the length of the End section and the section k in
the MA, respectively [3].
After obtaining the MA, the onboard equipment displays the essential information through
the Driver Machine Interface (DMI), as shown in Fig. 2.3. The DMI carries out two main
functions to:
• display information to the driver in response to operational situations. There is visual
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information, such as symbols and text messages, as well as audible information for the
speed and distance monitoring;
• provide the interactions between the driver and onboard equipment. These include
data input and acknowledgments by the driver.
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Figure 2.3: ETCS Driver Machine Interface
On the DMI, the orders and announcements overview shall be displayed within the movement
authority and up to the first target at zero speed, the following aspects should be involved
if any, as shown in Fig. 2.4.
• Distance scale
• Orders and announcements of track conditions (excluding tunnel stopping areas)
• Gradient profile
• Speed profile discontinuities
• Planning Area Speed Profile (PASP)
• Indication marker
• Hide and show planning information
• Zoom function
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Figure 2.4: Main objects of the planning information
2.2 Distance measurement methods in railway
Localization is one of the basic tasks of a train control system. Train control needs the
position information to control and manage the transportation. Position can be divided
into absolute position and relative position. Nowadays train control systems are using the
absolute position to control and manage trains operation.
Physical space separation is a fundamental safety precaution for trains. The primary goal is
to obtain the distance information between two trains in time. The means of acquiring this
distance information is to collect the location data of the train. Different technologies can
be applied in this process, as shown in Fig. 2.5. Various methods, systems, and tools can be
used to track the train’s absolute position. For instance, track circuit, axle counter, Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), Balise, Radio frequency identification (RFID), Wireless
Local Area Network (WLAN), and Ultrasonic range finding [4]. Alternatively, radar, speed
sensor, and spread spectrum communication can obtain the train’s relative position data.
The primary solutions are track circuit and axle counter. This kind of method has a relatively
high reliability, while the location resolution accuracy is low. Balises in ETCS-2 refer the
absolute position. Its absolute localization accuracy is affected by the layout density of
balises. Balises can also provide onboard systems with additional data [5]. These devices
store static or dynamic information depending on their types. However, Balises constitute
a discontinuous communication system. What is more, balise is expensive and maintenance
is required. There is also other hardware (accelerometer, gyroscope, odometer, etc.) which
can generate relative position information, however, the disadvantage is as time goes on,
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Figure 2.5: Localization methods
accumulative errors will have a certain increase.
GNSS is also one of the most developed location technologies, and it has been applied in
different research areas [6–9]. The advantages of GNSS are high location precision and low
costs. However, GNSS can only operate in an open area to receive location information [10].
However, due to GPS inherent error (multipath, ionospheric, mountain block, and so on),
GNSS solely based systems have not enough accuracy. Additionally, GNSS cannot provide
satellite signals for metro trains that are operating inside the tunnels.
WLAN location technology requires additional database support, because fingerprint-labeled
radio maps are needed. Ultrasonic location technology uses the Time of Arrival (TOA) to
calculate distance, but the location results are not accurate inside the tunnels because of
the severe beam divergence. RFID enables a one-way wireless communication. However, the
RFID tag must be put on objects previously [11].
Wireless location technology combines both location and communication together, and it
can be used to calculate relative distance between two trains. The procedure is about the
communication and distance calculation between two different Mobile Stations (MS), not
like nowadays wireless location system, which can obtain absolute distance and position in
a Cell Coverage Area. Fig. 2.6 shows a conventional location system.
Wireless location methods can be divided into three main parts, which are: signal intensity,
time differences of arrival (TDOA), and Angle of Arrival (AOA), respectively. Signal inten-
sity relied on the accuracy of path loss model, which will be variable at a different distance
and affected by some other factors (wall, metal, vehicle, and so on). Hence, the location
accuracy is relatively low. AOA needs antenna array to realize location, which has a high
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Figure 2.6: Wireless location technology
system requirement in the MS part. What’s more, in long distance measurement, a tiny
deviation in the angle can lead to a great difference in distance measurement result.
Using MS to calculate the distance between two trains, some deviations cause by normal
wireless locations system can be solved. For instance, multipath fading, near-far effect, and
non-line-of-sight propagation (NLOS). In the point-to-point distance measurement system,
only two MS are involved in the distance measurement. Consequently, the near-far effect is
not adaptive in this scenario. For multi-path fading, already many successful methods can
be applied to solve this problem, for instance, Root-Music and ESPRIT method [12,13].
Contrary to NLOS propagation, the corresponding one is line-of-sight (LOS) propagation.
Under the typical railway situation, LOS propagation in point-to-point communication will
cause distance measurement deviation in curve lines, as shown in Fig. 2.7. When the train is
running in the curve line, the LOS distance is shorter than the curve line. The real distance
between two trains in the track is ÷APB. However, the calculated distance is ALB, which
will be shorter than the actual distance. The error caused by LOS curve lines can be found
out in following Fig. 2.7.
2.3 Train collision accidents and avoidance
According to International Union of Railways (UIC) and European Railway Agency (ERA)
definition, types of railway accidents can be divided into three aspects: collective, individual,
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Figure 2.7: Error caused by LOS
and other types of accidents. Actual statistics of the UIC show that there are still significant
train accidents in Europe every day. Among these accidents, collective accidents cause more
severe economic and personal losses than other two accident types. The collective accidents
involve derailment of trains, train collision with another train, and train collision with an
obstacle. Fig. 2.8 indicates the comparable data of UIC statistical reports, the number of
accidents increased markedly in Europe1. Even though the latest technologies have been
implemented, accidents happened all the same. Hence, the process to enhance railway safety
can never be stopped.
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Figure 2.8: Train collisions and derailments numbers of events in European, 2006-2015, In-
ternational Union of Railways
1Data resources: UIC Safety Database Activity Report 2007-2016
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These three significant train accidents happen in Europe every day, despite millions of Euros
which have been invested in trackside and in-train safety equipment. Even with Automatic
Train Protection (ATP) systems like the future European Train Control System (ETCS) a
significant amount of accidents cannot be prevented. Since the accidents occur between trains
and other kinds of obstacles like construction vehicles, construction workers or pedestrians
and vehicles on level crossings. Additionally, the control system could also be out of service,
and the human error is also the main reason.
If the signaling equipment do not guarantee the fail-safety, the train distance interval would
no longer be monitored, which may result in train collision accidents [14, 15]. For instance,
in 2016 Berlin Tram-Crash, two commuter trains collided on a single-track of railway in
Bavaria, Germany [16]; a head-on collision involving two passenger trains in southern Italy
as well as; two cargo trains collided in Finland is the further example; the 7.23 Yong-wen
line train collision [17], the Shanghai Metro Line 10 collision in China [18]; collision between
a Union Pacific freight train and a METROLINK Commuter train in the USA [19], and so
on.
In today’s Train Control System, there are a number of technologies, processes, and proce-
dures that are combined to ensure the safe operation for trains. They are working together
to ensure that the risk of train collision is consistent with an acceptable Target Level of
Safety (TLOS): The target level of safety is the probability of an accident (fatal or hull loss)
during a movement.
These capabilities effectively function in a layered approach. Similar to defense in-depth
and layered information safety architectures, it would take failures at multiple layers to
cause a system failure, resulting in a collision. The risk of collision can be described as a
layered approach, as shown in Fig. 2.9. It takes failures at multiple layers to cause a system
failure [20]. Layer one indicates structures and procedures of the train operation. This layer
is defined in a manner that further reduces risk from the pure random chance, and does not
specifically focus on mitigating the risk of a collision between two trains. The timeliness of
layer one is lower when compared with other four layers. As an instance of the layer one, the
train diagram separates trains in timetables and reduces the potential conflicts, but it has to
be modified based on the actual operation of the train transportation. As the two and three
layers, blocks and movement authority implemented by advanced signaling systems indicate
where the train is allowed to reach, and increase the train transport safety. In layer four, the
railway collision avoidance system services as an assistant system, which effectively reduces
the risk of collision [21]. The last layer is “Driver see and avoid", the driver directly controls
the train and can react to the accident.
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Figure 2.9: Risk layer of collision
Contribution [14] discusses failure events of the train derailments and collisions, and this
reference is highly recommended for beginners. Once a hazardous movement is accepted by
the train, the driver does not know the train is operating a dangerous action until accidents
like collisions or derailments became apparent.
2.4 Emerging technologies: Train-centric
communication control system
To carry out the function of these five layers and to ensure the train safe distance interval,
the train control system plays a very significant role.
In order to meet the increased safety requirements in railway traffic, aforementioned train
control systems are installed in some countries and areas. Most of these control systems are
centralized, especially the Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system. Here the trains are
monitored by devices located along the rail. These devices send the collected information
to an operation control center that can send specific instructions to the train. A European
ATP standard, European Train Control System (ETCS), is intended to replace the various
European ATP systems, in order to protect international train traffic. However, according to
the estimations of the German railway company "Deutsche Bahn" (DB), it could take up to
20 years and cost up to 8 billion Euros to introduce ETCS right across Europe. Additionally,
only the operation control centers have an overall overview of the traffic situation, and a train
driver could only be warned of a hypothetical collision if the operation control center decides
it.
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Hence, some projects are carrying out the research of train-centric communication control
system, which provides a direct communication channel for trains. As a result, it enables
"virtually coupled trains" to operate much closer to one another (within their absolute
braking distance) and dynamically modify their own composition on the move (virtual cou-
pling/uncoupling of train convoys), while ensuring at least the same level of safety as is
currently provided. For example, the Shift2Rail joint venture project contributes to:
• Cutting the life-cycle cost of railway transports by as much as 50%
• Doubling railway capacity
• Increasing reliability and punctuality by as much as 50%
In this project, wireless virtual coupling of trains is further developed. With the assistance of
train to train communications, the virtual coupling breakthrough concept will revolutionize
the paradigm of railways [22]. Similar research is done in the Next Generation Train (NGT)
project [23]. The coupling will be non-mechanical, but virtual and will be maintained by
means of distance control technology. A communication link between the trains can ensure
that if the leading train starts to brake, the following train will do the same and maintain
separation as the two trains slow together.
Based on the technology trend, the train control system should reduce the proportion of
ground facilities [24]. Different from the centralized management systems, some projects
based on the train-centric communication have been carried out in these years.
For instance, Alstom offers a new train-centric communication-based train control system,
which called Urbalis Fluence. Urbalis Fluence is a CBTC solution whose intelligence is
based onboard. This system can carry out the direct train-to-train communication, and
the trains can control switches independently. The train-centric architecture brings better
performances with less equipment. The train-to-train communication significantly reduced
response time for lower headway. What is more, the track resources directly booked by the
train, and the simple architecture can improve system availability and reduce maintenance
cost. As a result, this system’s maintenance costs have been decreased by 20%, and energy
has been saved up to 30% [25].
In order to increase safety in railway traffic, German Aerospace Center introduces a train
collision avoidance system (RCAS), which is a vehicle integrated collision avoidance system
similar to the existing ones in maritime or air transportation. The basic idea of RCAS is to
calculate the own position and movement vector and broadcast this information as well as
additional data like vehicle dimensions to all other trains in the area. This system permits
2.5 Challenges associated with the Train-centric communication system 17
the train-to-train communication, and potential collisions are avoided in the future based on
the system [26]. RCAS can be applied in the scenarios like: regional lines, train stations, and
shunting yards. Main lines with high-speed services are not considered, because there the
safety level is already very high due to extensive technical equipment and train protection
and control mechanisms.
2.5 Challenges associated with the Train-centric
communication system
The challenges associated with the train-centric communication system involve two aspects:
development and implementation.
2.5.1 The system development
The system development procedure involves five different phases: planning, analysis, design,
implementation, and maintenance. These five phases involve different staffs and knowledge.
Hence, how to connect each phase and make sure an efficient information communication is
becoming a challenge. Additionally, the development of safety-critical and also multipurpose
automation systems leads to more and more complex control structure, especially for discrete
and hybrid systems. One approach to solve the problem and to improve the results is to use
so-called formal approaches [27].
For the safety analysis of the system, the formal approaches have been widely used in the
analysis and verification of the train control signal system. For instance, the formal methods
based on CPNs, Unified Modeling Language (UML), automata theory, and so on [28–30].
However, the aforementioned methodologies generally suffer from the following shortcom-
ings:
• Most studies are merely analyzing the system’s partial requirements and characteris-
tics, and lack of effective methods to model and verify the entire system development
and evaluation;
• In some studies’ (such as literatures [31–33]), the system’s modeling process and ac-
tual development are independent. There is a lack to combine these two procedures
together.
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• The heterogeneity between the safety model and the system development makes it
difficult for the model conversion code to be reused.
Given the above issues, this thesis will carry out an in-depth research to promote the signal-
related system modeling, verification and development work further development; to estab-
lish an assistant procedure that starts from the concept of the system to the system design
and system implementation [34].
Different formal methods are available to be applied, and we should find one that can cover
as more requirements as possible. In this thesis, the Petri net is selected. The benefits and
reasons are introduced in chapter 5.2. The relationship between Petri net and the actual
system behavior has to be deeply explored, and the system logical structure needs to be
accurately expressed by Petri net model. The functional safety of the system is verified by
the model test method of CPNs. The Monte Carlo simulation experiment is carried out by
parameterizing the model to obtain the statistical analysis data of the system. Moreover,
based on the safe model produced by the state space, a safe code framework will be generated.
Finally, the code framework will be applied to the actual system programming to save the
time spent on system development to ensure that the safety function calls between the
code.
2.5.2 The system implementation
The train-centric communication system carries out the data exchange between trains. The
fundamental tasks are: obtaining the data and transferring it, which are related to the sensor
technology and communication frequency selection, respectively.
Sensor Technology
Sensor inputs vary in terms of their data content and coordinate systems, their fields of
view, accuracies, and update rates. The task of sensing obstacles in the environment can be
performed by different kinds of sensors, most of which are limited to one degree of freedom.
The fundamental information that a sensor needs to acquire is the range, azimuth, and
elevation of all targets of interest, as shown in Fig. 2.10. If a suite of diverse sensors is used
to detect different targets, the algorithms must deal with these data differences. From the
view of sensors, two different ways to obtain data: active and passive.
There are two fundamental types of sensors to perform the surveillance of collision avoid-
ance:
2.5 Challenges associated with the Train-centric communication system 19
x
z
y
Range distance
Elevation
Azimuth 
Figure 2.10: Sensor degrees
• cooperative sensors, wherein a target transmits information about its position;
• non-cooperative sensors. These kinds of sensors can indirectly sense a target, through
either passively sensing an attribute of the target, or by actively deploying energy to
seek out the target.
Surveillance methods that sense a cooperative target will usually employ a transponder
method by which the target transmits information about its position. Such as the Traffic Col-
lision Avoidance System (TCAS) relies on this method to discover another aircraft. Surveil-
lance methods that sense non-transponder targets indirectly are considered non-cooperative
sensing methods. A target is sensed and tracked, either (1) through passively acquiring
information about the target (e.g., optical camera recording the reflected light, or acoustic
sensor perceiving the target by passively listening); or (2) by actively deploying energy to
seek out the target (e.g., radar which emits an electronic pulse and determine range and
bearing by the angle of sensor and timing of the response, or laser range finder which emits
infrared coherent light and detects reflections).
There are several strategies to manage the shortfalls of the sensor types. One could employ
multiple sensors to cover a larger area, or multiple sensor types. One could reduce the
detection and tracking requirement from fine resolution object tracking to area sensing (i.e.,
if there is anything detected in this sector, avoid the sector). One could simplify the avoidance
reaction maneuvers, so that the sensing requirement is limited.
Frequency Selection
A very important design step is the selection of the frequency band in order to allow a
reliable inter-vehicle communication in the various operational and topological scenarios on
railroads.
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The GSM-R is at about 900 MHz, which is a communication standard for data and voice
based on GSM for European high-speed trains using base stations of sufficient height. In
Japan, a band at 300 MHz is allocated for such applications, whereas in USA and Canada
two bands at 160 MHz and 455 MHz are utilized. For Europe two suitable bands from
456-459 MHz and 460-470 MHz that were marked for railway communication services by the
European Radio communications Committee (ERC).
The core feature of an ad-hoc network is to provide communication services without any
infrastructure or centralized access point. There is no base station to coordinate packet
transmissions. Since the direct train-to-train communication is intended to be used in specific
networks, where the lines conditions should be taken into consideration, and of course the
antennas are just mounted on top of the rail vehicles. That means, we face a much higher
propagation loss in case of direct vehicle-to-vehicle communication.
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3 System safety improvement by
involving train-centric
communication
In this chapter, we evaluate and compare the safety performance of the traditional ETCS-2
and the new system which added train-centric communication module on ETCS equipment.
The new system is an enhanced movement authority system, and it is defined as MA+ in
this thesis.
The necessity of involving train-centric communication system is discussed in section 3.1.
Section 3.2 aims at evaluating the system safety of the MA+ system. In this section, the
overall safety improvement ratio of the new system relative to ETCS-2 is calculated via
MTBF with the assumption that the dangerous side failure rates of all equipment are the
same. Moreover, we take the actual data from Chinese Wuhan-Guangzhou high-speed rail-
way as an example, which shows there would be 24.04 times safety increase providing using
of the new proposal. As involving the train-centric communication system, the train to train
collision can be reduced. Hence, a collision failure model is presented in section 3.3.
3.1 Necessity of applying the train-centric
communication
In 2010, European Directive mentioned that Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) would
be one of the most important transportation technology that will improve transport safety.
Further, developing a system that will establish the communication link between various
parties (e.g. between a car and a train) is the main element of ITS. Nevertheless, the
development of such technology is currently in progress. According to [35], statistics data
has proven that traffic safety can be improved by developing the system that would help and
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support vehicle drivers. This can be a system that assists vehicle drivers and train operators
to avoid accidents [36].
Improving transportation safety requires numerous suitable methods. Reducing transitions
to hazardous operations and increasing transitions to safer operations are the effective and
practicable methods [37]. Limiting the movement violation is one of the efficient and inno-
vative methods to reduce such accidents.
Different technologies have been applied to guarantee the safety of railway transportation.
The latest ETCS-2, which is based on the fixed block principle, safely optimizes the max-
imum capacity of the rail network. The movement authority (MA) together with speed
information and route data are transmitted to the vehicle via the Global System for Mobile
Communications-Railway (GSM-R). However, the train detection and interval supervision
remain in place at the trackside and sensors (axle transducers, accelerometer, and radar).
The train can only passively move based on the MA, and no train to train communication
is available.
Generally, the macroscopic physical movement embodies the following three aspects. As long
as there is no modification in the fundamental character of the railway that involves trains
moving along tracks, these three issues cannot be expected to change in the future [38].
• Scalar magnitude. The train movement is reflected as a position changing on the track.
No moving in a period can be treated as a special movement with a magnitude 0.
• Vector direction. Modified by means of the switch, the train can move in different
directions. It contributes to the vector direction varieties.
• Other objects, such as other trains and switches.
From a safety perspective, the movement under the scalar magnitude and vector direction
should ensure the safety relationship between trains and switches. In current ETCS-2, these
three factors are distributed in the interlocking system and the MA. As shown in Fig. 3.1,
the interlocking details are invisible to trains.
To cover all these three aspects, the MA+ should receive the information of switches and
trains. To obtain this information but without disturbing the original infrastructures, an
additional communication channel, which is available for the direct connection of train-to-
train and train-to-switch, is established.
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Figure 3.1: Movement information in different railway control policies
3.2 The overall system safety calculation of the MA+
In this section, the system safety evaluation carried out by analyzing the train safe distance
interval and overall system safety. The numerical analysis is carried out by calculating the
reliability of the average dangerous side failure probability. The result shows the system
safety increases approximately linearly as the average cost of the wayside equipment relative
to the trains.
Railway safety is an interdisciplinary research discipline [39]. Every new technology must
at least provide an equivalent level of safety, comparable to the system it will improve or
replace [14]. As shown in Fig. 3.2, the original risks of the system hazards are represented
as a deep-blue line, and the green arrow line refers to the reduction of risks due to the
application of the new system. Since each new system has a probability to fail, the risks
originated from the new system are shown as a red arrow line in Fig. 3.2 [40]. Hence, the
yellow line is the probability of hazards with the new system, which we should make it as
low as possible, at least not higher than the original risks of the system.
According to EN 50126 / IEC 62278: Railway applications - The specification and demon-
stration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS), the system safety
can be indicated as the average probability/frequency of dangerous side failure of the safety
system and/or function, which can be shown as:
λus = µ ∗ λ/h (3.1)
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where λ is the failure rate of the system, it is often used to indicate the system reliability;
λus is the failure rate of dangerous side, it is an expression of the system safety; µ is the
coefficient of the dangerous side failure, it is often supposed to be a constant.
The importance of equation (3.1) is that it combines the system safety with reliability. Hence,
the safety evaluation of the new proposal compared with ETCS-2 system can be alternated
to the reliability comparison as shown in equation (3.2).
λusW
λusETCS
=
µW ∗ λW
µETCS ∗ λETCS=$∗
λW
λETCS
(3.2)
where λW , λusW and µW represent the failure, dangerous side failure, and the coefficient of
the dangerous side failure rates of the whole system that with the MA+ module, respectively;
λETCS, λusETCS, and µETCS represent the failure, dangerous side failure, and the coefficient
of the dangerous side failure rates of ETCS-2 system, respectively; $ is the conversion
coefficient of reliability to safety, and it is a constant.
Assuming that the coefficient of the dangerous side failure rates for the new system and the
initial ETCS-2 system are nearly equal, which results in $ ≈ 1. Hence, equation (3.2) can
be rewritten as equation (3.3), which means the safety comparison result nearly equals to
the reliability comparison result.
λusW
λusETCS
≈ λW
λETCS
(3.3)
Our proposal of the new system is a hot-standby redundant safe control structure. In this
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structure, the ATP in ETCS-2 plays a major role while the MA+ module plays a backup
or supervisory role. The system safety can be ensured as long as the ATP or the MA+
equipment operates reliably as designed, or does not fail to the dangerous side. The reliability
block diagram of the whole system is shown in Fig. 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Reliability block diagram of the new system
According to the reliability theory, the reliability of the whole system RW (t) can be calculated
as:
R
W (t) = RETCS(t) +RMA+(t) −RETCS(t) ∗RMA+(t) (3.4)
where R
ETCS(t) and RMA+(t) are the reliability of all the ETCS-2 and MA+ equipment,
respectively.
MTTF is often used to indicate the system reliability. The definition ofMTTF is the definite
integral evaluation of the reliability function [41]. Given that the electronic equipment is
often treated as an exponential distribution with a constant failure rate, MTTF equals to
the reciprocal of the failure rate λt as shown in equation (3.5).
MTTF =
∫ ∞
0
R(t)dt =
1
λt
h (3.5)
The reliability of typical ETCS-2 system depends on the track circuit (TC), the computer
interlocking (CI), the radio block center (RBC), and the ATP module (ATP ) work in
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series [15]. Hence, the MTTF of ETCS-2 is given by equation (3.6).
MTTFETCS =
1
λETCS
=
1
λTC+λCI+λRBC+λATP
=
1
x∑
i=1
λTC[i]+
y∑
j=1
λCI[j]+
z∑
k=1
λRBC[k]+
n∑
m=1
λATP [m]
h
(3.6)
where x, y, z, and n are the number of equipment for each type; λTC , λCI , λRBC , and λATP
are the total failure rates of each equipment type; i, j, k, and m represent the specific one
of the equipment for each type, respectively.
Similarly, the reliability of new MA+ proposal depends on the preceding and the following
train work in series, and every train on the line can be the preceding or following train of
each other. Hence, the MTTF of the MA+ equipment can be calculated as equation (3.7).
MTTFMA+ =
1
λMA+
=
1
n∑
m=1
λMA+[m]
h (3.7)
where MTTFMA+ is the total MTTF of the all the equipment; λMA+ is the total failure rate
of the MA+ proposal. As there is a MA+ equipment for one ATP, its number is n as well.
Combining the equations (3.4) - (3.7), we can obtain the MTTF of the whole system as:
MTTFW =
∫∞
0 RW (t)dt
=
∫∞
0 [R1(t) +R2(t) −R1(t) ∗R2(t)]dt
=
1
λETCS
+
1
λMA+
− 1
λETCS + λMA+
h
(3.8)
In the case that the equipment in signaling system failure leads to dangerous side with a
ratio of 1000:1, and ATP equipment reaches SIL4 with a failure rate 10−9/h. Hence, MTTF
of the track circuit, computer interlocking, radio block center, and ATP are required to be
105 h, so all the failure rates of these equipment will be the same as 10−5/h [15]:
λ = λTC[i] = λCI[j]=λRBC[k] = λATP [m] = λMA+[m] = 10
−5/h (3.9)
Additionally, the MA+ equipment is very similar with the onboard ATP, it is assumed that
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its failure rate equals to ATP. Hence, the reliability and safety increase ratio r is calculated
as shown in equation (3.10).
r =
MTTFW
MTBFETCS
=
1
λETCS
+
1
λMA+
− 1
λETCS + λMA+
1
λETCS
=
1
(x+ y + z + n) ∗ λ +
1
n ∗ λ −
1
(x+ y + z + n) ∗ λ+ n ∗ λ
1
(x+ y + z + n) ∗ λ
= τ + 2− τ + 1
τ + 2
(3.10)
where τ represents the average cost of the wayside equipment, which can be calculated
as equation (3.11); x, y, z, and n are the number of equipment for track circuit, computer
interlocking, radio block center, and ATP, respectively. Obviously, a line with a large number
of wayside equipment and few trains costs much more than a line with few wayside equipment
but lots of trains.
τ =
x+ y + z
n
(3.11)
The limitation of τ can be (0,+∞). Two extreme values indicate two scenarios: a line
with no wayside equipment, and a line with no trains, respectively. So the reliability and
safety increase ratio r can be from 1.5 to positive infinity according to equation (3.10). The
fewer trains and the more wayside equipment in the line, the greater safety performance
improvement through applying the MA+ proposal.
Taking the Chinese “7.23 Railway Accident" as a case study to qualitatively evaluate the
proposal. It is an accident resulted from the failure of the wayside signal system. A rear-end
collision occurred between two trains on the Yongwen High-Speed Line in China on July
23, 2011. After the track circuit was failed after struck by lightning, the wayside Train
Control Center (TCC) subsystem continuously outputting erroneous permit signal. As the
track circuit error, the preceding train executed an emergency stop, then run at speed lower
than 20km/h in on-sight mode. Hence, the preceding train did not leave the track section
timely. Meanwhile, the following train was permitted to enter the section as the TCC fails to
locate the preceding train. Although the driver was informed the existence of the preceding
train by the Operations Control Center (OCC) operator 30 seconds before the accident, it
was too late to stop the following train. The accident resulted in 40 deaths and more than
170 serious injuries. From the cause analysis of the accident and principle of the new MA+
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proposal, we can see that if it were equipped with the MA+ module, the accident would be
avoided by the MA+ module.
To evaluate the proposal objectively and quantitatively, we took Chinese Wuhan-Guangzhou
high-speed railway as another case, where the values of x, y, z and n are 2600, 13, 9, and
114 respectively. We can easily calculate and get the result that r = 24.04. It means the
reliability and safety would increase 24.04 times by using MA+ proposal in this line, which
can bring a significant improvement in the quality of service.
3.3 Train to train collision failure model
Train collision is one of the most serious accidents in railway transportation. There are
three different potential train to train collisions: head-on, rear-end, and flank, as shown in
the Fault Tree Fig. 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Fault Tree of the collision failure model (adapted from Hartong, 2011)
Normally, with the implementation of double track railway, head to head collision is rela-
tively low. Additionally, the track geometry is carefully analyzed before the railway laying.
Hence, the train head to tail collision is the constant concern in railway transportation. It
is the consequence of three possible events as shown in Fig. 3.5: failure to establish correct
routes, failure to enforce routes, and trains over speed for the track conditions resulting in
overrunning limits of authority [14].
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Figure 3.5: Fault Tree of the train head to tail collision model
Failures to establish correct route are attributed to failures of expressing correct movement.
Failure of wayside equipment (FW) and unidentified by the dispatcher (DE), which allows
an unsafe movement or generates false signals, leads to the collision, as the Wenzhou line
accident a case study. This accident resulted from the failure of the wayside signal system.
Although the driver was informed the existence of the preceding train by the Operations
Control Center (OCC) operator 30 seconds before the accident, it was too late to stop the
following train.
The collision is arising from the failure of human factors, which is a leading cause of the
accidents. 86% of train crashes and 33% of derailments are related to human factors [42].
When the wayside equipment and interlocking are out of service, the train dispatcher takes
responsibility for ensuring no two trains are authored to occupy the same track at the same
time. The train crews are responsible for obeying the commands. Hence, failures of the
dispatcher (DE) sets correct routes or allows unsafe train movement to happen, and then
train collisions will occur. For instance, the dispatcher was to blame for trains head-on crash
in Bavaria, Germany.
Failures to enforce a correct route are attributed to the failures of command transmission
and implementation. Failure of the wayside equipment to execute the command (FWEC),
which allows an insecure movement, can be the reason for the system failed to display the
correct route to the crew. Signal information is transferred from the wayside equipment to
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the train, and then to the onboard equipment outputs command. Failures of preventing
against conflicting results could be a failure of receiving the command transmission (FTR).
The control center generates correct routes and signals, but the train failed to enforce it.
Hence, collisions can be the result of a failure of the transmission system to convey the
correct route to the train, failure of the onboard system to generate appropriate braking
commands (FGBC) to protect against conflicting routes, or failure of the braking system
(FEBC) to correctly implement the braking commands.
When applying MA+ into existing train systems, the collision failure model will be modi-
fied. In the failure model, FMT is used to represent the failure of MA+. Since MA+ can
independently obtain the switches’ and forward trains’ positions, even though the wayside
equipment is out of service or the dispatcher sets an incorrect route. Hence, it will pre-
vent unsafe movement caused by wayside equipment and dispatchers. Additionally, as an
extra communication link, the MA+ can avoid accidents caused by failures of the command
transmission.
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4 Enhanced movement authority
system (MA+)
MA+ combines advantages of the train-centric communication with current movement au-
thority mechanisms, as shown in Fig. 4.1. The aim of this chapter intends to provide
researchers the train-to-train distance measurement system (TTDMS), which is the main
component of MA+, and carries out the train distance measurement and data communica-
tion.
MA+
Train-centric communication Train messages data
Onboard equipment TTDMS
Train to train distanceMovement authority
Figure 4.1: components of MA+
Varying from the systems mentioned in publications [25] and [26], the MA+ requires no
additional position and speed measurement system. The essential information is collected
by using the internal wireless Packets generated from ETCS’s Automatic Train Protection
(ATP) system. The external data exchange is implemented via a train-centric communication
unit. Importantly, in order to maximize the utilization of this train-centric communication
unit, we applied distance estimation based on the Time of Arrive (TOA). This strategy can
serve as a backup distance estimation method for the MA+.
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 introduces the MA+ basic
structure and algorithm. Section 4.2 presents the principle of TTDMS. Section 4.3 proposed
a prototype TTDMS, and its reliability is estimated. Section 4.4 discussed two strategies of
train safe distance data acquisition. Section 4.5 calculates the safe distances of traditional
ETCS and the MA+ proposal and compares mathematically to show that the new proposal
in this chapter can work correctly and safely without disturbing the normal control process
of the ETCS system.
4.1 System structure and algorithm of MA+
Based on the technology trends, the train control system should rid of the proportion of
ground faculties, and give trains more individual initiative than the past. Some projects
based on the train-centric communication are carried out in these years [24–26]. In principle,
the MA+ is very similar to the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) in
aeronautical transport.
In order to obtain the extra information without disturbing the original infrastructures,
an additional communication channel is established. It is available for direct connection
between train-to-train and train-to-switch. In the designed MA+, each train broadcasts its
position and movement authority as well as other required information to all other trains in
the area. The MA+ has to receive the information of approaching switches and encountering
trains. In the MA+, new train-centric communication architecture will be installed in each
train, and the switch announcement architecture broadcasts the switch location and situation
repeatedly. Therefore, the MA+ combines advantages of the train-centric communication
and current movement authority mechanisms. Such an infrastructure-less collision avoidance
overlap system has many advantages. For instance, the MA+ can serve as the supplement of
GSM-R to enhance safety. Additionally, during the MA+ communication process, a backup
distance measurement that based on Time of Different Arrive method is possible.
The structure of MA+ is indicated in Fig. 4.2. In the MA+, a new train-centric communi-
cation unit is required to install in each train, and the switch announcement unit broadcasts
the switch’s location and status repeatedly. In the train-centric communication unit, the
transceiver unit is in charge of exchanging train location between different train-centric
communication units, and receiving the information from switch announcement units. The
MA+ algorithm analyzes the received information both from other train-centric communi-
cation units and the ATP equipment, and outputs results. The digital map provides the
description of all the railway-related data including the infrastructure (the railway tracks,
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stations, signals, line topology, and length, etc.), the parameters of the rolling stocks and
other control equipment, the timetable (schedule), and so on [43]. The TTDMS can carry
out the distance interval measurement as a backup strategy, more details are discussed in
the following subsection.
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Figure 4.2: Structure of MA+
As presented in section 3.1, the MA only contains the train interval information but lacks the
information of the interlocking and preceding train’s position. Hence, the MA+ proposed
in this chapter intends to monitor the train distance interval based on the moving block
principle, and to provide interlocking information based on a digital map. The performance
of MA+ highly depends on the resolution of the localization used. Hence, two strategies are
proposed for the acquisition of train distance interval data:
• Normal strategy: in order to distinguish each train on the tracks based on position,
the Train Messages (TM) and digital map, which can be abstracted from the onboard
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equipment, are involved in the high correctness distance estimation.
• Backup strategy: when the onboard equipment or its connection with RBC is ab-
normal, the train-centric communication unit can estimate the train distance interval
based on the TTDMS, which uses the TOA method to calculate the distance.
Taking the operation scenario in Fig. 4.2 as a case study. This scenario splits into two
communication parts: train-to-switch and train-to-train. The train-to-switch communication
link permits the train obtaining the Switch messages, which involves the switch’s position
and status. The train-to-train communication exchanges the TM between the following and
preceding trains. The TM including train’s speed, position, direction, ID, and length can be
obtained from the onboard equipment, and be transferred to other trains.
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Figure 4.3: Flow chart of the MA+ algorithm
The logical model of the MA+ algorithm can be described as shown in Fig. 4.3. The MA+
starts from the IDLE mode. After obtaining and decoding the basic information from the TM,
the MA+ matches the digital map (DMM) and obtains the track data (DT). The following train
detects the preceding train and calculates the train distance interval based on the TM (HD_TM)
when the onboard equipment operates functionally (SA). If the TM from the preceding train
is not available, the TOA distance estimation unit can implement the distance measurement
(D_TOA). Afterwards, the MA+ obtains the information of the track and vehicles (DTV). In
the following steps, it detects the front switches (SM). If there is not switch in the detection
range, the MA+ update the MA+ ( MAU). Otherwise, the MA+ turns into the corresponding
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mode, which involves digital map, track data, vehicles, and switch information (DTVS), then
updates the MA+.
4.2 System principle of TTDMS
In this section, the principle and operation model of the TTDMS are described. The distance
between two trains is calculated based on the TOA. The system application scenarios and
block diagram are presented.
Physical space separation is a fundamental safety protection for trains. The primary goal
is to obtain distance information between two trains in time. The mechanism of obtaining
distance information is to determine a train’s absolute position, for instance with Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), balise, or track circuit. Radar, speed sensors, and
spread spectrum communication can place the train’s relative position.
The TTDMS is based on the Time of Arrival (TOA) method to get distance information
[8]. Importantly, it does not rely on other systems such as Global Position System (GPS),
GLONASS, and so on. The information can be directly transferred between trains without
involving the Centralized Traffic Control (CTC). Trains equipped with the TTDMS have a
"See and Avoid" ability, which is already widely applied in aviation areas [44].
The technology applied in this TTDMS is using the time duration of wireless signals transfer
in the air between the sender and the receiver to calculate the distance [45]. In this chapter,
the TOA calculation relies on the characteristics of spread spectrum communication. The
details of TOA estimation can be found in section 4.4. The time consumed by signal trans-
mission can be captured using autocorrelation of pseudorandom noise (PRN) code [46]. With
PRN code involved, the signal sequence has an autocorrelation attribution. Here, based on
the TOA and PRN theories, radio transmission characteristics can be used to obtain the
distance between two trains. At the same time, necessary information can be added to the
communication code, such as train ID, velocity, and other control information.
Similar technologies have been applied in different fields. Some other organizations also have
research in this technology. For example, in German Aerospace Center a Railway Collision
Avoidance System was proposed by Prof. Dr. Thomas Strang and his team [26, 47]. Other
examples are the Advanced Automatic Train Control (AATC) system used in San Francisco
[48], the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System applied in the U.S. Army [49], and
a train-centric CBTC solution putted forward by Alstom [25].
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The TTDMS application scenarios and general process are shown in Fig. 4.4. It starts from
surveillance mode, and then the following train tries to detect nearby trains equipped with
TTMDS. After the communication is established, the following train sends a sequence with
a PRN code sequence to the detected train, and the detected train feeds back the sequence
after it has received it. The system analyzes the TOA information and generates results
which involve, but are not limited to, distance and alarm information.
Since the TTDMS obtains the distance information based on TOA, the train-centric com-
munication condition is important. The communication process involves connection estab-
lishment, transmission error, and disconnection. All these factors could cause an impact on
calculation results. The system communication part provides distance measurement infor-
mation for the TTDMS, the approaching information of other nearby trains is available to
the following trains, as shown in Fig. 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Application scenarios and general process
By applying the TTDMS, each train can have an overview of its surrounding environment,
even though the ATP has lost the connection with the train control center. The train can
still detect the distance between nearby trains, at the same time other trains can also detect
it. The TTDMS can provide essential information for its service train, no matter whether
other onboard systems are under normal operation or failed state. The TTDMS can work
as an assistance system by providing essential and useful data for the service train. As a
result, the TTDMS can improve the railway operation safety in some scenarios.
The TTDMS’s application scenarios and block diagram are depicted in Fig. 4.5. The
system starts from surveillance mode, and then the following train tries to detect nearby
trains equipped with TTDMS. After the communication is established, the following train
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sends a sequence with PRN code to the detected train, and the detected train re-sends the
sequence after its reception. The system analyzes the TOA information and outputs results,
which involve amongst others the distance and alarm information.
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Figure 4.5: Application scenarios and block diagram of TTDMS
4.3 Actual TTDMS reliability estimation
To further the system principle into the engineering implementation, we proposed a prototype
machine, which is applied to do actual measurements in metro lines. The prototype machine
is as shown in Fig. 4.6. It operates at frequency 1.2 GHz with a peak power <10 mW.
Because of the antenna power limitation and hardware ability, the experimental data was
obtained in straight road scenarios at a distance of 1000 meters and 500 meters in tunnel
scenarios. Fig. 4.7 is the system’s application scenario in a tunnel.
Hundred percent reliable railway systems do not exist. System failures cannot be avoided.
The overall failure rate of a system can be represented by λsystem, it should be as low as
possible. The consequences of the system’s failure can be divided into two groups, hazardous
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Figure 4.6: TTDMS prototype machine
Figure 4.7: TTDMS prototype machine application scenario in tunnel
and safe faulty states. λh and λs are used to represent the failure rates of these two faulty
states, respectively.
Failure rates of electronic components can be divided into three periods, as shown in Fig. 4.8.
It includes early failures, random failures, and wear out failures. Each section is described
with its Weibull distribution as λ (t) = b
T
· Ä t
T
äb−1 [41]. Here, b is the shape parameter of
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failure slope. T is the characteristic lifetime. t is the service time. For electronic components,
a burn-in process is required, which makes the components enter into the random failures
period. At this period, the shape parameter is 1.0. Hence, the failure rates are constants.
The manually burning process is shown in Fig. 4.9.
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Figure 4.8: Failure rates and Weibull parameter b
Figure 4.9: Manually burning
For the TTDMS, the CPN model will reflect the main function of the TTDMS. The distance
measurement unit implements the distance measurement. As shown in Fig. 4.10, the whole
TTDMS involves different units: Power supply Module (DC), Baseband Module (BM), Dis-
tance Measurement Module (DM), Input and Output Module (IO), and Display Module
(DIS).
At this period the failure rates are constants [41]. The failure rate (λunit) of an unit mentioned
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above is shown in equation (4.1).
λunit=
n∑
i=1
Ni(λGipiQi) h
−1 (4.1)
where λGi, piQi, and Ni are the general failure rate, quality, and quantity of the electronic
component i, respectively. The calculations of the reliability prediction of electronic equip-
ment can be carried out according to MIL-HDBK-217. Based on the MIL-HDBK-217, the
failure rates of different modules are calculated.
Table 4.1: Failure rates values
Failure rate type Numerical value ×10−6h−1 MTBF (h)
λDC 18.7 53225
λBM 20.5 48852
λDM 19.3 51803
λIO 17.2 58102
λDIS 22.3 44782
For a series system with constant device failure rates, Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) is
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defined as
MTTFSERIES =
∞∫
0
RSERIES (t) dt =
∞∫
0
[R1 (t)×R2 (t)× · · · ×Ri (t)]dt
=
∞∫
0
e
−
Å
n∑
i=1
λi
ã
dt =
1
n∑
i=1
λi
(4.2)
where Ri and λi are the reliability and failure rate of device i, respectively.
Consider a two device parallel system that has devices A and B , the MTTFPARALLEL is
given by:
MTTFPARALLEL =
∞∫
0
RPARALLEL (t) dt =
∞∫
0
[RA (t) +RB (t)−RA (t)×RB (t)]dt
=
∞∫
0
î
e−λAt + e−λBt − e−(λA+λB)tó dt = 1
λA
+
1
λB
− 1
λA + λB
(4.3)
Hence, the reliabilities of DC, BM, DM, IO, and DIS modules are shown in equations (4.4),
(4.5), (4.6), (4.7), and (4.8), respectively.
RDCModule(t) = 2e
−λDCt − e−2λDCt (4.4)
RBMModule(t) = 2e
−λBM t − e−2λBM t (4.5)
RDMModule(t) = 2e
−λDM t − e−2λDM t (4.6)
RIOModule(t) = e
−λIOt (4.7)
RDISModule(t) = e
−2λDISt (4.8)
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Substituting the reliabilities into theMTTFSERIES definition yields, the MTTF of the overall
system is given by:
MTTFsystem =
∞∫
0
[RDC (t)×RBM (t)×RDM (t)×RIO (t)×RDIS (t)]dt
= 16908 h
(4.9)
The core mission of the TTMDS is implementing the distance measurement. It is carried
out by the DC, BM and DM units. Hence, the failure rate of the unsafe state is:
λh =
1
∞∫
0
RDC (t)×RBM (t)×RDMdt
= 2.79× 10−5 h−1 (4.10)
To specify this equipment’s adequate reliability level, we refer to the Safety integrity level
(SIL), as shown in Table 4.2. This TTDMS equipment reaches SIL 4 in the low-demand
mode of operation, which was also as a result of parallel structures.
Table 4.2: Quantitative SIL requirements
Safety Integrity Level
Low-demand mode of operation High-demand mode of operation
Average Probability of Failure on
Demand (PFDavg )/activation
Probability of dangerous Failure
per Hour (PFH)/h
SIL 4 10−5 ≤ PFDavg < 10−4 10−9 ≤ PFH < 10−8
SIL 3 10−4 ≤ PFDavg < 10−3 10−8 ≤ PFH < 10−7
SIL 2 10−3 ≤ PFDavg < 10−2 10−7 ≤ PFH < 10−6
SIL 1 10−2 ≤ PFDavg < 10−1 10−6 ≤ PFH < 10−5
It implies that the TTDMS can provide a considerable hardware reliability in actual imple-
mentation.
4.4 Train safe distance interval data acquisition of MA+
This chapter calculates the safe distance interval between two following trains to show its
feasibility. Calculation of the train safe distance interval by MA+ is somewhat like the way
of moving block system. If the interval between two following trains is shorter than the
safe range due to any reasons, such as an equipment failure or unsafe interaction between
ATP and the train, or the RBC dysfunctionality, the MA+ equipment will output a control
instruction to the driver or execute brake action directly. As a result, the MA+ can enhance
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the safety of train tracking without influencing the train operation under the protection of
ATP equipment.
In the MA+, there are two strategies to carry out the calculation of the train safe distance
interval. As illustrated in Fig. 4.3, the first one is based on TM and the digital map (HD_TM);
the second one is based on the TOA distance estimation (D_TOA).
4.4.1 Normal strategy: high correctness distance estimation
When the ATP onboard equipment operates functionally, it can generate the train’s position
with high precision. In ETCS-2, the train localization is based on the absolute position
information from balises and the odometry onboard. The uncertainty of balise’s position
and geographic data is given with typically 5 m; odometry error resulting from tachometer
is provided with typically 1% of the distance from the last balise [21].
MA+ algorithm receives and decodes all the data coming from ATP onboard equipment and
transceiver unit. Fig. 4.11 indicates the TM exchanging process. The TM is obtained from
the Packets of radio messages. Table 4.3 indicates partial definitions of Packets, which are
essential in composing the MA+. Packet 0 contains details of train position information. The
train’s position, speed and driving directions are available in variables D_LRBG, V_TRAIN
and Q_DIRTRAIN, respectively. Variable L_TRAIN in Packet 11 indicates the real length
of the train. NID_OPERATIONAL is the train’s running number in Packet 5.
Table 4.3: Packet 0, 11 and 5 (partial)
Variable Comment Direction of the information
Packet 0
D_LRBG Distance between the LRBG and the train
Train to trackV_TRAIN Actual train speed
Q_DIRTRAIN Direction of train movement
Packet 11
L_TRAIN the absolute real length of the train Train to track
Packet 5
NID_OPERATIONAL Train running number ID Train to track
In the MA+ system, the following train can obtain the location detail of the preceding train
through the transceiver unit, and calculate the train distance interval after matching with
the digital map.
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Figure 4.11: TM exchanging process
4.4.2 Backup strategy: TTDMS
When the ATP onboard equipment or its connection with RBC is abnormal, the TTDMS
can estimate the train distance interval based on the TOA method [50]. The TOA method
calculates the train distance interval by measuring the time duration (τ) of wireless signal
transfers between two trains. Obtaining the time consumed by signal transmission is the
first step to calculate the distance, since
L =
τ
2
× C m (4.11)
where L represents the distance from a following train to a preceding train. C is the velocity
of light, C = 3 · 108 m/s.
The autocorrelation of the PRN code is used to capture the τ , which is hard for the hardware
to measurement directly. The PRN code generation process is not introduced in this paper,
reference [51] introduces different spreading codes.
For truly random sequences u(t) and w(t), which are infinite and statistically independent,
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the correlation function is defined as:
Ruw (τ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
u (t)w∗ (t− τ)dt (4.12)
It is not realizable to generate a truly random chip sequence in engineering, but the periodic
PRN code provides a close approximation. For instance, the maximal-length m−sequences
with Nc chips, which can be generated through an n−element shift register [52]. The PRN
code generation process is not introduced in this chapter, however, [51] introduced different
spreading codes. The correlation function of the m−sequence is given by:
R (τ) =
 1−
Nc+1
Nc
|τ |
Tc
, τ = 0 (modNc)
− 1
Nc
, τ 6= 0 (modNc)
(4.13)
s(t) and x(t) are the signals transferred from the following train and received by the detected
train, respectively.
x(t) = s(t) +m(t) (4.14)
where m(t) and n(t) are the channel noise, which are statistically independent.
y(t) is the signal transferred from the detected train and received by the following TTDMS,
thus
y (t) = s (t− τ0) + n (t) +m (t) (4.15)
where τ0 is the time difference between the original and received signals. The correlation
function of s(t) and y(t) is given by
Rsy (τ) = E [y (t+ τ) · s (t)] =
E [s (t+ τ − τ0) · s (t)] + E [s (t) · n (t+ τ)] +
E [m (t+ τ) · s (t)]
(4.16)
As channel noise n(t), m(t) and the original signal s(t) are statistically independent. Hence,
E [s (t) · n (t+ τ)] = 0 (4.17)
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E [m (t+ τ) · s (t)] = 0 (4.18)
the equation (4.16) can be simplified as:
Rsy (τ) = E [s (t+ τ − τ0) · s (t)] = Rs (τ − τ0) (4.19)
The time offset of the signal is shown in Fig. 4.12. The original signal transferred from
the following train is s(t), and x(t) is the signal received by the preceding train. Hence,
x(t) = s(t)+m(t), wherem(t) is the channel noise. The signal transferred from the preceding
train and received by the following train is y(t).
Figure 4.12: Original and with time delay PRN sequences
Taking the time offset in Fig. 4.12 as a case study, the frequency of the original PRN
sequence s(t) is 2 MHz, the time delay between y(t) and s(t) is τ0 = 16Tc , Tc = 5× 10−7s.
Based on the correlation definition, when τ = τ0 , Rsy (τ − τ0) has a peak point, and the
corresponding peak point locates at the 16th code element.
As the length of the PRN sequence is Nc = 63, the peak points interval is 63 code elements.
Fig. 4.13 shows the correlation calculation results of s(t) and y(t), a maximally sharp
correlation peak appears at the 16th code element. Hence, the minor time delay can be
calculated by finding out the corresponding peak point. The distance between two trains is
1200 m.
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TOA distance estimation flow chart is shown in Fig. 4.14. s(t) is the original signal trans-
ferred from the following train, y(t) is signal resent from the preceding train and received
by the following train, m(t) and n(t) are the channel noises. The following train does the
correlation calculation between the original signal s(t) and the received signal y(t), the τ0
can be obtained. The principle of calculating τ0 is introduced in reference [34].
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Figure 4.14: TOA distance estimation flow chart
Note that the T has to be modified before actual application, since
T = τ0 − Tz − Tj (4.20)
where τ0 is total time consumption; Tz and Tj are the time consumed by hardware processing
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and calculation, respectively. Tz is a constant value which can be measured in the hardware
design. Tj is related to τ0 and the solution algorithm applied in actual hardwares.
In engineering, the maximum detection distance lmax of this method can be estimated by
the equation (4.21) [53] .
lmax =
[
PtG
2λ2σ
(4pi)3Smin
] 1
4
m (4.21)
where Pt is the transmit power of transceiver unit; G is the antenna gain; λ is the carrier
wave frequency; σ is the effective reflective; Smin is the minimum detectable signal.
To implement the system function, a basic block diagram of TTDMS is illustrated in Fig.
4.5. The hardware design will not be discussed here. The PRN generator is responsible for
the generation of a PRN code, and the properties of the PRN code control the maximum
detection distance and minimum resolution, which will be discussed in section 4.4.2.
Since PRN is often generated from cyclic codes (m-sequences, gold sequences), the resulting
correlation graph (Fig. 4.13) shows different peaks. As such, ambiguity may appear. The
maximum unambiguous detection of distance is limited by the length of PRN, as shown in
equation (4.22). The minimum resolution (Pr) is affected by the code rate of PRN, as shown
in equation (4.23).
Lu =
Nc · C · Tc
2
m (4.22)
Pr =
C
2 ·Rc =
C · Tc
2
m (4.23)
where Lu is the maximum unambiguity detection distance, Nc is the periodic length of PRN,
Rc is the code rate of PRN.
Different carrier waves are applied in different situations. The proper combination of the
carrier wave and the antennas can provide a better propagation, and a larger detection
distance can be achieved.
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4.5 Performance improvement by MA+
The safety improvement by MA+ is analyzed, a procedure is introduced, and the results
indicate that the new proposal is flexible and scalable enough for the improvement of railway
safety.
4.5.1 Train safe distance interval protected by ATP on-board in
ETCS-2
In ETCS-2, the ATP on-board protects the train operation based on the speed-distance
monitoring curve, as shown in Fig. 4.15 (a) [54]. First, according to the route and occupation
condition of the track section, the RBC generates and sends MA to the ATP. Second, the
ATP calculates the permitted speed for every train location according to four categories of
data, which are MA, temporary speed restriction, track data, and train data. Third, the
ATP compares the actual speed with the permitted speed, if the actual speed exceeds the
limitation of brake intervention, the ATP will generate a brake command to reduce the train
speed.
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Figure 4.15: Train safe distance interval calculation by ATP and MA+ overlay equipment
respectively
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In ETCS-2, the End Of Authority (EOA) of the following train locates at the entry point of
the block section, which is occupied by the preceding train. Thus, the safe distance interval
guaranteed by ATP is given by equation (4.25):
LEOA = Ld1 + Lb1 + Lr1 (4.24)
LATP = Ld1 + Lb1 + Lr1 + Ls + Lt + Lm1 (4.25)
where
LATP : safe distance interval when protected by ATP (m);
Ld1: additional distance for ATP equipment delay (m), which can be calculated as
Ld1 = v ∗ treaction1 (4.26)
where treaction1 represents the time delay (s) for ATP equipment to react to EOA, v represents
the train speed(m/s).
Lb1: brake distance calculated by ATP (m), which is a function of the train speed, train
performance, and line parameters;
Lr1: reserved safety distance (m);
Ls: distance from EOA to the rear end of the preceding train in ETCS-2 (m), which can be
the length of a block section in the worst case;
Lt: length of the train (m);
Lm1: position changing of the preceding train, which relates to the train speed and specific
time delay. It is given by equation (4.27):
Lm1 = v ∗ (t11 + ttc + t12 + tIL + t13 + trbc + t14) (4.27)
where t11, t12, t13, t14 represent the time delay (s) for the track circuit to detect the train
position, message transmission from track circuit to interlocking, from interlocking to RBC,
and from RBC to ATP, respectively; ttc, tIL, trbc represent the processing time (s) of track
circuit system, interlocking, and RBC respectively.
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4.5.2 Train safe distance interval protected by MA+ overlay system
The MA+ equipment also protects the train operation with a speed-distance curve. The safe
distance interval calculation method provided by MA+ is similar with ETCS-2 as shown in
Fig. 4.15 (b). In the following train, the MA+ equipment gets an EOA independently based
on the safe rear end of the preceding train. This EOA is applied to calculates the permitted
speed and protects the train operation in the MA+.
Hence, the safe distance interval guaranteed by LMA+ is given by equation (4.28):
LMA+ = Ld2 + Lb2 + Lr2 + Lt + Lm2 (4.28)
where
LMA+: safe distance interval when protected by MA+ (m);
Ld2: additional distance for MA+ equipment delay (m), which can be calculated as:
Ld2 = v ∗ treaction2 (4.29)
where treaction2 represents the time delay (s) for the MA+ equipment to react to the EOA.
Lb2: brake distance calculated by MA+ equipment (m), which is the same with Lb1;
Lr2: reserved safety distance by the MA+ system (m);
Lt: length of the train (m);
Lm2: position changing of the preceding train (m). Lm2 can be calculated as equation (4.30):
Lm2 = v ∗ (tMA+ + t21) (4.30)
where tMA+ is the time delay for the MA+ module to locate itself and send out its position
(s), t21 is the time delay for message transmission from the preceding train to the following
train (s).
4.5.3 Comparison of the train safe distance interval
Based on the analysis in section 4.5.1 and 4.5.2, we can compare all the components and
parameters to find out the performance improvements through applying MA+. It is assumed
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that, the train length, speed, reaction time, and the line parameters in both proposals are
the same or nearly equal respectively. Hence, the additional distance for equipment delay,
brake distance, and reserved safety distance are nearly equal, respectively, which means:
Ld1 ≈ Ld2
Lb1 ≈ Lb2
Lr1 ≈ Lr2
(4.31)
Furthermore, by comparing equations (4.25), (4.28), we can get the main performance im-
provement:
• In the MA+ proposal there is no Ls, as the EOA of the following train is the safe
rear end of the preceding train’s end. However, the EOA is the block section entry in
ETCS-2;
• Lm2 < Lm1, as the time delay for the MA+ proposal is much less than it in ETCS-2.
We can reasonably assume that the time delay for message transmission via wireless
channels in both proposal is the same; the processing time for MA+ is no more than
Track Circuit module, which means t21 < t13 and tMA+ < ttc. Hence, this deduction
based on equations (4.27) and (4.30) is obtained.
Based on these two differences, we can get LMA+ < LATP , which indicates that there is a
big decrease of the safe distance interval from the ETCS-2 to MA+ proposal. In another
word, the MA+ equipment can brake later than ETCS-2 under the premise of keeping trains’
safe separation. It is clear to find out that the MA+ proposal can assure the system safety
without disturbing the normal protection function in ETCS-2, which is of great importance
for a backup equipment.
To prove the effectiveness of the MA+, we also calculated the safe distance interval in ETCS-
3. Although it is still in the conceptual stage, ETCS-3 is an upgrade level of ETCS-2. Hence,
it is useful to make the comparison between the MA+ proposal and ETCS-3. In ETCS-3,
the RBC receives the safe location of the preceding train, which is generated by the ATP,
and sends it to the following train as the EOA, and the train is operated based on the moving
block theory. Hence, the time in both ATP and RBC should be taken into consideration.
The position change in ETCS-3 Lm3 can be calculated as:
Lm3 = v ∗ (tatp + t15 + trbc + t11) (4.32)
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where tatp is the processing time for ATP in the preceding train to locate itself and send
its position to RBC; t15 and t11 are the time consumed by the message transition from the
preceding train to RBC and from RBC to the following train, respectively; trbc represents
the RBC processing time, including the communication cycle between RBC and On-Board
ATP.
To see it intuitively, we simulate and obtain the safe distances under different train speeds in
three different solutions. The value of the parameters we use in the simulation are shown as
table 4.4, most of the parameters are the typical value in the Chinese High-Speed Railway
[55].
Table 4.4: Parameters used in the simulation
Time Parameters treaction1 t11 t12 t13 t14 ttc tIL trbc treaction2 t21 tMA+ tatp t15
Value (s) 1 0.5 0.05 0.2 0.5 2 0.2 6 1 0.1 0.2 6 0.5
Length Parameters Lr1 Ls Lt Lr2
Value (m) 200 2000 416 200
As shown in Fig. 4.16, the safe distance interval in MA+ is much less than it in ETCS-2
and ETCS-3 at any speed. As has analyzed before, the main reasons for the safe distance
interval decrease are the elimination of the fixed block length in ETCS-2, and the time saved
from direct train-to-train real time communication compared with a lot of processing nodes
and time delay in ETCS-2 and ETCS-3. ETCS-2 relies on the RBC to send the EOA to
ATP based on fixed block principle, so the safe distance interval is always much longer than
it in MA+.
The results also indicate that the safe distance interval in ETCS-3 is much shorter than it
is in ETCS-2 at low speed, but the gap decreases quickly as the speed grows. There are two
reasons for this situation: i) the safe distance interval in ETCS-2 includes a block section
length Ls, which makes the distance interval longer than it in ETCS-3; ii) position changing
of the preceding train Lm1 in ETCS-2 is shorter than Lm3 in ETCS-3, as the sum of all the
message transmission delay time in equation (4.27) is less than it in equation (4.32). Hence,
when the train speed is getting lower, the block section length weights higher and the gap
between these two levels is bigger; as the train speed grows, the gap becomes smaller.
This is also one of the main reasons why the adjacent MA+ module should communicate
with each other much more frequently (every process cycle time, 0.2 s) than ATP with RBC
in ETCS-2 or ETCS-3 (every communication cycle time, 6 s), so MA+ is better than ETCS-3
as we can see in Fig. 4.16. As a result, the MA+ proposal can work well as a backup module
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for ETCS-2 and even for ETCS-3, which can brake later when the main system fails and
still be able to ensure system safety.
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Figure 4.16: Safe distance interval in different speed
4.6 Summary
Except for the train-centric wireless communication architecture, other hardware and in-
formation are shared between the new movement authority system and existing onboard
equipment. Integrating with the existing onboard equipment, this system has two strategies
to carry out the train distance interval calculation. Importantly, TTDMS solution is possible
in emergency situations. For example, the onboard equipment outputs erroneous commands
or the connection between train and waysides equipment is abnormal.
Additionally, it was crucial to confirm the safety of hardware design, and to guarantee the
system correctness. Hence, the reliability of a prototype TTDMS was estimated. However,
to compare with the actual data, a new TTDMS prototype machine can be developed, which
has a further detection distance, and the experimental data can be collected in real train
operation scenarios. What is more, it can permit the consideration of both simulated and
analyzed real data.
For the system safety analysis, an approach was proposed to calculate the safe distance
interval and dangerous side failure rate of the new proposal compared with the traditional
ETCS-2 system. The results indicated that the safety increase ration is greater than 1.5,
especially this new system is more suitable for the lines with few trains and more wayside
equipment.
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5 System modeling and validation by
means of Petri nets
Validation, verification, and evaluation are necessary processes to assure the safety and
functionality of a system before its implementation in practice. As suggested in EN 50128
[56], in the area of railway application, the techniques of formal methods are suitable to do
the system requirements specification, design, implementation, as well as modeling.
In this chapter, we introduce the formal methods that can be applied to do system evaluation
and verification, and the benefits of using CPNs in this thesis. Afterwards, basic definitions
of CPNs and tools for the application of Petri nets are presented. Finally, the methods that
can refer to the qualitative items and quantitative values in the CPN Tools are illustrated.
5.1 Evaluation methodology
A system has to be evaluated during its life cycle. The evaluation results provide essential
information for system design and improvement. System performance represents the effec-
tiveness (safety or reliability) of a system. The performance verification helps engineers to
have a better understanding of the system before its application in practice. Model and
simulation can obtain the information about how a system reacts, without actually observ-
ing the data from experiments in practice. With proper parameterization, the model can
represent fundamental aspects of the system, and obtain data that is either hard or costly
to replicate in the real world.
A parameterized analysis is possible in the simulation process. The system accuracy in-
dicates how well the system operates. It can analyze the system according to reasonable
parameterizations. Product data is the basis of information technologies in development
and manufacturing processes. The data arises in the complete life cycle of a product and
are required in all departments of production enterprises.
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The evaluation methodology helps one better understand the system [57]. There are four
main steps in the evaluation methodology:
• Determine the parameters of the evaluation.
• Determine the methods used for the evaluation.
• Set requirements and collect data.
• Analyze and make conclusions.
There are a number of operational and technical questions that must be explored as a basis
for evaluating these capabilities. As an example, fault tree is necessary to evaluate the
whole system reliability, but insufficient to provide the performance details. See Table 5.1.
A number of evaluation methods were examined for their applicability to answering relevant
questions. These methods are scoped as follows:
Mathematical calculation: Based on scientific formula derivation to estimate the system
behaviors, and to include component evaluation of a technology in the operational setting
under controlled environmental conditions.
Fault Tree and Hazard Analysis: Techniques used to ensure that a system behaves as
needed when parts fail.
Model checking: Given a model of a system function, exhaustively and automatically
check whether this model meets a given functional specification
Monte Carlo Simulation: combines kind of models for each technology to capture the
statistical distributions. Permits extensive testing runs that may not be practical under real
operating conditions; used to scope the performance bounds of the technology.
Laboratory Simulation: provides operating capabilities in a simulated environment, to
supplement field testing and as a precursor to operational evaluations; frequently done in
parallel to advance the understanding of the technology.
Operational Evaluation: provides a full range of testing to prove that a technology fulfills
a specification or standard. Includes limited deployment in the operational environment.
Performance Monitoring: adds to the technology experience data, by evaluating it in
use, under standard operating conditions.
Table 5.1 maps evaluation methods to some of the potential research and development ques-
tions that exist in the aviation community. No one evaluation method can answer all the
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questions. Thus a well constructed set of tests must be developed to sufficiently support
evaluation, verification, and certification of collision avoidance capabilities.
Table 5.1: Evaluation methods, and the questions that can be addressed
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Are the system structure correct?
√
Can a specific reaction be implemented?
√ √ √
Is the model correct?
√
Does the system function together?
√ √ √ √ √ √
Does system provide safe separation from trains?
√ √ √ √ √ √
Does collision avoidance algorithms react in an acceptable way for
other trains?
√ √ √ √ √
What are the limits of the system? Conditions? Range? Reliability?
√ √ √ √ √ √
How well the system performance? i.e., time delay
√ √ √ √ √ √
What is the overall system performance?
√ √ √ √ √
What does the system range?
√ √ √ √
5.2 Formal methods for system evaluation and
verification
The train protection system is a safety-critical system. The development of train protection
system has been to reduce the reliance upon and the responsibility placed on train drivers to
maintain safe separation between trains. It has been done by providing different improved
signaling systems. The issues related to system safety are of primary importance [58]. To
assure safety and functionality of each system before its application, an efficient development
and analysis procedure that can perform verification and validation analysis is essential.
Various methods can be applied to evaluate the reliability performance of the safety-related
system. For instance, fault tree analysis [59], Bayesian network [60], and Markov Analysis
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[61]. However, fault tree analysis is based on the assumption that all items obey Bernoulli
distribution, which is not suitable to represent practical systems [62]. The Bayesian network
cannot deal with system functional safety evaluation. Markov chain does not allow the use
of non-exponential statistical. Importantly, real systems require a higher formalization level
to describe.
As the high level Petri nets, Colored Petri Nets (CPNs) describe system actions and states
by using definitions of different color sets and data manipulation. The aim of this thesis is
to validate, verify and evaluate the target system’s properties by means of CPNs. Hence, an
approach is proposed in this thesis for the evaluation and verification of system description
and development. Importantly, different from most analysis methodologies for systems that
only perform simulations to verify the systems’ performance or the correctness of system
functions, this approach provides both functional safety evaluation and simulation-based
verification. CPNs can carry out these requirements.
There are several motivations using CPNs:
• CPNs have a discrete-event modeling language, which combines basic Petri nets with
the functional language Standard ML (SML);
• CPNs describe system actions and states using the definition of different color sets and
data manipulation;
• and CPNs support modeling, formal analysis, and simulation [62].
For these purposes, CPN method is chosen to implement the formalization. What is more,
Petri nets have been applied for the modeling and evaluation of safety-critical systems
[63–66], such as a multitude of successful research projects implemented by Institut für
Verkehrssicherheit und Automatisierungstechnik (iVA), Technische Universität Braunschweig,
Germany. These are motivations using CPNs for a model based reliability analysis and eval-
uation.
More importantly, taking into account that railway-related systems are highly complex sys-
tems in aspects of functionality as well as dependability [67], a procedure is proposed to
analyze the system safety and security during the TTDMS development. Formal methods,
e.g. Petri nets, are suggested in EN 50128 for railway applications’ system design as well as
modeling [56].
In the railway domain, UML, the B method, Petri nets and other varieties of modeling
languages have been applied to describe railway application systems [63]. UML is usually
used to model the system and software functionality, but is not suitable for structural analysis
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and formal proof. The B method is mainly used for function modeling and proof as well
the source code generation. CPNs, as one of such formal methods, permit the description
of a system in development phases as diverse as system requirements specification, design,
evaluation, and coding [34].
CPNs are usually applied in the modeling of systems and the verification of software function-
alities [68]. Additionally, the reachability graph is used for the actual software development
down to source code generation. Hence, CPNs are used as the formal method to provide a
framework of the system, and a proper software needs to model the system structure and
analyze the system performance.
The systems development lifecycle can be divided into two main sections, as shown in Fig.
5.1 [56]. CPNs can be applied into the whole period to implement the system description,
evaluation, and verification. What is more, the CPNs can also be applied to carry out the
system performance evaluation after the system implementation, and more details can be
found in our previous publication [34].
Requirement analysis 
Functional safety concept 
System architecture design
Technical safety
SW/HW requirements
Safety evaluation
SW/HW architecture & design
SW implementation
HW construction
SW/HW integration/verification test
SW/HW testing (validation)
System integration/validation 
test
System test
System validation
(Safety) validation
(Safety) verification
System description and development System performance evaluation
SW (software)
HW (hardware)
Figure 5.1: Systems engineering and verification
5.3 Basic definitions of CPNs
CPNs language is a discrete-event modeling language and combines basic Petri nets with
a functional language, i.e. Standard ML (SML). CPNs provide different color sets, which
are suitable for the parameterization process. In CPN models, each place represents a
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system state. Transitions between places can interpret as activities. For a model net N et =
(Σ, P, T, A,N,C,G,E, I) satisfies the requirements below [69]:
• Σ is a finite set of color sets. It represents different resources.
• P is a finite set of place. It indicates states.
• T is a finite set of transitions. System action can be treated as transition in CPN .
• A is a finite set of arcs.
• N is a node function, it is defined from A into (P × T ) ∪ (T × P ).
• C is a color function. It is defined from P into Σ.
• G is a guard function. It assigns a guard to each transition t such that Type[G(t)] =
Bool.
• E is the arc expression function. For a given place p ∈ P , E(p, t) represents the arc
expression on the input arc from p to t.
• I is an initialization function. It is defined from P into closed expressions such that:
∀p ∈ P : [Type (I (p)) = C(p)MS]. Here, MS refers to multiset.
Additionally, the global state of a given N et at a given moment can be depicted as situation,
i.e. the current marking of the net is M , and all the markings in another labeled order
combine an occurrence graph OG [70]. M0 is the initial marking. The set of markings
reachable from a marking M is denoted as R(M).
Fundamental terms and concepts of a system are resources, rules, input and output, inter-
mediate data, and processes. Formal validation should cover as many of these as possible.
For instance, rules and processes are related to system behavior; intermediate data and in-
put/output can be grouped as parameterization. The relationship between system structure
and Petri net description is shown in Fig. 5.2. Hence, the corresponding relationship can
be used to assist the system development. A system includes two main properties: states
and functions. States show the system’s situations. Functions are in charge of changing the
system states by means of events. Different system states trigger respective events, and the
updates of events trigger respective states by means of events. After the basic properties
are clear, more system structure details should be considered. CPNs represent system states
and events as places and transitions in the model, respectively.
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System structure Petri nets description
Figure 5.2: Relationship between system structure and Petri net description
5.4 Tools
There are different kinds of computer-aided tools for the application of Petri nets. They
support different Petri nets and features. Normally, four basic kinds of Petri nets are token
into consideration: low-level Petri nets, high-level Petri nets, stochastic Petri nets, and timed
Petri nets. Based on the usage of this thesis, some tools are shown in Table 5.2, and the
features of these tools are defined as follows [63]:
• Graphical Editor supports editing of nets in a graphical representation.
• Token Game Animation supports simulation with animation of the flow of tokens.
• Simulation supports simulation without graphics to allow maximum simulation per-
formance.
• State Spaces supports the generation of markings (also know as reachability graphs/trees
and occurrence graphs).
• Performance Analysis permits performance analysis such as simulation with time,
Markovian chains, Monte Carlo simulation, and so on.
Based on the requirements of this thesis, the simulation, state space, and performance anal-
ysis are the basic required features. Hence, the software CPN Tools is applied in modeling
the system structure and analyzing its performance. CPN Tools is a software for editing,
simulating, and analyzing CPN models; various stochastic scenarios can be simulated in the
model. It can be set to follow different stochastic distributions to monitor real situations.
What is more, in some case studies, the pi−Tool is applied for the stochastic Petri nets
analysis. In this paper, the high-level Petri nets analysis is not carried out by pi−Tool. As
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Table 5.2: Petri net tools and their features
PN and Features supported
Tools
CPN Tools pi−Tool Poseidon TimeNET INA GreatSPN
Low-level Petri nets X X X X
High-level Petri nets X X X X X
Stochastic Petri nets X X X
Timed Petri nets X X X X X
Graphical Editor X X X X X
Token Game Animation X X X X X
Simulation X X X X
State Spaces X X X X X
Performance Analysis X X X X X
the pi−Tool is more suitable to do the simulation of stochastic analysis, which not take the
high-level Petri nets into consideration.
5.5 Items and data value
5.5.1 Qualitative items
A state space is a occurrence graph of CPN models. In this graph, a node and an arc represent
each reachable marking and occurring binding, respectively [69]. Mi used to represent the
marking i in the state space. The variables of a transition t denotes V ar(t). All bindings
for a transition t is denoted B(t). A binding element is a pair (t, b). The system state will
be modified through firing specific transitions. In a marking Mi, when an enabled binding
element (t, b) occurs, it will change the marking Mi to another marking Mi+1, defined by:
∀p ∈ P : Mi+1 (p) =
Mi(p)− ∑
(t,b)∈Y
E (p, t) < b >+
∑
(t,b)∈Y
E (t, p) < b >
(5.1)
where Mi(p) is the number of Mi (p)− ∑
(t,b)∈Y
E (p, t) < b > removes tokens from Mi while∑
(t,b)∈Y
E (t, p) < b > added tokens to Mi+1 . Moreover, Mi+1 is directly reachable from Mi
by the occurrence of the step Y , which denote: Mi[Y > Mi+1.
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The analysis of the state space is carried out by checking queries with Computational Tree
Logic (ASK-CTL) [71]. The ASK-CTL logic and the model checker are implemented in
SML [72]. To denote place instance, transition instance, and markings, the following SML
structures are available, respectively.
con PI.<PageName>’<PlaceName>
con TI.<PageName>’<TranName>
fun Mark.<PageName>’<PlaceName>
SearchNodes is the basic function that traverses the state space. The function can be
described as Fig. 5.3 in pseudo-code, more details are available in publication [72].
• Area specifies the searching area, data type Node list.
• Pred evaluates whether the Node can take part in further analysis or not, data type
Node -> bool.
• Limit specifies searching terminal requirement, data type int.
• Eval maps each Node into a value, data type Node -> ’a 2.
• Start is a constant, data type ’b.
• Comb is a function can map Eval(n) and Result into ’b, data type ’a*’b -> ’b.
SearchNodes(Area,Pred,Limit,Eval,Start,Comb)
Begin
    Result:=Start; Found:=0
    for all n in Area do
      if Pred(n) then
            Result:=Comb(Eval(n),Result)
            Found:=Found+1
            if Found=Limit then 
                break
            end
      end
    end
    return Result 
end
SearchNodes(Area,Pred,Limit,Eval,Start,Comb)
Figure 5.3: Pascal-style pseudo-code of basic traverse method
2a, b are arbitrary data type
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The exact SML call for SearchNodes looks as follows:
SearchNodes(EntireGraph, fnn => (length(OutArcs(n)) = 0), 10, fnn => n, [ ],op ::)
PredNodes and EvalNodes are abbreviated forms of SearchNodes, functions details shown
as follows:
PredNodes(area, pred, limit) : Nodelist = SearchNodes(area, pred, limit, id, [ ],, op ::)
EvalNodes(area, eval) :′ blist = SearchNodes(area, fn_ => true,NoLimit, eval, [ ],, op ::)
PredNodes and EvalNodes are abbreviated forms of SearchNodes. Functions details
shown as follows:
PredNodes(area, pred, limit) : Nodelist = SearchNodes(area, pred, limit, id, [], op ::)
EvalNodes(area, eval) :′ blist = SearchNodes(area, fn_ => true,NoLimit, eval, [], op ::)
PredNodes(area, pred , limit) : Nodelist= SearchNodes(area, pred , limit , id , [ ], op ::)
EvalNodes (area, eval) : ′b list = SearchNodes(area, fn_ => true,NoLimit, eval, [ ], op ::)
Similarly, functions SearchArcs, PredArcs and EvalArcs traverse the arcs of the state
space. Boundedness properties are used to check how many and which tokens on a particular
place instance. There are four query functions for the boundedness properties:
fun UpperInterger (Node->’a ms)->int
fun LowerInterger (Node->’a ms)->int
fun UpperMultiSet (Node->’a ms)->’a ms
fun LowerMultiSet (Node->’a ms)->’a ms
As shown in following Fig. 5.4, there are three numbers in the rounded rectangle. The
number in the first line is the marking index number, for instance, "1" means the marking 1.
The second line contains two numbers, taking marking 1 as an example, the left number "2"
indicates only one marking can transfer to marking 2, the right number "1" means marking
1 has one successor.
1
2:1
2
1:2
Figure 5.4: Partial state space
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5.5.2 Quantitative values
When simulating or executing a CPN model, it is necessary to extract information from the
markings and binding elements, and then to do the analysis. Data collector monitors are used
to extract numerical data during simulations. The numerical data is used when Calculating
statistics, and the data may be saved in data collector log files. A data collector can calculate
either timed or untimed statistics. Data collector monitors are used for performance analysis
of CPNs. There are four kinds of data collector monitors: marking size monitor, list length
monitor, count transition occurrences monitor, and generic data collector.
Function types for the accessible functions:
• init: markings -> <numerical type> option initialization function
• pred: subnet -> bool predicate function
• obs: subnet -> <numerical type> observation function
• stop: markings -> <numerical type> option stop function
Normally, the observation function of the generic data collector is mainly applied in the
practical simulation. This function examines the monitored nodes, and returns a numerical
value. For more information on data collector monitoring functions, please refer to the
publication of [72].
Figure 5.5: A net consists of place A and its surrounding transitions on page New Page
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Taking the following model as a case study, as shown in Fig. 5.5. The transition generate
outputs values which follow an exponential distribution with the mean value 1.0/4.0. To col-
lect the data value, the monitor named as "monitor a value" is associated with the transition
add. If the predicate function is invoked after the add occurs, then the observation function
will return true. The observation function will be invoked when the predicate function for
the monitor returns true, and it will return the value of bind element a. The data values are
collected during a simulation and should be saved in a data collector log file.
5.6 Problem description and definitions
A variety of modeling languages and methods can be used to describe railway application
systems [63]. All these approaches can be described by the BMW-concept [73], which is
developed by the Institute for Traffic Safety and Automation Engineering (iVA), Technische
Universität Braunschweig:
• B is Beschreibungsmittel in German, it denotes the means of description;
• M is Methoden in German, it indicates the methods for design, structuring, modeling
and verification;
• W is Werkzeuge in German, it represents the tools for system engineering to support
methods and description.
The means of description consist of informal and formal ones. An example of the informal
description is the human language, which has an ambiguous attribution. In order to de-
scribe a system more specifically, the informal description is translated into computerized
formalization.
The development of safety-critical systems leads to complex control structures. In this
chapter, a common approach for the development of a new system is divided into four
stages, as shown in Fig 5.6:
• conceptual level,
• construction level,
• formal level,
• and technical level.
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Figure 5.6: A common approach for system development
In this chart, square boxes represent available resources or methods, and ellipses represent
outputs. The arrows indicate the development procedure.
In step 1, which has been elaborated on in the aforementioned chapters, a system starts
from conceptualization and objective. The system’s requirements are illustrated in this
step. After the identification of need is carried out, the system’s requirements and functions
are presented. However, the connections between possible scenarios cannot be specified
unambiguously when an operation process is described using natural language. Hence, step
2 advances this approach.
In step 2, before the engineers transfer the concept and objective into a system structure with
the help of informal process modeling, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of the
system principles. This step is carried out in chapter 4. Normally, informal formulations are
like charts or blocks, such as the block diagram in section 4.1. After introducing the system
principle, we illustrate application scenarios of TTDMS in a chart flow, and the system block
diagram is also presented. Because of the informal description of the system structure, no
validation of system behaviors is possible. With the assistance of the unambiguous definition
of formal methods, a system can be presented in a clear way. Hence, the procedure can be
furthered by using formal methods.
In step 3, the system structure is formalized into a CPN model, which is implemented
in section 6.1. CPN-modeling is a suitable means of description for representing system
behaviors, and validation can also be implemented by using the state space analysis [33].
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Modeling the system structure with CPNs permits derivation of an occurrence graph. The
chart involves all procedural sequences of the operational process. Based on the graph, the
system functionality and behaviors can be validated. After the model structure’s safety is
validated, we present a universal approach to generate code frameworks from the occurrence
graph.
In step 4, we assemble an actual TTDMS using a combination of hardware and software.
Sections 6.3 and 7 provide the analysis of TTDMS performance. TTDMS performance is
evaluated by implementing in the simulation, mathematical calculations, and model based
estimation. Additionally, actual measurement results are presented and analyzed. The
results indicate that TTDMS can meet the requirements of daily metro trains. This can be
found in chapters 9 and 10.
In this chapter, the new process seeks to perform TTDMS modeling and validation, func-
tional safety and timed performance evaluation using CPN, and estimates the actual system
reliability. Here, we combine the system development and formal method conceptualization
together. The procedure can be divided into four steps, as shown in Fig. 5.7.
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Figure 5.7: System development and formal method conceptualization (adapted from [1])
• Recognition level. The development of increasingly sophisticated automation systems
usually starts with a verbal requirement specification [1]. Each new system starts with
the activity of human mind, and the mind has to be described and explained using
languages. Consequently, other individuals can understand the system.
• Modeling level. Considering all languages have ambiguities, people can rely on formal
methods to describe the idea. With the assistance of the unambiguous definition of
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formal methods, a system can be presented in a clearer way. People can take advantage
of formal models to reflect human ideas and the system behaviors.
• Parameterization/ simulation level. It carries out the analysis of system functional
safety and performance. The functional safety determines a system can operate as
designed. An actual system operates in real time space, but some time-related per-
formances cannot be expected for a relatively long time. Hence, after the language
description is transferred to a formal model, functional safety analysis and simulation
based on the model are required. As a result, engineers can rely on the results to
update the actual system.
• Physical level. A physical system is available, and the system reliability is estimated.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, system evaluation methodologies were discussed. The results indicated that
a well-constructed set of tests were required to support the evaluation and verification of
a system sufficiently. To cover the whole system development life cycle, CPN method was
chosen to implement the formalization. After introduced the basic definitions of CPNs,
different kinds of computer-aided tools for the application of Petri nets were discussed.
Additionally, we briefly introduced the method to refer the items and data value of CPN
models, which were used for the further functional and performance analysis. Finally, we
introduced a novel approach, and it was divided into four levels and four steps to carry
out the system development, functional safety evaluation, and simulation-based verification.
The instantiation of this approach is carried out in chapter 6.
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6 Formal modeling of TTDMS
In this chapter, we proposed a new process using Colored Petri Nets to verify the TTDMS
system functional safety, as well as to evaluate the system performance. Three main contri-
butions are carried out in the chapter: Firstly, this chapter proposes a formalized TTDMS
model, and the model correctness is validated using state space analysis and simulation-
based verification. Secondly, corresponding checking queries are proposed for the purpose
of functional safety verification. Further, the TTDMS performance is evaluated by applying
parameters in the formal model. Thirdly, the reliability of a functional prototype TTDMS is
estimated. It is found that the procedure can cooperate with the system development, and
both formal and simulation-based verifications are performed. Using our process to evaluate
and verify a system is easier to read and more reliable compared to executable code and
mathematical methods.
6.1 Formal modeling process of TTDMS
Based on the unambiguous definition of formal methods, the TTDMS can be described much
clearer and more readable than it is in executable codes. Following the steps in Fig. 5.7, the
system will be modeled by using CPN. Based on the system property concept proposed in
this section, an instantiation model is built and validated.
6.1.1 Formal modeling and system property
Generally, system operation can be described as transitions between different system states.
A series of system operations can be treated as a transition-firing sequence from one state
to another. Each system state can be represented as a place in the computerized executable
model. The model parameterization can implement the mathematical description and the
unit dimension. The description refinement of a system depends on the formalization degree.
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The higher the formalization level used to describe the real system, the greater the possibility
to formally (mathematically) verify the formalized concept system [1].
To evaluate the system performance before its actual design, a computerized executed model
is required. Here the system property concept that proposed by iVA is applied to build the
CPN model [74]. Four hierarchical levels of system abstraction are composed and described
as follows [75].
• Property. The property represents the abstraction of characteristics. Observable char-
acteristics empirically cause observed properties, and properties deal with abstract
concepts.
• Characteristic. The characteristic is the fundamental element of objective recognition
and description. Therefore, the characteristic is objectively determinable, and it de-
scribes the essential or unique feature of the property. Characteristics are available
according to a measurement (continuous characteristics) or counting (discrete charac-
teristics). The characteristics can be quantified, and they can be directly described
and identified by digital objects.
• Quantity. The quantities are physically and numerically deduced from characteristics.
Quantities are special cases of the general characteristic values. The quantities are
determined due to the restriction of related characteristics.
• Value & Units. Every quantity results in one value and its unit. Values result from
measurements and calculations. A numerical value including its unit can also be pa-
rameterized into system quantities.
6.1.2 CPN model of TTDMS
Since the TTDMS availability and functional safety are the most important parts, the dif-
ferent communication parameters should be considered in the model process. The com-
munication system stability influences the distance measurement accuracy. Many different
parameters affect the TTDMS performance. In a normal operation mode, the communication
link between two TTDMS is connected, the following failures can occur [76]:
• Fail to establish a connection. To execute a communication, the first step is to establish
a communication link, and then exchange data. The time consumed in establishing
the connection is uncertain, and a reconnection action is required if it fails.
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• Transmission error. Due to various reasons, there is not enough data information
available to perform an actual distance calculation during a short period. Importantly,
the communication link is still available.
• Disconnection. The channel link between two systems is broken and a reconnection is
required. This state normally happens in a poor signal transmission environment.
Availability and functional safety are selected as two fundamental properties of the TTDMS.
The availability emphasizes how well a system operates in numerical analysis. The functional
safety indicates whether a system runs normally in logical analysis. The system availability
can be described with distinct characteristics, such as connection stability and time delay
[77]. The characteristics of functional safety indicate that the TTDMS can react and work
correctly under specific resources.
Hence, the CPN model and system attribute hierarchy is shown in Fig. 6.1. For the TTDMS,
the distance information should be updated in time. The time delay has to be limited to an
acceptable level, which will not influence the train operation. Here three main parameters are
chosen with in the quantity level to quantify the characteristics of the connection stability:
time consumed during connection establishment, transmission error, and disconnection. The
token, available markings and path can be used to implement the functional safety analysis.
The detailed description of system functional safety is introduced in section 6.2, and the
feasibility analysis is presented in section 6.3.
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Figure 6.1: Concept model of the TTDMS in the structural property aspect
The CPN model of TTDMS is built as shown in Fig. 6.2, and Table 6.1 shows the cor-
responding meanings of places and tokens in the model. The red color marked part indi-
cates the abnormal procedures and states. While, the green color part means the correct
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process. As shown in the model, the TTDMS starts with 1‘IDLE under the surveillance
mode. If it detects other TTDMS, it tries to establish a connection with the transition
try to scan. Once the communication link is established successfully, the following system
sends the PRN code and attempts to calculate the distance. Transitions data_loss_1 and
part_transmission_1 represent disconnection and transmission error, respectively.
Connected
Result
1`FAILConnect 
reliable
Result
Offline
Result
Scan results
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PACK
ConStatus
Status
1`IDLE
reconnect
try to scan
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MSG
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1`WFDR
1`PART
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Res
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MSG
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1`NULL
1`PART
SUCCESS
1`SUCCESS
Res Res
1`FAIL
Figure 6.2: The CPN model of the TTDMS
Table 6.1: Meanings of places and tokens in the CPN model (see Fig. 6.2)
CPN model element Element type Meaning
ConStatus Place Main system situation
Scan results Place Detection result
Connect reliable Place Connection situation
Oﬄine Place Disconnection
Connected Place Connection established
R_Message 1 Place Received message in the following train
T_Message 1 Place Transmitted message in the following train
R_Message 2 Place Received message in the detected train
T_Message 2 Place Transmitted message in the detected train
IDLE Token Connection is closed or does not exist
WAIT Token Wait for detection results
SPNC Token Send PRN code and try to calculate the distance
WFDR Token Wait for feedback data from the detected train
FULL Token Completed packet
PART Token Incomplete packet
NULL Token Packet lost
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6.2 Model validation and functional safety verification
In safety critical applications, system validation is an essential step that is required before
further developments. Normally, model checking is an automatic validation technique that
can implement analysis of the system behavior. In this study, we applied the model checking
facilities of the CPN Tools to investigate requirements of TTDMS. As illustrated in Fig. 5.2,
the system behavior results from the combination of a change in state and the execution
of functions. Each relevant physical and technical state of a component is called a local
state [27]. Ensuring that functions can generate correct states, and that correct states can
trigger appropriate functions are the most important requirements in system design.
In section 6.2.1, four validation requirements are proposed. Both the requirements’ meanings
and methods have been performed. Corresponding checking queries with ASK-CTL are also
demonstrated in this section.
After the formalized model is validated, the functional safety is verified using state space
analysis in section 6.2.2. The basic components of a functional system are resource, rules,
input/output, intermediate data, and process. Formal verification should cover all these
elements or as many as possible. For instance, standards and processes relate to system
functional safety; intermediate data can be grouped as parameterization. Only if the system
functional safety has been verified, the other relative performance evaluations make sense.
6.2.1 Validation of the CPN model
In safety critical systems, design validation is an essential step that is required before any
further analysis. Validation is a process of determining that a system actually can fulfill the
purpose for which it was intended. In other words, validation is solving the issue of "are we
building the right thing?" [78].
Here four system safety criteria of the CPN model are validated. The validation process pro-
vides evidence whether the model satisfies specific requirements, which ensure the functional
safety evaluation in Section 4.2. In this study, we apply the state space method to carry out
the model validation [71]. The model has to satisfy the following aspects as shown in Table
6.2. V1 guarantees that all states are involved in the state space, V2 reflects the abnormal
system termination; V3 is an indicator of the endless loop in the system; V4 contributes to
validate the simulation accuracy.
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Table 6.2: Validation requirements and methods
Requirements Description
V1: All available states are calculated To implement state space analysis, a full state space needs
to be calculated, which means all system available states are
involved.
V2: The model runs infinitely The TTDMS should operate endlessly. Hence, unreasonable
dead markings are not allowed.
V3: Self-loop is forbidden Self-loop means a system holds on the same marking through
an executable transition, and it consumes additional system
resources.
V4: Simulation accuracy Parameterization applied to figure out the system perfor-
mance, the simulation results’ accuracy should be validated.
In the descriptions, marking is a representation of tokens in places that constitute a specific
combination [79]. Dead marking is a unique marking; it reflects that the system is termi-
nated, and no further subsequent actions are available. Unreasonable dead markings are
undesired. Self-loop can be a design defect, which should be avoided and corrected, or it can
also be an essential update action in a system.
Figure 6.3: State space analysis report of TTDMS CPN model
We apply these four validation requirements into the TTDMS. The result of V1 is presented
in Fig. 6.3, which is the state space generation result of the CPN model. The status of
the state space is Full, and it indicates that all available states have been calculated in the
state space. Fig. 6.4 shows the state space, which has been omitted the labels on the arcs
specifying the binding elements. There are 16 nodes and 19 arcs in the state space. It means
that the whole system model can generate 16 different markings, and 19 arcs connect the
markings. Scc (strongly connected component) Graph means every vertex is reachable from
any other vertex in this graph, and it declares that every marking in the model is reachable
from any other marking.
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Figure 6.4: State space
The description of other validation requirements is drawn by Computational Tree Logic
(ASK-CTL). The ASK-CTL is interpreted over the state spaces (also called the occurrence
graph or reachability graph/tree) of the CPN model in the CPN Tools [80]. The ASK-CTL
logic and model checker are implemented in SML (a general-purpose functional programming
language), and queries are formulated directly in SML syntax. Checking queries written
in SML are proposed to carry out various verifications. Some basic SML functions are
introduced in section 5.2, and more details are available in the reference [72].
Checking of V2 and V3 can be achieved by the following queries as shown in Fig. 6.5.
Function SelfLoopTerminal returns the nodes that has itself as the output. Function
ListDeadMarkings calculates all the nodes that are dead and returns them as a list. In
the result, it expresses that there are no self-loop terminals and no dead markings in the
formal model. It indicates that the system will not stop at a permanent state, and there is
no risk for resources consumption caused by the infinite invalid self-loop.
V4 validates the accuracy of mathematical simulation in CPN model. In order to validate the
results, the time consumed by establishing a connection is assumed to follow an exponential
distribution as shown in Fig. 6.6. The system returns to 1‘IDLE after the connection is
established, this choice aims at simplifying the analysis. As a result, it is obtaining quickly
enough data to do statistical analysis. The result is shown in Fig. 6.6, the Probability Density
Function of obtained online by simulation fluctuates around the theoretical result.
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fun SelfLoopTerminal n=(OutNodes(n)=[n])
fun InValidTerminal()=PredNodes(EntireGraph, fn n => (SelfLoopTerminal n), NoLimit);
let
val fid = TextIO.openOut "Logic verification results.txt"
val _ = if InValidTerminal()=[]
then TextIO.output(fid, "There is no self loop terminal!\n")
else TextIO.output(fid, "List of self loop terminals: \n")
val _ = EvalNodes(InValidTerminal(), fn n => INT.output(fid,n) )
val _ = TextIO.output(fid, "List of dead markings: \n")
val _ = EvalNodes(ListDeadMarkings(),
fn n => INT.output(fid,n) )
val _ = TextIO.output(fid, "\nNumber of dead markings: ")
val _ = INT.output(fid,length (ListDeadMarkings()))
in
TextIO.closeOut(fid)
end
There is no self loop terminal!
List of dead markings: 
Number of dead markings: 0 
Checking queries Result
Figure 6.5: Self-loop terminal and dead markings in the CPN model
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Figure 6.6: Simulation accuracy: parameter setting in CPN model and simulation result
6.2.2 Functional safety verification of TTDMS
In this section, the verification process adopts a universal approach. Hence, this process
can also be used to analyze different sorts of systems. The procedure is carried out by a
state space analysis to check the requirements. This procedure is about checking whether
a particular state or variable meets given specifications, which reflects the feasibility of the
system and predicts whether the system can run normally. In this case, parameterization is
not considered so as to limit the number of system states. Based on the state space analysis,
the system’s structure correctness is validated.
From the definition of functional safety given by the International Electrotechnical Com-
mission (IEC), functional safety means the system will operate correctly with response to
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its inputs [71]. Potential hazardous conditions can be precluded by applying the functional
safety analysis. To carry out the functional safety verification, three representative require-
ments are presented here. These requirements can be used: (i) to determine system resource
consumption; (ii) to traverse and identify required system states; (iii) to implement reacha-
bility analysis.
These requirements can be checked by analyzing the reachability graph. This graph contains
all the possible occurrence sequences and reachable markings. The relationship between
system functions and reachability graph is shown in Fig. 6.7. Importantly, the following
elements details are involved.
• Path. A system transfers from the idle state to a required state, it can be reflected by
existing a path transferring from the source marking to the target marking.
• Available markings. Different states can directly activate a system target marking.
The states are expressed by available markings, such as A1, A2, and A3.
• Token. The token details of a marking can also be analyzed. For instance, the token
details of target marking are shown in the rectangle in Fig. 6.7.
source target
  
A3
Figure 6.7: Mapping between system function and reachability graph
Hence, in a CPN model, the three safety properties requirements mentioned before can be
described respectively as:
• State verification:
– ensuring all reachable states satisfy a given prediction on states;
– determining whether a reachable marking exists that can fulfill a given prediction;
• Function verification:
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– ascertaining whether a reachable sequence that satisfies a particular state predic-
tion exists;
– ensuring one state can and can only be modified by one event.
For the state verification, the following three examples are illustrated, the meaning of places
and tokens in the CPN model are shown in Table 6.1.
(i) The ConStatus indicates the system main state, and it controls the system actions.
The place ConStatus can and only can hold one specific value at one time. It means that
∀M ∈ R (M0) : |M (ConStatus)| = 1 where |M (ConStatus)| denotes the size of the multiset
M(P ). The initial state is 1‘IDLE. It is obvious that there must always be one and only one
token on the place ConStatus, because a system can only work in one particular situation
at any given moment. Here boundedness properties can be applied to check this function.
Generally, the boundedness properties specify how many and which tokens a place holds [69],
it can reflect hardware or software resource requirements, since one place holding more tokens
indicates more storage space is required. The checking query in Fig. 6.8 is available to verify
the boundedness properties. Function UpperInteger calculates the maximal number of
tokens on the place ConStatus. The result is 1, which means that at most one state is
available at the given time. Function LowerInteger is similar to function UpperInteger
but reflects the minimum number of tokens on the place. The result is 1, which indicates
that there is always one state of the system. Function UpperMultiSet indicates the details
of all available states for the TTDMS. It is clear that TTDMS has four operation modes as
expected.
let
val fid = TextIO.openOut "Boundedness.txt"
val _ = TextIO.output(fid, "system main statue: \n")
val _ = TextIO.output(fid, "Upper integer: \n")
val _ = INT.output(fid,UpperInteger (Mark.TTDMS'ConStatus 1 ))
val _ = TextIO.output(fid, "Lower integer: \n")
val _ = INT.output(fid,LowerInteger (Mark.TTDMS'ConStatus 1 ))
in
TextIO.closeOut(fid)
end
System main statue: 
Upper integer: 1 
Lower integer: 1 
Checking queries Result 
Figure 6.8: Boundedness properties of place
As shown in the results, both the upper integer and lower integer are 1 on the place
Mark.TTMS‘ConStatus. It suggests that the model operation obeys the expected behav-
ior.
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(ii) Additionally, the main system states must be limited to the proper state in specific
situations. For instance, before the connection link is established, the main state should be
only in IDLE or WAIT 3. It illustrates that the system will hold a proper state in a specific
situation. Variable Offline involves all the nodes when TTDMS is oﬄine. In this kind of
situation, TTDMS should be in a proper main state. As shown in the Fig. 6.9, the tokens
on the place ConStatus are 1‘IDLE and 1‘WAIT.
val Offline=PredAllNodes(fn n=>Mark.train_control'connected 1 n=[]);
let
val fid = TextIO.openOut "Proper state.txt"
val _ = TextIO.output(fid, "When the connection is offline, the main state is: \n")
val _ =TextIO.output(fid, STRING.mkstr_ms(EvalNodes(Offline, fn 
n=>st_Mark.train_control'ConStatus 1 n)));
in
TextIO.closeOut(fid)
end
When the connection is offline, the main state is: 
1`"train_control'ConStatus 1: 1`IDLE"++
3`"train_control'ConStatus 1: 1`WAIT"
Checking queries Result
Figure 6.9: Token detail on a place
(iii) After the connection between two TTMDS is established, the distance information
update starts after the following train’s TTMDS sends PRN code. It is reflected in the
CPN model as that markings obtaining the token 1‘SPNC should be found, and parallel arcs
which can transfer from other markings to it should also be enumerated. This feature can
be performed by the checking query in Fig. 6.10. Function Operating(SPNC) returns all the
nodes with token 1‘SPNC. The results show that the marking 6 contained the required token,
and three arcs are connecting to the marking 6. The details of the state space graph are
shown in Fig. 6.11. It is clear that after transitions TTDMS’WFND, TTDMS’update_distance,
and TTDMS’ONLINE, the system turns to send PRN code procedure. These three transitions
correspond with three actions in the TTDMS: wait for the data receiving, update distance,
and establish the connection, respectively.
In general, this query can be used to check the following function: when one system can
turn into a particular state, and which transitions can trigger it. It is a fundamental feature
of the functional safety verification. The reachability of Mm[
∑
Y > Mn can be described as
tokens’ consumption and generation.
To illustrate the function verification, the following two cases are given:
(i) In the calculation process, the main steps are implemented through transitions send
PRN code and update distance. Transition send PRN code can only be activated when
the connection is established. When the R_Message 1 obtains full package (1‘FULL), the
3See Table 6.1
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fun Operating(p:Status)=PredAllNodes (fn n=>cf(p,Mark.TTDMS'ConStatus 1 n)>0);
Operating(SPNC);
val L=EvalNodes(Operating(SPNC), fn n=>InArcs(n));
val fid = TextIO.openOut "RelativeBoundedness.txt"
val _ = TextIO.output(fid, "Markings contain token 1`SPNC are: \n")
val _ = EvalNodes(Operating(SPNC), fn n => INT.output(fid,n) )
val _ = TextIO.output(fid, "\nArc Details: \n")
fun listpro(LL)=
let
val OR=LL;
val LL=List.nth(LL,0);
val test=InArcs(LL);
val _ = EvalArcs(test, fn a => INT.output(fid,a) );
val _ = EvalArcs(test,
fn a => TextIO.output(fid, st_BE(ArcToBE(a)) ^"\n"))
val RR=List.drop(OR,1);
val _=if RR<>[] then listpro(RR) else TextIO.output(fid, "Here is end!\n")
in
TextIO.closeOut(fid)
end;
listpro(Opreating(SPNC));
Markings contain token 1`SPNC are: 
6 
Arc Details: 
18 17 6 TTDMS'WFND 1: 
{Res=SUCCESS}
TTDMS'update_distance 1: 
{Res=SUCCESS}
TTDMS'online 1: {Res=FAIL}
Here is end!
Checking queries Result 
Figure 6.10: Query to analyze places and arcs related to a particular token
6
3:1
6:
TTDMS'Connected 1: 1`SUCCESS
TTDMS'Connect_reliable 1: empty
TTDMS'Offline 1: empty
TTDMS'Scan_results 1: empty
TTDMS'T_Message_1 1: empty
TTDMS'R_Message_1 1: empty
TTDMS'T_Message_2 1: empty
TTDMS'R_Message_2 1: empty
TTDMS'ConStatus 1: 1`SPNC
15
1:1
14
1:1
5
1:1
18:15->6 TTDMS'WFND 1: {Res=SUCCESS}
17:14->6 TTDMS'update_distance 1: {Res=SUCCESS}
6:5->6 TTDMS'online 1: {Res=FAIL}
A1
A2
A3
target
Figure 6.11: Details of the checking result in state space graph
transition update distance is triggered. The checking query in Fig. 6.12 can be used to
implement this validation requirement. Function TI_Arc observers all the arcs that have
connections to the transition update distance. Variable ArcList represents the results.
It is clear to notice that the system will send PRN code when the connection is successful
(1‘SUCCESS). All the markings that can trigger the distance update are with a 1‘Full
package received.
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let
val fid = TextIO.openOut "Event_test.txt"
val _ = TextIO.output(fid, "Arcs relate to transition:\n")
fun TI_Arc(TI:TI.TransInst)=PredAllArcs(fn a=> ArcToTI a=TI);
val ArcList=TI_Arc(TI.train_control'send_PN_code 1);
val _ =EvalArcs(ArcList,fn a=> INT.output(fid,a));
val _ =TextIO.output(fid, "\nOriginal Nodes:\n");
val NodeList= EvalArcs(ArcList, fn a=>SourceNode(a));
val _ =EvalNodes(NodeList,fn n=> INT.output(fid,n));
val _ =TextIO.output(fid, STRING.mkstr_ms(EvalNodes(NodeList,fn n=> 
st_Mark.train_control'connected 1 n)));
val ArcList=TI_Arc(TI.train_control'update_distance 1);
val NodeList= EvalArcs(ArcList, fn a=>SourceNode(a));
val Enodes=PredNodes(NodeList, fn n=>Mark.train_control'R_Message_1 1 n=[FULL], NoLimit);
val _=if NodeList=Enodes
then TextIO.output(fid,"The nodes trigger update_distance are nodes with FULL package\n")
else TextIO.output(fid,"validation failed")
in
TextIO.closeOut(fid)
end
Arcs relate to transition:6 
Original Nodes:5 1`"train_control'connected 1: 1`SUCCESS"
The nodes trigger update_distance are nodes with FULL package
Checking queries Result
Figure 6.12: Function validation examples
(ii) When a disconnection happens, the system tries to establish the connection again and
continues to detect the distance between two trains. The following method in Fig. 6.13
is applied to check whether the execution is available: after R_Message 1 obtains 1‘NULL
(disconnection), the ConStatus can change to 1‘SPNC again.
fun Dataloss(p:PACK)=PredAllNodes (fn n=>cf(p,Mark.TTDMS'R_Message_1 1 n)>0);
fun Opreating(p:Status)=PredAllNodes (fn n=>cf(p,Mark.TTDMS'ConStatus 1 n)>0);
val Source=List.nth(Dataloss(NULL),0);
val Target=List.nth(Opreating(SPNC),0);
Reachable'(Source,Target);
if (Reachable(Source,Target)) 
then
print"reconnection established"
else 
print"can not establish connection"
val Dataloss=fn:PACK->Node list
val Opreating=fn:Status->Node list
val Source =16:Node
val Target=6:Node
A path from node 16 to node 6 is: [16,1,3,5,6]
val it=true:bool
Reconnection established val it=(): unit
Checking queries Result 
Figure 6.13: Reachability analysis: system returns to a particular state from another
In general, this query can be assigned to check whether a system can transfer from a specific
state to another. The query can do reachability checking more easily by directly configuring
valuables Source and Target with relevant tokens
The result represents a possible path, it is [16,1,3,5,6], as shown in Fig. 6.14. When
the receiver receives no more data (R_Message 1:1‘NULL), the system tries to establish
the connection again through transition reconnect, if the communication link is avail-
able (Connected 1:1‘SUCCESS), the system turns to the detection mode again (ConStatus
1:1‘SPNC).
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16
1:1
16:
TTDMS'Connected 1: 1`SUCCESS
TTDMS'Connect_reliable 1: empty
TTDMS'Offline 1: empty
TTDMS'Scan_results 1: empty
TTDMS'T_Message_1 1: empty
TTDMS'R_Message_1 1: 1`NULL
TTDMS'T_Message_2 1: empty
TTDMS'R_Message_2 1: empty
TTDMS'ConStatus 1: 1`WFDR
1
2:2
1:
TTDMS'Connected 1: 1`FAIL
TTDMS'Connect_reliable 1: empty
TTDMS'Offline 1: empty
TTDMS'Scan_results 1: empty
TTDMS'T_Message_1 1: empty
TTDMS'R_Message_1 1: empty
TTDMS'T_Message_2 1: empty
TTDMS'R_Message_2 1: empty
TTDMS'ConStatus 1: 1`IDLE
19:16->1 TTDMS'chain_break_reconnect 1: {Res=SUCCESS}
3
1:1
3:
TTDMS'Connected 1: 1`FAIL
TTDMS'Connect_reliable 1: empty
TTDMS'Offline 1: empty
TTDMS'Scan_results 1: 1`SUCCESS
TTDMS'T_Message_1 1: empty
TTDMS'R_Message_1 1: empty
TTDMS'T_Message_2 1: empty
TTDMS'R_Message_2 1: empty
TTDMS'ConStatus 1: 1`WAIT
2:1->3 TTDMS'try_to_scan 1: {Res=SUCCESS}
5
1:1
5:
TTDMS'Connected 1: 1`FAIL
TTDMS'Connect_reliable 1: 1`SUCCESS
TTDMS'Offline 1: empty
TTDMS'Scan_results 1: empty
TTDMS'T_Message_1 1: empty
TTDMS'R_Message_1 1: empty
TTDMS'T_Message_2 1: empty
TTDMS'R_Message_2 1: empty
TTDMS'ConStatus 1: 1`WAIT
4:3->5 TTDMS'detected 1: {}
6
3:1
6:
TTDMS'Connected 1: 1`SUCCESS
TTDMS'Connect_reliable 1: empty
TTDMS'Offline 1: empty
TTDMS'Scan_results 1: empty
TTDMS'T_Message_1 1: empty
TTDMS'R_Message_1 1: empty
TTDMS'T_Message_2 1: empty
TTDMS'R_Message_2 1: empty
TTDMS'ConStatus 1: 1`SPNC
6:5->6 TTDMS'online 1: {Res=FAIL}
source
target
Figure 6.14: Details of the reachability analysis result
6.3 Performance evaluation of TTDMS
To analyze the system performance, we applied parameterization into the formal model.
Each token can be parameterized with a required meaning in the CPN model. By adapting
values to corresponding quantities, a system can be more easily understood and changed
than it in executable codes. With the data obtained from the model, the system performance
measurement is available. The data can be used to do statistical analysis, and responding
safety and availability analysis can be carried out.
The TTDMS is based on the time delay to calculate the distance between two systems.
Hence, the time delay’s deviation has primary influences on measurement results. In this
dissertation, the model is based on the following presuppositions:
• Hardware failure rates are not involved in the model, and the hardware reliability is
estimated in section 4.3.
• Time delay caused by mathematical calculation error is not involved.
• The time consumption distributions are chosen based on our prototype machine ex-
perimental data and previous researches of Prof. Dr. Armin Zimmermann [76].
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With parameterization applied in the CPN model, various stochastic distributions can be
quickly configured and analyzed. Additionally, the model is readable and clear.
6.3.1 Parameters initialization
In section 6.2, model validation and system functional safety verification have been imple-
mented, respectively. Only under this precondition, the parameterization can be conducted
reasonably in the model.
Normally, the distance information update cycle is in sub-second level (in our prototype
machine is 100 milliseconds). As proposed in section 6.1.2, there is a time delay existing
between a new distance update and the last one [76]. For the railway transportation safety,
investigations of the maximum time delay tmax and the possibility of applying the emergency
braking or the normal braking caused are essential. To analyze the upper limit of tmax, the
physical distance s is mapped to a time consumption level, as shown in Fig. 6.15 for an
illustration.
detection distance s
braking time
signal 
transfer
system 
process
max time 
delay
physical 
distance m
time 
consuming s
error
Figure 6.15: Time consumption and physical distance
Firstly, the time used for the signal transition in the air, which equals
2× s
C
, needs to be
subtracted from the whole time consumption. Secondly, when the TTDMS calculates the
results of the signal transfer time, the information is already late, because the hardware
system needs time to finish mathematical calculations; and then there is a calculation error
possible in the signal transfer time results, which relates to the device’s ability. These time
delays are denoted with ∆t. Thirdly, the time used to finish the emergency braking needs to
be subtracted as well. The braking distance LEB depends on the actual train velocity v.
Hence,
tmax =
s− LEB
v
−∆t− 2× s
c
sec (6.1)
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Here we choose the deceleration a is 1 m/s2, which is the average value in practice [81],
hence
LEB ≈ v
2
2a
≈ v
2
2
m (6.2)
tmax =
s− LEB
v
−∆t− 2× s
c
<
s− LEB
v
≈ s
v
− v
2
sec (6.3)
The worst-case delay can be estimated as follows: after the disconnection, followed by the
reconnection and transmission error. The first step is to establish the connection again. The
system tries to build the communication channel when the place ConStatus holds the token
1‘IDLE. Here it is assumed that if the connection was not available in 3 seconds under the
surveillance mode, the connection establishment action retried. Based on the experimental
results of the prototype machine, the time used to establish the connection is no more than
150 milliseconds. Hence, the corresponding distribution is thus exponential with a parameter
λ. Here,
E (X) =
1
λ
= 0.15 sec (6.4)
λ ≈ 6.6667 sec−1 (6.5)
Because of the transmission error results in the time delay, during this period, there is no
useable data to update the distance until a full complete packet is received. Here the delay
has been assumed to be memoryless and be smaller than x seconds in p of all cases. Here
we choose x = 5 seconds, p = 75%. Thus, the transition follows an exponential distribution
with the expectation related parameter λ, where
p = 1− e−λx (6.6)
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λ = − ln (1− p)
x
≈ 0.2773 sec−1 (6.7)
When it comes to the disconnection, this kind of state is not common in nowadays wireless
communication networks. For instance, a disconnection occurs only 10−4 times per hour in
the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) [76]. This parameter is different from
specific communication technologies applied to the real system. Therefore, it is assumed
that in 80% of all cases, the system attempts to establish the connection within not more
than 1 second. Hence,
λ = − ln (1− p)
x
≈ 1.6094 sec−1 (6.8)
It is important to note that, the parameters vary in different communication technologies.
In this section, they are only used for illustrating the performance of our approach.
6.3.2 Simulation and results
For an exponential distribution, the Probability Density Function (PDF) and Cumulative
Distribution Function (CDF) express as f (x) = λe−λx and F (x) = 1 − e−λx, respectively.
Hence, let T1, T1, T3 are the three independent random variables assigned with exponential
distributions with parameters λi (i = 1, 2, 3). T1, T1, T3 represent time consumed by discon-
nection, connection establishment, and transmission error, respectively. Hence, the whole
time consumption is
tmax := T1 + T2 + T3 sec (6.9)
According to the mathematical character of exponential distributions in reference [82], we
got
ftmax (x) =
n∑
i=1
λ1...λn
n∏
j=1
j 6=i
(λj − λi)
e(−xλi) = [
n∏
i=1
λi]
n∑
i=1
e(−xλi)
n∏
j=1
j 6=i
(λj − λi)
(6.10)
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where x > 0. Hence
ftmax (x) = [λ1 · λ2 · λ3]·
[
e−xλ1
(λ2 − λ1) (λ3 − λ1) +
e−xλ2
(λ1 − λ2) (λ3 − λ2) +
e−xλ3
(λ1 − λ3) (λ2 − λ3)
]
(6.11)
ET1+T2+T3 (X) =
λ2λ3 + λ1λ3 + λ1λ2
λ1λ2λ3
sec (6.12)
It is obvious that, compared with mathematical calculations, the simulation procedure
in the time CPN model are much closer to the actual scenario, and it can solve more
complex distributions without having an onerous computation. With the parameters (re-
fer to the dotted rectangles) applied to the CPN model, timed based analysis is avail-
able, as shown in Fig. 6.16. For instance, in one dotted box (only used as a mark)
@+(1000.0*round(exponential(6.6667))) means a random time delay that follows an
exponential distribution with a parameter λ = 6.6667 is added after the transition has been
fired.
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Figure 6.16: With parameterization in TTDMS CPN model
For 1,000,000 times Monte-Carlo-Algorithms testing (Fig. 6.17), the maximum result is
46.92 seconds in this one million times simulation. Based on the data of emergency braking
curves, taking the CRH2-300 high-speed train in China as a case study, the emergency
braking distance is 2786.68 meters when the train speed is 300 km/h [2]. To make sure
all the 1,000,000 times results do not trigger the emergency braking, the TTDMS should
have a detection distance s further than 6,695 meters. If our technology can only maintain
the detection distance up to 5,000 meters, then the time delay must be smaller than 27
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seconds.
tmax <
s− LEB
v
=
5000− 2786.68
83.3
sec (6.13)
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Figure 6.17: Distribution of time delay
Fig. 6.18 presents the intercorrelations among the TTDMS availability, detection distance,
and braking strategies. If we continued to use this system factors with a detection distance
5,000 meters, there is a less than 7 × 10−4 probability to apply an emergency braking.
However, the emergency braking is not a frequently used braking strategy. For a normal
braking of CRH2-300 as an example, the braking distance is 5,172.28 meters. Hence, the
TTDMS should have a distance detective ability farther than it in the emergency braking
mode, or else the train speed has to be reduced if this system is applied in practice. If the
system can detect 6,000 meters, the deadline is 9.94 seconds, and it has a 8×10−2 probability
of actualizing normal braking.
tmax =
s− 5172
83.3
−∆t− 2× s
c
sec (6.14)
All in all, based on simulation results we can: (i) evaluate the actual TTDMS performance,
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Figure 6.18: Intercorrelations among TTDMS availability, detection distance, and braking
strategies
such as the probability of triggering an emergency braking and a normal braking; (ii) adjust
the TTDMS performance to meet engineering requirements. For instance, braking distance,
train operating velocity, and measurement accuracy.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, it has been shown how CPNs is applied to evaluate and verify a system.
Different from most analysis methodologies, a novel approach has been introduced to carry
out both functional safety evaluation and simulation-based verification. This procedure was
illustrated based on a TTDMS. Based on the system property concept, the TTDMS was
formalized in the form of CPN model. Using state space analysis and simulation-based
verification, it proved that there are no dead marking and self-loop, and the mathematical
simulation is accurate. Verifications in both system functional safety and performance were
implemented. Different checking queries were presented to analyze the system functional
safety. The results indicated that the TTDMS could operate correctly with response to
its inputs and conditions. Based on this precondition, three parameters (fail to establish a
connection, transmission error, and disconnection), which affected the system performance,
had been discussed and parameterized in the CPN model. The simulation results indicated
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the intercorrelations among TTDMS availability, detection distance, and braking strategies.
It was found by the functional safety and simulation-based analysis that the whole procedure
was highly efficient and was easier to implement than mathematical calculations. The further
work is that one can propose a better organized and thorough checking process in the formal
model analysis, and introduce different checking queries more systematically.
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7 Model based code generation and
time estimation
In this chapter, a safe software code framework is generated from the model structure, and
combined with the hardware structure to assemble the actual system. Model-based software
development is a primary approach to describe software on different levels of abstraction.
Even though formal methods are not widely used in the development of software, formal
models can prove the completeness and correctness of system requirements and specifica-
tions. Hence, inconsistencies and bugs can be avoided and predicted at an early stage of the
development process.
7.1 Code framework generation from formal model
When the computerized executed model is composed and applied to evaluate the system’s
performances. It can be used to a code framework, and to do the model based estimation.
The potential methods for the code generation from CPNs are structural analysis, simulation-
based, and OG based. The structural analysis is to search for regular structures, such
as loops and if-constructs, in the underlying graph. However, directly translatable graph
patterns cannot be found in every model. The simulation-based approach is not suffering
from the above problem, but its performance limits the application. What is more, the
large memory footprint make this approach not suitable for embedded systems [83]. The
OG based approach proposed in this paper does not have the efficiency problems, as the
OG is the representation of all possible states of the model. Additionally, this approach is
independent of the programming code. Hence, the OG is used to control the execution of the
program and determine the next system state. An extensive review in the area of automatic
code generation from Petri nets is given in [84].
A primary requirement of software design is the simplification, which makes the program
convenient to read and maintain. The logic connection among different functions must be well
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designed. It is conducive to ensure that the program is well organized and easily maintained.
Improperly jump and call functions can cause system errors. In order to eliminate system
bugs, the program structure should be outlined and proofed before the coding process.
In this section, we propose a procedure to organize various functions by using CPNs. As dif-
ferent systems require different programming languages, there will be no further elaboration
on the specificities other than a brief mention of the encoding framework. The occurrence
graph is able to generate codes efficiently [84]. The graph includes all available system states
of the CPN model. The states are connected by corresponding transitions. All transitions
in the graph represent different system events. The events can be handled as various func-
tions in programming codes. Each arc represents a transition in the graph. In combination
with the CPN model, the functional requirements are clear. Note that, not all the places
are parameterized in this procedure. Parameterization can cause the state explosion of the
occurrence graph when a value is stochastic. Here, we only take care of the system structure
and no parameterization is required. The parameterization simulation procedure was carried
out in section 6.3.
In software designs, state change relates to variables update. In Fig. 7.1, the same state
(local state a) can be reached by different events (event P and event N). Logical states are
not states of physical components, but "memory" states of abstract elements, which must
be derived from the contextual domain knowledge and the objectives of the process [85].
Event M
Local state b
Local state a
x
Local state c
[condition]Cp
Event N
Local state d
[!condition]Cq
Event P
Figure 7.1: Function formulation
As shown in Fig. 7.2, the CPN model has the following four main factors: place, colored
sets, transition, and node. Colored sets indicate different types of Class in program codes.
A Class is a particular construct, and it groups variables and methods defined by users.
Places represent local states that can be defined by variables. Transitions in the CPN model
are functions or events in code. Transitions will cause a change in the state of a system,
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which reflects as node changing in the CPN model. CPNs provide different color sets, which
can be mapped onto a Class in the encoding process. The system development is based on
models as an abstraction of the real world. An extensive review of existing work in this area
of automatic code generation from Petri nets is given in [84].
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1@0.0:
train_control`connected 1: empty
train_control`offline 1: empty
train_control`Scan_results 1: empty
train_control`T_Message_1 1: empty
train_control`R_Message_1 1: empty
train_control`T_Message_2 1: empty
train_control`R_Message_2 1: empty
train_control`ConStatus 1: 1`IDLE
Place Transition
Node
// Declaring Classes
public class Customer
{
    //Fields, properties, methods and events go here...
}
// Creating Objects
Customer object1 = new Customer();
// Declare variables
Variable<string> var1 = new Variable<string>()
{
    Default = "one"
};
Coloured 
sets:
// Declare function 
Public void (Variable 1,...)
{
    Variable 1=...
};
Elements in CPNs
Elements in CODE framework 
Figure 7.2: Elements in CPNs and code framework
The system operation is reflected as changing variables under specific events (ei ∈ E). It
can be given by V ×E|G = V ′, where V,E, and G are the sets of all valuations of variables,
events, and guard functions, respectively; V ′ is the new set of V after the changing. The
values of variables are in valuation V , if event E occurs and guard G is true, then the new
values for variables are given by valuation V ′. Each event will have a guard function g ∈ G,
which will decide the function results. The guard functions can be implemented as Switch
function in codes. One state (local state a) can have different outputs (local state b and
local state c) through one event (event m) as shown in equation 7.1. Meanwhile, different
states can have the same output through different events as shown in equation 7.2.
(V,E,G) = Va × em|g =
 VbVc
g = cp
g = cq
(7.1)
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[
Vm Vq · · ·
]
×

em|g
eq|g
· · ·
 = Va (7.2)
where Va, Vb, Vc, Vm, Vq, · · · ∈ V , em, eq, · · · ∈ E.
Fig. 7.3 indicates the full occurrence graph of the CPN model. Taking a partial graph
for example, M1 can transfer into M2 and M3 through the same transition try to scan.
M2 and M3 indicate the success (1‘SUCCESS) and failure (1‘FAIL) of the scanned result,
respectively. Marking M3, M9, and M10 can change into M5 through transitions ONLINE,
update distance and WFND, respectively.
1
2:2
1:
TTDMS'Connected 1: 1`FAIL
TTDMS'Connect_reliable 1: empty
TTDMS'Offline 1: empty
TTDMS'Scan_results 1: empty
TTDMS'Transimitter1 1: empty
TTDMS'Receiver1 1: empty
TTDMS'Transimitter_2 1: empty
TTDMS'Receiver2 1: empty
TTDMS'ConStatus 1: 1`IDLE
3
1:1
3:
TTDMS'Connected 1: 1`FAIL
TTDMS'Connect_reliable 1: empty
TTDMS'Offline 1: empty
TTDMS'Scan_results 1: 1`SUCCESS
TTDMS'Transimitter1 1: empty
TTDMS'Receiver1 1: empty
TTDMS'Transimitter_2 1: empty
TTDMS'Receiver2 1: empty
TTDMS'ConStatus 1: 1`WAIT
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1:1
2:
TTDMS'Connected 1: 1`FAIL
TTDMS'Connect_reliable 1: empty
TTDMS'Offline 1: empty
TTDMS'Scan_results 1: 1`FAIL
TTDMS'Transimitter1 1: empty
TTDMS'Receiver1 1: empty
TTDMS'Transimitter_2 1: empty
TTDMS'Receiver2 1: empty
TTDMS'ConStatus 1: 1`WAIT
2:1->3 TTDMS'try_to_scan 1: {Res=SUCCESS}
1:1->2 TTDMS'try_to_scan 1: {Res=FAIL}
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5:
TTDMS'Connected 1: 1`FAIL
TTDMS'Connect_reliable 1: 1`SUCCESS
TTDMS'Offline 1: empty
TTDMS'Scan_results 1: empty
TTDMS'Transimitter1 1: empty
TTDMS'Receiver1 1: empty
TTDMS'Transimitter_2 1: empty
TTDMS'Receiver2 1: empty
TTDMS'ConStatus 1: 1`WAIT
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6:
TTDMS'Connected 1: 1`SUCCESS
TTDMS'Connect_reliable 1: empty
TTDMS'Offline 1: empty
TTDMS'Scan_results 1: empty
TTDMS'Transimitter1 1: empty
TTDMS'Receiver1 1: empty
TTDMS'Transimitter_2 1: empty
TTDMS'Receiver2 1: empty
TTDMS'ConStatus 1: 1`SPNC
6:5->6 TTDMS'online 1: {Res=FAIL}
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1:1
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1:1
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15
1:1
15:
TTDMS'Connected 1: 1`SUCCESS
TTDMS'Connect_reliable 1: empty
TTDMS'Offline 1: empty
TTDMS'Scan_results 1: empty
TTDMS'Transimitter1 1: empty
TTDMS'Receiver1 1: 1`PART
TTDMS'Transimitter_2 1: empty
TTDMS'Receiver2 1: empty
TTDMS'ConStatus 1: 1`WFDR
18:15->6 TTDMS'WFND 1: {Res=SUCCESS}
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1:1
14
1:1
14:
TTDMS'Connected 1: 1`SUCCESS
TTDMS'Connect_reliable 1: empty
TTDMS'Offline 1: empty
TTDMS'Scan_results 1: empty
TTDMS'Transimitter1 1: empty
TTDMS'Receiver1 1: 1`FULL
TTDMS'Transimitter_2 1: empty
TTDMS'Receiver2 1: empty
TTDMS'ConStatus 1: 1`WFDR
17:14->6 TTDMS'update_distance 1: {Res=SUCCESS}
4
1:1
16
1:1
16:
TTDMS'Connected 1: 1`SUCCESS
TTDMS'Connect_reliable 1: empty
TTDMS'Offline 1: empty
TTDMS'Scan_results 1: empty
TTDMS'Transimitter1 1: empty
TTDMS'Receiver1 1: 1`NULL
TTDMS'Transimitter_2 1: empty
TTDMS'Receiver2 1: empty
TTDMS'ConStatus 1: 1`WFDR
13
1:1
Figure 7.3: Occurrence graph and partial details
Hence, the procedure to generate a code framework can be indicated as shown in Fig. 7.4. Af-
ter the OG is loaded, the token details (obj) in different Vm become clear. foreach (colset
7.2 Model based execution time estimation 95
in Σ) declares different Classes based on the colset. foreach (place in P) creates ob-
jects, which represent places in CPN model, based on respective Classes. Initialization
(Vo) sets the system with initial variables. Vm can only be modified with a given g. As a
result, L, a list of em, is available for generation, and it can be used to organize the encoding
framework and do the execution time estimation.
Algorithm generate code framework
Load
 , ,OG V E G
OG
foreach (colset in     )
//Declaring Classes
public class colset
{
//variable definition 
}

foreach (place in     )
//Creating Objects
colset          =new closet()
P
mobj V V 
obj
Initialization (    )
oV V
oV
foreach (OutArcs in     )mV
.me Arc TI TransInst 
.g Arc Bind Elem 
if mV obj g 
|m m mV V e g 
then
,mV Lreturn
endif
mV 
meadd to L
 L 
Figure 7.4: Model-based code-generating algorithm
With the same OG in one project, a standard way is available for different programmers to
rely on to build and deploy applications. The OG helps programmers visualize the system
structure. Unlike in standard applications, the system’s control flow is not determined by
the programmers but by the framework.
7.2 Model based execution time estimation
Although hardware accuracy, multi-path propagation and NLOS play indeed a major role
in the measurement resolution, the software implementation could also have an impact, for
example through the processing time induced by the source code configuration obtained with
the CPN-based method.
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In the analysis of many systems, it is necessary to know the execution time of the tasks
in the system. Traditionally, the estimation has been calculated based on static analysis
techniques. The source code or disassembled binary executable of the task is analyzed to
determine the time required for the longest path through the code [86]. Given the code
framework is generated based on the OG, which can be used to do the static analysis.
As shown in Fig. 7.3, after the connected is SUCCESS, it requires TTDMS five steps to finish
one distance update. Equation (7.3) illustrates this:
Vt = Vs × ∏
m∈L
em|g (7.3)
L =

send PRN code
full transmission
Acknowledgment
Link situation
update distance

(7.4)
where Vs and Vt represent variables in the source and target states, respectively.
The time required to execute an event is fit to the Gumbel distribution, Tem ∼ Gumbel (µm, σm)
[87,88]. The parameters of a Gumbel can be estimated by applying the algorithm proposed
in [86]. Here we give a proposal to carry out the estimation while no numerical parameters
are considered.
In an action period, an event em is executed ρm times, for ρm ∈ R. Hence, the total time
taken is W = ∑
m∈L
ρmTem . The characteristic function (φW (t)) and Probability Density
Function (fW (t)) of W are defined by equations (7.5) and (7.6) respectively.
φW (t) =
∏
m∈L
¶
Γ (1− itσmρm) eitµmαm
©
, t ∈ R (7.5)
fW (t) =
1
2pi
∞∫
−∞
exp
{
it
(∑
m∈L
ρmµm − t
)} ∏
m∈L
Γ (1− iρmσmt) dt (7.6)
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where φW (t) and fW (t) represent the results of characteristic function and PDF, respec-
tively; Γ is the gamma function; i2 = −1 is the complex unit. The details for the mathe-
matical proof can be found in [88].
The CPN model reflects the system structure. As long as proper parameters are available,
the system performance can be evaluated using a CPN model. However, it is not further
discussed in this thesis.
7.3 Summary
In this chapter, a methodology for an encoding framework premised on an occurrence graph
was introduced. This OG based approach permitted an efficient code framework generation.
As a result, it offered an approach to convert the safe model to safe code framework. What
is more, the encoding framework was applied to perform a static analysis of the execution
time estimated in the latter part of this chapter.
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8 Evaluation of the collision fault tree
by means of CPNs
Probability-related system states can be analyzed with the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). How-
ever, restricted by the commercial tools, the FT is limited to assess dynamic systems without
event-repair operations and probability-related attributions.
Thus, this chapter proposes a new method to represent and extend the FT in CPNs, which
combine event maintenance components, model correctness verification, time factors and
mathematical calculation together. Additionally, it can be reused for customizations. The
accuracy of the approach is verified by using model-based simulation and state space analysis.
The performance and benefits of the new approach are demonstrated by investigating train to
train collision failure models. The results indicate that involving model correctness checking
and repairable events into modeling approaches can provide much more essential information
than the traditional Fault Tree Analysis. With the collision failure model proposed in section
3.3, the dependability of the overall MA+ can be analyzed by means of this method.
8.1 Introduction
Despite developments in automation technology, system faults can exist at any time and
in any situation. It is essential to evaluate the dependability of systems for the sake of
maintaining an equivalent or a higher safety level, after a new system is involved.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) can qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate the reliability, and
represent the relationship between different faults. However, in the general FTA, the constant
failure rates, absence of repair events, and time duration limit the analysis ability of FT
[62,89]. Some extended FTs are thereby proposed. For instance, publications [90,91] present
a Multi-state Fault Tree, which involves repair events. Publication [92] introduces a Temporal
Fault Tree, and it allows addressing dynamic behaviors that depend on time duration.
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There is some commercial software, such as, Windchill FTA, ITEM ToolKit, Fault Tree++,
and so on. They can provide various functions of event-oriented analysis. However, the
limitations of commercial tools used for fault tree analysis restrict the application of the
fault tree method. More importantly, for the dependability analysis of safety critical complex
systems, some mathematical calculation, which can not be fully satisfied in the commercial
software, is essential to quantify the dependability characteristic. Hence, it is necessary to
provide an efficient method satisfying the following requirements (R):
• R1: take different failure rates into account;
• R2: demonstrate the time attributions;
• R3: carry out the mathematical calculation;
• R4: consider repairable multi-state components;
• R5: verify the model’s correctness.
Hence, it is necessary to develop a methodology that can cover all these five requirements.
These requirements are essential for improving the flexibility and continuity in system de-
pendability analyses. Importantly, this solution is free and modifiable for special applica-
tions. The methodology is applied to describe practical systems, and do qualitative and
quantitative analyses.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: First the terminological relationships
between FT and CPNs is discussed. The main contribution of this work is discussed in
sections 8.3 and 8.4. Section 8.3 is dedicated to discussing the modeling process; the model’s
calculation accuracy and structure correctness are verified. For the sake of illustrating our
process performance, based on the MA+ proposed in section 3.2, the train to train collision
accident is selected as the top event in fault tree. Moreover, the evaluation approach is
illustrated in section 8.4, which carries out the model correctness evaluation and system
dependability analysis. Finally, section 8.5 presents the conclusion and future works.
8.2 Terminological relationships between FT and CPNs
Formalization & modeling can efficiently and cost-efficiently represent a real-world system.
The system safety analysis based on modeling is widely used in different research areas. The
description refinement of a system depends on the formalization degree. The higher the
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formalization level used to describe the real system, the greater the possibility to mathemat-
ically verify the formalized concept system [39]. CPNs as high-level Petri nets are applied
to evaluate the FT in this chapter rather than low-level Petri nets [93]. The components of
(Colored) Petri nets and Fault Tree are shown in Fig. 8.1.
(Colored) Petri nets
Place
Transition
Directional arc
Token
Structure
Fault Tree
Fault Tree event
--
No direction arc
--
Gate/logic
Fault
Failure
State
Event
Actual state
Relation Relation
--
--
Items Symbol Dynamic meaning Items Symbol Dynamic meaning
Connect & control Connect
--
Figure 8.1: (Colored) Petri nets and Fault Tree
In FT, an "event" indicates an actual subject or case in a system, such as that the wayside
equipment is out of service. However, "event" that in Petri nets has a dynamic meaning,
and is represented by a transition. Transition is used to modify the system state, which is
illustrated by the place in Petri nets. However, the failure action of the fault is not modeled
and has not symbol in FT. Hence, in order to distinguish the terminological difference of
"event", P_event and F_event are applied to represent the "event" meanings in Petri nets
and Fault Tree, respectively.
What is more, the arcs in Petri nets not only have the connect but also control functions.
However, the arcs in FT only play an indicative role. Importantly, CPNs provide different
color sets, which are suitable to represent different attributions, such as F_event state, name,
and maintenance information. All these aforementioned attributions can not be satisfied in
FT. Additionally, the structure in Petri nets is more flexible to change to represent the gate
logic in FT.
Hence, using the CPNs is a suitable and efficient way to represent and analyze the FT. It has
advantages of the aforementioned FTA for dependability analysis. Moreover, model correct-
ness verification is carried out by applying state space analysis; F_events and conditions are
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represented by time durations but not considered as instantaneous; a subnet of a F_event
is proposed to implement other procedures, such as the maintenance.
8.3 New procedure for representing an FT in a CPN
model
For the dependability analysis of complex timed systems, the analysis method should make
up the deficiencies in FTA. This chapter proposed a new process that can convert the typ-
ical FT to a CPN model. After the conversion, the F_event maintenance process, model
correctness, time attribution, and parameterization are fully satisfied with the CPN model.
A CPN model consists of net and color structures. The net structure reflects relations among
different F_events and states. The color structure can be used to represent the F_events’
and states’ attributions. In the CPN model, the model correctness, time attribution, pa-
rameterization, and F_event subnet are fully satisfied.
8.3.1 Requirements reflect in CPNs
The core components of FT are fault F_events and logical gate functions. By involving
CPNs, the FT is converted into the CPN model, which contains the five requirements men-
tioned in chapter 8.1.
As shown in Fig. 8.2: different failure rates (R1) and time attributions (R2) are implemented
in the F_event initialization by applying set color structures, which are detailed in section
8.3.2. The mathematical calculations (R3) are carried out by corresponding functions; the
maintenance process of the F_events (R4) is involved by adding subnets, which are presented
in sections 8.3.3 and 8.3.4.
The model correctness (R5) is performed during the verification process by using state space
analysis. All these aspects guarantee the fault F_event maintenance, time consumption,
system structure correctness, and appropriate parameterization. With the assistance of
CPN model, the dependability analysis of complex timed systems can be extended.
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Figure 8.2: Requirements reflect in CPN net structure
8.3.2 Color set structure
A basic F_event must consist of these attributes: name, state, service time with relevant
parameters, operation time, maintenance period, and lifetime [94]. An intermediate F_event
is the output of a gate, and it has the name and state attributes.
A basic F_event has a name to identify itself. Additionally, the F_event can result either
to faulty or to operate states. When the F_event is a fault caused by a failure, it will be
repaired in a certain time. Since Weibull distributions are widely applied in practices, it
8.3 New procedure for representing an FT in a CPN model 103
can describe many fault F_event’s behaviors [95]. The Weibull distribution can be divided
into a two parametric and a three parametric distribution. Except for parameters T and b,
which represent the characteristic lifetime and the shape parameter, respectively, the three
paramagnetic Weibull distribution exhibits an additional parameter t0. It is the failure free
time - location parameter. With this additional parameter, failures can be described that
only begin to occur after a certain time t0. While the two parametric Weibull distribution
always describes failures starting from time t = 0.
In this chapter, we apply the two parametric Weibull distribution to predict the F_event’s
service time τ (statistical variable). As an intermediate F_event is the output of a gate,
and it is solved or triggered based the gate logic and input F_events’ states. Hence, the
intermediate F_events have the name and state attributes.
colset subsystem=string;
colset timestamp=int;
colset servicetime=int;
colset state=with operate|fail;
colset maintenance period=real;
colset characteristic lifetime=real;
colset shape parameter=real;
colset FAULT=with 
subsystem|timestamp|servicetime|state|maintenance 
period|characteristic lifetime|shape parameter timed;
colset INTER=with subsystem|state timed;
Figure 8.3: Color set declaration
To represent the F_event’s attributions mentioned above, the declarations of the color struc-
ture are presented as shown in Fig. 8.3. Here, color sets FAULT and INTER represent basic
F_events and intermediate F_events, respectively. Note that, the color set can be modified
based on an actual application. For example, the basic F_events with timestamps have the
following attributions in FAULT:
• F_event name (string);
• real operation timestamp (int);
• service time τ (int);
• item situation (state);
• maintenance period TPM (real);
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• characteristic lifetime T (real);
• and shape parameter β (real).
8.3.3 Gate structures
AND and OR gates are the fundamental logic gates in FT. In many cases, only these two
fundamental gates are needed to build a fault tree [41]. Here we only illustrate these two
gates to introduce the gate structures in the CPN model.
An intermediate or top F_event happens when both F_events’ state and time duration meet
the gate logic. As shown in Fig. 8.4, F_event X1 occurred at n1 period. The duration of the
fault F_event relates to its maintenance time, and this fault F_event is activatable for the
following steps during [n1, n2]. Hence, the time parameters are useful for the dependability
analysis of technical systems [62]. As shown in the service fault F_events results, the AND
gate has a lower probability to occur than the OR gate in the same period. Hence, to
increase the system safety, the new system should combine with the existing F_events as
AND gates.
Clock Timenn10 n2
x1
x2
OE
OE
AND gate
OR gate
F_event x1 
F_event x2 
No fault Maintenance Fault
Figure 8.4: A example of occurrence of service failure
The basic net structure for the logical gate is introduced in Fig.8.5. In the repairable system,
the fault will be corrected after it occurs. These two procedures are represented by transitions
solve and fire, respectively. Hence, all the gates share the same net structure, which is
flexible to be reused in the following model.
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Mid
INTER
1`("NULL",operate)
In/Out
x2
FAULT
x1
FAULT
solve
[((#4 X1)andalso(#4 X2))
andalso not (#2 mid)]
input (X1,X2,mid);
output (mid1);
action
let
in
("NULL",operate)
end
P_HIGH
fire
[(not (#4 X1)orelse not (#4 X2))
andalso (#2 mid)]
input (X1,X2,mid);
output (mid1);
action
let
val event=(#1 X1)^(#1 X2)
in
(event,fail)
end
P_HIGH
mid1
X2
mid
mid1
X1
X1
mid
X2
In/Out In/Out
Figure 8.5: Gate structure in CPN model
Taking Fig.8.5, which indicates the AND gate, as a case study. When the F_events x1 and
x2 failed in the same time period, the guard of fire is satisfied. The token on place Mid
is changed from 1‘("NULL",operate) to 1‘("X1X2",fail) through the transition fire.
Afterward, when at least one of the F_events is fixed, the transition solve triggers, and the
token on the place Mid will turn into 1‘("NULL",operate).
In CPN models, guards are used to monitoring the input variables. Hence, guards can be
used to carry out gate logics, as illustrated in Table 8.1. Here, #idi rec extracts the idi
element from the record rec.
Table 8.1: Guards functions in different gates
Transition Gate Guards
fire
AND [not (#4 X1) andalso not (#4 X2) andalso (#2 mid)]
OR [(not (#4 X1) orelse not (#4 X2)) andalso (#2 mid)]
solve
AND [((#4 X1) orelse (#4 X2)) andalso not (#2 mid)]
OR [(#4 X1) andalso (#4 X2) andalso not (#2 mid)]
8.3.4 Subnet of F_events
In an actual system, each case (F_event) can have a maintenance procedure (P_event) [96].
Before a fault is treated or fixed, this case may cause hazards. The corrective maintenance
of humans is treated as that: when the dispatchers make errors, it takes a period of time to
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carry out the redeployment work. In this section, the condition-based maintenance is not
considered in the maintenance components.
“The most commonly used distributions for maintainability analysis have been the normal,
lognormal, and exponential," from Handbook, Electronic Reliability Design released by the
US Department of Defense [97]. Hence, the exponential distribution is selected. In order
to simplify the description, the following assumptions are considered when applying main-
tenance in this section:
• the downtime required for corrective maintenance time is set to follow an exponential
distribution;
• the downtime required for the periodic maintenance is negligible;
• after the maintenance procedure, the F_event is as new as original;
• the failure behavior is stochastically independent.
The P_event of the maintenance process and the chart flow are shown in Fig. 8.6. When
the F_event is out of service, the staff is required to carry out the corrective maintenance.
Afterwards, the F_event is reset. The periodic maintenance is implemented based on the
schedule, and no additional staff is required.
Periodic 
maintenance
Correctness 
required
Reset
servicetime>
maintenance period
state=fail
F  _  event
subnet
Staff
Figure 8.6: Chart flow of the P_event subnet
Fig. 8.7 shows the CPN model of the chart flow in Fig. 8.6. Transitions Repair_C and
Repair_P represent corrective and periodic maintenance, respectively. When a corrective
maintenance is required, the staff will be informed immediately. The F_event is in the
fault state (place Failed) during the corrective maintenance, which is controlled by function
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Next_T_f
INT1
F_event
FAULTx1
Renewal times
INT
1`1
Next_T
INT
Staff
FAULT
Failed
FAULT
Reset
[not (#4 FAT)]
input (FAT,N_time);
output (FAT_U,timePro,time_r,
time_b,Old);
action
ini(FAT,#6 FAT,#7 FAT,N_time);
Repair_C
[timePro<=N_time]
Repair_P
[timeb>N_time]
input (xx,timeb,timer,s,T_R,T,b,i,N_time);
output (FAT_U,timeR,time_b,time_r);
action
repair((xx,timeb,timer,s,T_R,T,b),T,b,
i,1000,N_time);
N_time
i
(xx,timePro,time_r,
s,T_R,T,b)
N_time
compare(FAT_U,time_b,
time_r,timePro,Old)
(xx,timeb,timer,
s,T_R,T,b)
T_R*(i+1)
N_time
compare_r(FAT_U,time_b,
time_r,timeR)
i+1
FAT
maintain(xx,timePro,
time_r,s,T_R,T,b)
FAT
FAT_F
(xx,timePro,time_r,
not s,T_R,T,b)
F(FAT_U)
1
In/Out
Figure 8.7: Net structure of treatment subnet
maintain(). The function adds a maintenance down time to the time stamp. After that, the
F_event’s state will be initialized by transition Reset after the maintenance is completed.
Transition Repair_P implements the periodic maintenance, which can be described as a
function repair() in SML, as shown in Fig. 8.8, where timeR indicates the F_event service
time after the i th periodic maintenance (time_r).
fun repair((m,time_b,time_r,s,T_R,T,b):FAULT, 
lamd,k,i,Trp,N_time)=
let
val timeR=round(weibull(lamd, k))
val time_r=Trp*(i+1)
val time_b=Trp*i+timeR
in
((m,time_b,time_r,s,T_R,T,b),timeR,time_b,time_r)
end
Figure 8.8: Function repair in SML
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8.3.5 Verification of the new approach for analyzing FT in CPN
In order to verify the accuracy of the new modeling approach, the following two verification
(V) are considered:
• V1: For quantitative analysis, parameterizations and numerical calculations will be
implemented in the CPN model. Hence, the accuracy of these calculations has to be
verified.
• V2: For qualitative analysis, the gate logic is carried out by using SML. Hence, the
correctness of the model structure has to be checked.
V1 can be applied to verify the calculation accuracy of the CPN model. The maintenance
components are the main numerical operations parts. If F_event X1 failed, a corrective
maintenance is triggered. From the definition of failure probability, it represents the proba-
bility that an item will fail during a time interval τ . Equation (8.1) can estimate the failure
probability of a F_event with periodic maintenance [95].
F (τ) = 1− exp
[
−
(
k ·
Ç
TPM
T
åβ
+
Ç
τ − k · TPM
T
åβ)]
(8.1)
where TPM is the periodic maintenance period; k is the k th periodic maintenance, k ∈ N;
T is the characteristic lifetime; β is the shape parameter.
Figure 8.9: Data collection monitor of transition
For simulation, we set the service time τ of F_event X1 follows a two parametric Weibull
distribution with T = 2000, Tpm = 1000 and β = 1.5. In the CPN model, the failure
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probability of X1 can be calculated by monitoring the transition Repair_C, as shown in Fig.
8.9. When the transition Repair_C fired, the time stamp will be recorded. In order to obtain
the simulation data in the CPN model, the monitor in CPN Tools is applied. The monitor
is a mechanism that is used to observe and inspect the simulation of a CPN model [34].
We assume that the reader has a basic understanding of it. Otherwise, publication [98] is
suggested for starters.
After obtaining the simulation data, we compare it with the formula results that obtained
by using the mathematical calculation. The results of V1 are presented in Fig. 8.10. The
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of X1 during 4000 periods obtained by simulation
and theoretical approaches are similar. It indicates that using CPNs can accurately carry
out parameterization and numerical calculations.
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Figure 8.10: Failure probability of the basic F_event with maintenance
To implement V2, the state space analysis is required. Take the AND gate as an example,
when X1 and X2 happened, the responding F_event Mid must occur. Here, Mi represents
that both X1 and X2 are failed; step Y represents the gate logic;Mi+1 means the Mid is failed.
This attribution can be checked by the following query, as shown in Fig. 8.11. Markings Mi
and Mi+1 are found through function Operating(). Here, Mi is found in the node 4, which
represents that both F_events X1 and X2 are failed. In addiction, arc 7 is the only out arc
of Mi, and its destination marking is Mi+1. The binding transition of arc 7 is Gate’fire.
The results mean the AND gate logic meets the requirement.
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Figure 8.11: State space analysis for AND gate logic verification
8.4 New approach for evaluating FT and application to
MA+
Based on the translation rules in section 8.3, the collision failure model in Fig. 8.12 can be
converted into CPN models, as shown in Fig. 8.13 and Fig. 8.14. The definitions of color
set structure, gate structure, and subnet of F_event are in chapters 8.3.2, 8.3.3, and 8.3.4,
respectively. Here, over speed and collisions with other obstacles are not included in the
discussion. This case focuses on the efficiency evaluation of MA+, so the scenarios related
to the movement authority are considered. In the model, the basic F_events are indicated
by green symbols. The MA+ is based on the train-centric communication technology, the
fundamental failure of the MA+ is the transmission failure.
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Figure 8.12: Fault Tree of the collision failure model without and with MA+
8.4.1 Qualitative evaluation
Before parameterization, the CPN model correctness should be checked. Here, three most
important aspects are evaluated.
• The absence of deadlock markings. Dead marking is a unique marking, which reflects
the termination of the system operation and the unavailability of further subsequent
actions. However, the railway system is a real-time system, and it has to operate
infinitely.
• The absence of self-loop. Self-loop means the system holds on the same marking
through an executable transition, and it consumes additional system resources. Self-
loop may be a design defect, which should be avoided and corrected.
• Boundedness properties of the top F_event. Boundedness properties represent the
token details on a particular place instance. In this chapter, the boundedness properties
are used to calculate the minimum cut sets of FT.
To verify the model correctness, a full state space needs to be calculated. In the verification
process, no parameters and time attributes are considered, which can avoid the state explo-
sion problem. Under a full state space, all the system variable states are calculated. The
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Figure 8.13: CPN representation of collision failure model without MA+
computer used for this calculation is a laptop with a 3.2 GHz Intel i5 processor and 4 GB
of RAM. The state space generation results of the CPN model is shown in Fig. 8.15.
There are 138 markings and 199 arcs. The status of state space is Full, indicating that all
available states have been calculated in the state space.
On the premise of no state explosion, dead marking reflects the abnormal system termination,
and self-loop is an indicative of the endless loop in the system. The minimum cut set is for
FT qualitative analysis. Fig. 8.16 (1) shows the SML query verifying that the model does not
include deadlock markings. By checking the deadlock markings with function EvalNodes,
the result demonstrates the absence of deadlock markings. All the F_events discussed
here have maintenance P_event, and no deadlock markings are permitted in this model.
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Figure 8.14: CPN representation of collision failure model with MA+
The query that demonstrates the absence of self-loop is shown in Fig. 8.16 (2), function
SelfLoopTerminal checks whether the marking will hold the same marking. The query
results in Fig. 8.16 (2) confirms the correctness of the CPN model.
The boundedness properties response to the token details on a specific place instance. In
the Fig. 8.14, both the intermediate F_events and top F_event have color set INTER. It will
record which basis F_events triggered the intermediate F_events and top F_event. Hence,
the boundedness properties provide a new qualitative analysis approach to study the FT
minimum cutsets. Using prime number method, binary bit string method can easily carry
out the minimum cut-set [99]. The SML query for the minimum cut-set could be specified
as in Fig. 8.16 (3).
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Statistics
———————————
State Space
Nodes: 138
Arcs: 199
Secs: 0
Status: Full
Figure 8.15: State space statistics report (partical)
let
val fid = TextIO.openOut "Dead Marking results.txt"
val _ = TextIO.output(fid, "List of dead markings: \n")
val _ = EvalNodes(ListDeadMarkings(),
fn n => INT.output(fid,n) )
val _ = TextIO.output(fid, "\nNumber of dead markings: 
")
val _ = INT.output(fid,length (ListDeadMarkings()))
in
TextIO.closeOut(fid)
end
List of dead markings: 
Number of dead markings: 0 
fun SelfLoopTerminal n=(OutNodes(n)=[n])
fun InValidTerminal()=PredNodes(EntireGraph, fn n => 
(SelfLoopTerminal n), NoLimit);
let
val fid = TextIO.openOut "ListOfSelfLoops.txt"
val _ = if InValidTerminal()=[]
then TextIO.output(fid, "There is no self loop terminal!\
n")
else TextIO.output(fid, "List of self loop terminals: \n")
val _ = EvalNodes(InValidTerminal(), fn n => 
INT.output(fid,n) )
in
TextIO.closeOut(fid)
end
There is no self loop terminal!
let
val fid = TextIO.openOut "Minimum cut-set.txt"
val _ = TextIO.output(fid, "\nMinimum cut-set: ")
val _ =TextIO.output(fid, 
STRING.mkstr_ms(UpperMultiSet(Mark.TOP'collision 
1)))
in
TextIO.closeOut(fid)
end
Minimum cut-set: 
1`("",operate)++
1`("++FWEC",fail)++
1`("+FEBC+FGBC++FWEC",fail)++
1`("+FEBC+FGBC+FTFMT+FWEC",fail)++
1`("+FMTDE+",fail)++
1`("FEFMT++",fail)
(1) Absence of dead markings
(2) Absence of self-loop
(3) Minimum cut-set
Checking queries Results
Figure 8.16: (1) Absence of dead markings,(2) absence of self-loop,(3) minimum cut-set
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8.4.2 Parameterization procedure
In this section, database reports and statistical data are applied to carry out the parame-
terization procedure, which estimates the parameters of F_events’ service time. Note that
these assumed parameters and distributions are not real parameters of the railway system.
They are only used for illustrating the performance of our approach.
For the F_events that have practical data, the parameters are calculated based on the Safety
Database Activity Report Significant Accidents from 2011-2014. Moreover, the numbers of
accidents were almost the same in each year from 2011-2014. Hence, we assumed that the
successful service time of basic F_event A is τA. F_event A failed N times during the
observation time T0. Hence,
τA =
T0
N
h (8.2)
For an exponential distribution, its expectation is
τA =
1
λ
h−1 (8.3)
λ =
N
T0
h−1 (8.4)
where, λ is the parameter needs to be calculated.
Table 8.2: Database reports and statistical data of F_events
Database reports from 2011 to 2014
Causes Number of accidents Observation time T0 (h) Relative F_events
Human factors 125 35040 DE
Rolling stock 5 35040 FGBC, FEBC
Control-command systems 0.2% of accidents 35040 FW, FWEC
Statistical data of systems
Systems Working time (h) Failure possibility Relative F_events
MA+ transition failed > 200 < 0.2 FMT
GSM-R communication failed > 1 < 10−4 FTR
We collected the number of significant accidents of the train to train collisions in Europe,
the results are shown in Table 8.2. Among causes of train to train collisions, human factors
represented the first cause of accidents. The observation time T0 is 35040 hours, N = 125.
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Based on the equation 8.8, the distribution of DE can be assumed as an exponential with a
parameter λDE. Hence,
τDE =
T0
125
=
1
λDE
= 280 h (8.5)
λDE = 3.57× 10−3 h−1 (8.6)
Similarly, there were 5 train to train collisions caused by rolling stock. We assumed that fault
F_events FGBC and FEBC related to onboard equipment have the distribution parameter of
rolling stocks λ = 4.75×10−5h−1. The existing train signal system has a high-safety level, the
failure of control-command signaling and operations & traffic management systems caused
0.2% of accidents [42]. Here, we assume the failure distribution of FW and FWEC with an
expectation working time of 2190 h, the parameter λ = 4.56× 10−4h−1.
For certain systems or technologies, practically statistical data is possible. A system service
time τ follows an exponential distribution [100]. The system can be assumed to work more
than x hours in P of all cases. Hence,
P = e−λx (8.7)
λ = − ln (P )
x
h−1 (8.8)
For the FMT, it is supposed to work 200 hours without fault in 80% of all the cases. Based
on the equation (8.7) and (8.8), the distribution parameter is: λFMT = 1.12× 10−3h−1. For
the FTR in the GSM-R communication, a complete connection loss takes place 10−4 times
per hour [76]. The parameter of the FTR is set accordingly. The distribution parameters of
basic F_events are shown in Table 8.3.
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Table 8.3: Places corresponding meaning and distribution parameter in the CPN model
Elements Corresponding meaning λ(h−1)
FW Failure of wayside equipment 4.56× 10−4
DE Dispatcher error 3.57× 10−3
FMT MA+ transmission failed 1.12× 10−3
FTR Transmission failed 1.00× 10−4
FGBC Failed to generate braking commands 4.75× 10−5
FEBC Failed to execute braking commands 4.75× 10−5
FWEC Failure of wayside equipment to execute the correct
commands to protect against conflicting routes
4.56× 10−4
8.4.3 Dependability analysis
With the assistant of monitors and simulation report 4, all the data details are available to
do the analysis. In this section, the failure probability of the top F_event is illustrated as a
case study.
The unreliability, F (τ), a measure of failure, is defined as the probability that a system is
failed under given conditions for a given time interval τ [41]. Hence,
F (τ) = P (TE ≤ τ) (8.9)
where TE indicates the top F_event, i.e. the first time the collision occurs after the last
maintenance; P (TE ≤ τ) is the system unreliability, i.e. the cumulative probability function
of TE until τ . Hence, the probability of failure is defined as:
f(τ) =
F (τ)
dτ
(8.10)
For 1.0 × 108 period simulations, the simulation report frame is shown in Fig. 8.17. In the
report, one period represents one hour. The report illustrates when a transition will fire, and
the corresponding binding elements are given. As shown in step 109, one collision occurs at
the 3946 periods, and the hazardous F_events cause this collision are FWEC. The fault FWEC
is treated at the 3953 periods, the collision problem solved at the same time.
With the simulation results, the cumulative failure probability of the F_event collision
can be calculated. All the time interval data is divided into 50 parts, and the median values
4A simulation report is a text file that contains information regarding the transitions that occur during a
simulation.
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109 3946 fire @ (1:Collision)
- M1 = (“”,operate)
- M2 = (“+FWEC",fail)
- mid1 = ("++FWEC",fail)
110 3953 Reset @ (1:S_FWEC)
- FAT_F = ("FWEC",3946,4000,fail,1000,2190.0,1.0)
111 3953 solve @ (1:Group_8)
- M1 = (“”,operate)
- X2 = (“”,4105,4000,operate,1000,2190.0,1.0)
- mid = (“+FWEC",fail)
112 3953 solve @ (1:Collision)
- M1 = (“”,operate)
- M2 = (“”,operate)
- mid1 = (“”,operate)
Figure 8.17: Timed CPN simulation report (partial)
are used to do data fitting. As shown in Fig. 8.18 and 8.19, the results indicate that the
cumulative failure probability of collision has a reduction when MA+ is applied.
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Figure 8.19: Cumulative distribution function of the collision happens at time t
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Based on the above case study, the new approach is more powerful to analyze the depend-
ability of a complex system such as railway systems.
8.5 Summary
This chapter introduced an approach to transfer and evaluate the regular FT in CPN models
for the system dependability analysis. The approach can be reused and re-customize, which
is generally limited to other FT commercial products. With the assistant of CPNs, the
evaluation process can carry out the F_event subnet operations, model correctness verifica-
tion, time factors, mathematical calculation, and so on. In detail, the approach permitted
application of different fault rates and consideration of maintenance components. All the
F_events and gate behavior were treated as duration time conditions.
In the verification approach, both quantitative and qualitative analyses were accomplished
in the CPN model. The accuracy of the verification was demonstrated by comparing the
simulation and mathematical calculation data. The model’s correctness is verified by means
of state space analysis. The evaluation results proved that more information was available
than FT to do the failure rate and availability analysis, and the MA+ can reduce the
probability of collision.
In further works, more gates could be considered for different conversion rules. One can
propose a better organized and thorough checking process in the formal model analysis
and introduce different checking queries more systematically. Furthermore, as soon as the
distributions of basic F_events are available, one can analyze experimental data and apply
them to the CPN model for dependability assessments.
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9 Practical implementation in the metro
In this chapter, we apply the TTDMS in the metro system. After introduced the system
strategy, the stochastic Petri nets model is applied to assess the system availability. Ad-
ditionally, in order to evaluate the system’s functional performance, it is deployed in the
real world. The numerical validations are implemented. Both mathematical calculation and
software simulation are considered. The system performance is validated in distance de-
tection and measurement accuracy. The detection range is verified in straight and curved
lines through computer simulation and mathematical calculation. The TTDMS detection
distance is simulated by using Wireless InSite R©, and the simulation results indicate that
the method applied in TTDMS is feasible.
Additionally, a TTDMS prototype machine is assembled by Tongji University (China). More
importantly, experimental data is collected from a metro line in use. Static and dynamic
measurements are considered in both tunnel and viaduct scenarios. With the practical mea-
surement results obtained by the prototype machine, the distance measurement accuracy is
evaluated. Based on the results, the train to train distance is proved to follow a Gaussian
distribution, and TTDMS can satisfy a daily metro train’s operation in terms of the dis-
tance requirement. By comparing the obtained data with the record of Automatic Train
Supervision (ATS), the result that TTDMS is feasible in real metro scenarios is achieved.
The chapter is arranged as follows: Section 9.1 describes the TTDMS in the metro system,
which is a speed based distance warning strategy. What is more, the distance measurement
unit and distance calculation flowchart are introduced. Section 9.2 evaluated the system
availability by using the stochastic Petri net. The prototype machine is presented in section
9.3.
Sections 9.4 and 9.5 are seeking to verify TTDMS’s performance through these three steps:
• Mathematical calculation and simulation results are used to estimate the detection
range. The simulation results confirm that TTDMS is feasible in actual railway engi-
neering applications.
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• With the experimental results obtained by our prototype machine, the distance mea-
surement accuracy is evaluated. Comparing TTDMS to the data in Automatic Train
Supervision (ATS) shows that TTDMS is feasible in real metro scenarios.
• Model-based execution time estimation is used to do the static analysis of the software
implementation. With proper parameters, the system performance can be evaluated.
Finally, Section 9.6 concludes this chapter and presents future works.
9.1 TTDMS in metro
A metro is a typical high-capacity public transport in metropolitan areas. It constitutes
a considerable part of the public transport. Different from transportation on the ground,
such as buses and trams, the metro system is localized in tunnels or on viaducts. In these
scenarios, the metro system cannot be accessed by any other vehicles or pedestrians. To
ensure a safe operation, the metro train control system is subject to strict fault-to-safe
regulations. When a train is under the supervision of a metro control system, the risk is
limited. However, a loss in efficiency of the signal system or the ATP equipment leads to
trains running without supervision. For example, when the communication between trains
and the ground control center fails, or when the ATP needs to be deliberately disabled for a
high operation efficiency. Once the train to ground connection is interrupted, the probability
of train collision will increase. Hence, it is essential to do some research in the domain of
train collision avoidance. Developing a distance measurement system that can be applied in
various scenarios, especially in the underground is the most important issue.
9.1.1 Speed based distance warning strategy
In the close proximity driving, the braking distance relates to the train speed. As shown
in Fig. 9.1, we divided the train distance interval into several sections. Sw is the warning
distance period, which will provide 6 s for warning information for the train driver before a
braking action is required. S(v) is the braking distance. Since the TTDMS is implemented
in the STM32F205RET6 prototype machine, a safe and efficient braking distance calculation
strategy is proposed, as shown in Eq. (9.1).
S(v) = Sde + Str(v) + Seb(v) + Ssp m (9.1)
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Figure 9.1: Braking procedure
where Sde is the distance measurement error caused by the Non-line-of-sight (NLOS) and
calculation; Str(v) is the train movement distance in the reaction delay; Seb(v) is the braking
distance; Ssp is the safety prevent distance.
Sde is related to the measurement distance L, as shown in Eq. (9.2). The parameter β can
be obtained based on the actual measurement results; Ssys is the system error.
Sde = β · L+ Ssys m (9.2)
Str(v) is given by Eq. (9.3).
Str(v) = (1 + δe) · v · ttr + 1
2
(atra + ar + ag) · t2tr m (9.3)
∣∣∣∣vr − vv
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δe (9.4)
where δe is the error coefficient of speed measurement, and it is defined by Eq. (9.4); v is
the measured train speed and vr is the actual train speed, respectively. Due to the error
in speed measurement, we choose the worst case for the initial speed in the train braking
procedure, which is the maximum possible speed according to the speed measurement. ttr is
the time consumed to establish the braking action; atra is the current traction acceleration;
ar is the resistance acceleration usually caused by rolling friction and air resistance; ag is the
current line slope, curve or tunnel acceleration.
In details, the characteristics of ar is shown as a traditional quadratic formula the so-called
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Davis formula [101] in Eq. (9.5), and ar is shown in Fig. 9.2. Those accelerations are
changing with the train speed, but we can regard them as constants for the efficacy of
calculation. Additionally, due to the time ttr of the braking establishing is extremely short,
the train speed will not increase too much.
ar = A+B · v + C · v2 (9.5)
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Figure 9.2: A typical graph of tractioin/resistance acceleration with no adhesion
Seb is related to the start and end speeds, and it is given by:
Seb(v) =
v2b − v2e
2aeb
m (9.6)
where vb is the start speed of the braking procedure, also it is the end speed of the reaction
delay procedure for the continuity of train speed and can be obtained in Eq. (9.7); ve is the
end speed and aeb is the braking deceleration which is regarded as a constant here.
vb = (1 + δe) · v + (atra + ar + ag) · ttr m/sec (9.7)
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9.1.2 Distance measurement unit
The TTDMS can obtain the extra information by applying the train-centric communication.
The additional information includes but not limits to other trains’ speed and position. The
structure of distance measurement core unit is shown in Fig. 9.3. The digital map stores
the line data [102].
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Figure 9.3: The distance measurement core unit
This unit involves six parts: transceiver, distance calculator, avoidance algorithm, PRN
generator, forwarder, and the mode controller. The transceiver is in charge of exchanging
data. The distance calculator does the correlation calculation and matches the distance
information with the digital map. The avoidance algorithm analyzes the distance and speed
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information, then outputs appropriate commands. The PRN generator generates PRN code.
The forwarder resends the received signal. The mode controller makes both following and
detected trains share the same system architecture, but carry out different functions. For
example, when the system is in the detection mode, as shown in Fig. 9.3 the forwarder
section that marked with the gray background is disabled; the distance calculator, avoidance
algorithm, and PRN generator that identified with the green background are implementing
the detection function.
The distance measurement flowchart is shown in Fig. 9.4. In the detection mode, the train
sends signal s(t) involving PRN code sequence; when the train obtains the forwarded signal
r(t), the system implements distance measurement calculation and outputs results. In the
response mode, the train will forward the received signal to the following train.
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Figure 9.4: Distance calculation flowchart
9.2 System availability evaluation
In this section, a quantitative model of the system availability is presented and analyzed.
The strategy for processing the distance results is taken into account. The quality of com-
munication architecture is given in the specification of the Euroradio [103]. The model is
based on the specification to do the parameterization. We assumed that readers have basic
knowledge of stochastic Petri nets.
126 9 Practical implementation in the metro
In order to evaluate the system availability, stochastic Petri nets are applied [76], as shown
in Fig. 9.5. In the model, the system states represented by places, and system functions
are indicated by transitions. There are three different arcs in the model, they are normal,
test, and inhibitor arcs, respectively [104]. Normal arcs allow the modifications of states by
transferring tokens among places through transitions. Test arcs have the same function as
normal arcs, but not lead to consuming the tokens. Inhibitor arcs make sure that a place
must be empty for the transition to get activated. During the simulation, one unit of the
model time means on second in reality. The meanings of places are shown in Table 9.1.
Figure 9.5: Availability evaluation
The distance measurement strategy is proposed as follows: ten times continuous initial
measurement results will be stored in the buffer; based on these ten initial data, the system
will output a smoothing result through transitions update1, update2, and update3. When
there is no smoothing distance result is available, the token will transfer from Available to
Unavailable. Additionally, if the TTDMS is unavailable for more than 6 s, which is modeled
by transition Warning, the driver has to be involved to maintain the operation safety until
the system is available again.
The system carries out the initial distance measurement every 50 ms. The connection loss
happens < 10−2 per h or < 2.77∗10−6 per second. Hence, transitions broken and online are
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set with possibilities < 2.77∗10−6 and 1−2.77∗10−6, respectively. When the system is oﬄine,
transition connect models the connection establishment procedure. The time assumed by
this procedure is random, but requires to be < 8.5 sec (95%) and follows an exponential
distribution. The density and distribution functions of the exponential distribution are
given by equations (9.8) and (9.9), respectively.
f (x) = λe−λx (9.8)
F (x) = 1− e−λx (9.9)
Hence, the parameter λ value can be calculated as:
λ = − ln(1− p)
x
sec−1 (9.10)
where p is 0.95, x is 8.5 sec, hence λ = 0.35.
After the establishment, the requirements specify that the connection will be successfully
established with a possibility 99%. Hence, the transitions success and fail are set as
deterministic transitions, and with weights 0.99 and 0.01, respectively.
During the data communication process, the transmission problem occurs since the elec-
tromagnetic interference will influence the measurement result. It can be treated as the
relationship between the bit error rate (BER) and carrier-to-noise ratio (CNR). In our sys-
tem, the digital modulation process is Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK), and the Spreading
Gain is 20 dB. Hence, when CNR > 0 dB the BER  10−6 [105].
Here we choose the failure rate of distance measurement to be 10−4, which is a more critical
value than it in the actual scenario. The parameters of the deterministic transitions Error
and wait are set accordingly. Transition disturb models the time delay caused by trans-
mission problem. The delay is assumed to be < 0.8 sec for 95% of all cases. Hence, the
parameter λ = 3.7 sec−1.
For numerical analysis of the model, Monte Carlo Simulation is applied. The model is
simulated with a Windows 10 Pro system, Intel Core i5 3.20 GHz processor, and 4 GB
RAM. The computation lasts 7.5 hours to do a simulation duration about 18566 days, equal
to 50 train years, in the model. The simulation results are shown in Table 9.1. The system
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is working available with a probability of 99.6937%. The probability that the driver has to
be involved is 7.22667 ∗ 10−8.
Table 9.1: Place occupancy probability
Place Probability Meaning
Loss 0.00106693 Data loss
Buffer 0.898805 Buffer
Available 0.996937 Distance is available
Unavailable 0.00306337 Distance is unavailable
Driver involved 7.22667*10−8 Driver has to be involved
Driver monitoring 1 Driver monitors the equipment
Check < 6.20551*10−10 System self-test
Establishing < 6.20551*10−10 Establishing the connection
Connected 0.99984 System connected
Oﬄine 0.000159658 System oﬄine
9.3 Prototype machine
A prototype machine is designed to carry out the aforementioned TTDMS functions, as
shown in Fig. 9.6. The practical measurements are shown in Table 9.2, average errors
β are obtained. In the close proximity driving scenario, the delay caused by the braking
establishing and driver reaction is set to 1.5 s [106]; the braking deceleration aeb is 0.8 m/s2;
the safety prevent distance Ssp is 30 m. Based on the distance warning strategy, Fig. 9.7
shows the relationship among measurement distance, speed, and braking distance.
Table 9.2: Measurement errors
Distance L (m) Number of measurements Average errors (%) β
> 800 m 106 14.46
600− 800 m 214 11.98
300− 600 m 55 10.34
< 300 m 28 9.01
In order to assist the driver with essential information just in cases of imminent danger, an
easy and simple train-driver interface is introduced, as shown in Fig. 9.8. Symbols or shapes
having a certain meaning in general railway control systems are avoided, and the interface
permits the no interaction with the system during the normal operation. Both acoustic and
graphic alarms to remind the driver when the train is in the Sw section. Additionally, a
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Figure 9.6: Prototype TTDMS system in the metro train
Figure 9.7: Intercorrelations among measurement distance, speed, and braking distance
suggested speed is proposed based the train distance interval. When the system is out of
service, an error prompt is available.
In close proximity driving, the train tracking interval limits the transport capacity and
efficiency. In order to simulate the efficiency of this system, we simulate the two train
tracking procedure based on the actual line parameters of Shanghai metro line 7. The
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Table 9.3: Traction calculation
Train ID From To Block m Departure time (s) Arriving time (s)
1001 Meilan Lake Luonan Xincun 1639 0 126
1001 Luonan Xincun Panguang Road 3040 157 373
1001 Panguang Road Liuhang 966 403 483
1001 Liuhang Gucun Park 1754 514 647
1001 Gucun Park Qihua Road 2534 678 863
1001 Qihua Road Shanghai University 1691 894 Null
1003 Meilan Lake Luonan Xincun 1639 67 192
1003 Luonan Xincun Panguang Road 3040 223 438
1003 Panguang Road Liuhang 966 468 550
1003 Liuhang Gucun Park 1754 580 713
1003 Gucun Park Qihua Road 2534 744 929
1003 Qihua Road Shanghai University 1691 960 Null
Up lineDetection Warning: On 2016-07-13 17:32:50
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Searching
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550 m
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Error code: OA
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345 m
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Current speed: 60 km/h
Current speed: 60 km/h
(a) Establishing connection (b) Normal operation
(c) Warning (d) Error prompt information
Suggested speed: 57.5 km/h
Figure 9.8: The train-driver’s interface
minimum distance between two trains is based on the results in Fig. 9.7. When the train
arrives at stations, the train will stop for 30 seconds. The details of the traction calculation
are shown in Table 9.3.
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 9.9. It indicates that the tracking interval is around
67± 2 s, and no braking action is fired due to the safety distance interval.
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9.4 Detection distance validation in simulation
The detection distance depends on the hardware ability. A larger detection distance results
in a higher transmission power. The collision alarm should be given before the avoidance
of a collision becomes impossible. Hence, the detection distance should be further than the
braking distance. In the case of a metro train with a weight of 90 t, the braking distance
is 318.5 m when the train is moving at an initial speed of 80 km/h [107]. The path loss
(LB [dB]) limits the distance measurement (dKm), as shown in equation 9.11 [108].
Pr (d) [dBm] = Pt [dBm] +G− LB [dB]− PL∆ − PLw ≥ sensitivity (9.11)
G = 10 log (GtGr) (9.12)
where Pr (d) [dBm] is the receive power, Pt [dBm] is the transfer power, G is the gain, Gt
and Gr are the gain of the transfer and receiver antenna, respectively. LB [dB] is the path
loss, PLw is the attenuation caused by glass windows. Pr (d) [dBm] should be greater than
the sensitivity of the receiver. In an ideal case of no obstacles, the path loss would be the
free space loss. The path loss LB [dB] can be calculated using equation 9.13 [108].
LB [dB] = 32.44 + 20log10fMHz + 20log10dKm (9.13)
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where fMHz is the frequency of the carrier wave.
To estimate the detection distance of TTDMS, the following specifications are made. The
input power is 20 dBm, the maximum gain is 6 dBi, the receiver threshold is -100 dBm,
the working frequency of the carrier wave is 2406 ∼ 2476 MHz, and the center frequency
(2440 MHz) is applied, in the following calculations. The device attenuation PL∆ = 0, the
attenuation caused by the glass windows is PLw = 6. Hence,
−100 < 20 + 6− LB [dB]− 0− PLw (9.14)
LB [dB] < 120 (9.15)
From equation (9.13) results,
dKm = 10
(
LB [dB]− 32.44− 20log102440
20
)
km (9.16)
dKm ≈ 9.77 km (9.17)
The maximum propagation distance is 9.77 km in the ideal case of no obstacles. Tunnel
and curve lines are common in metro lines. However, the path loss calculations in these
scenarios are hard to carry out because the propagation calculations are complex. In order to
evaluate the propagation ability in these scenarios, the simulation software Wireless InSite R©
is applied. The software is a suite of ray-tracing models for the analysis of radio propagation
and wireless communication systems. The software’s efficient and accurate predictions can
be used to undertake our simulation.
The simulation environment is divided into two main parts. The path loss is estimated in
a straight line and a curve line. The object model is shown in Fig. 9.10. The tunnel’s
diameter is 5.5 m, the curve line has a length of 550 m with a radius of 360 m. The straight
tunnel line is 1653 m. The simulation parameters’ settings are shown in Table 9.4. In order
to have a better transfer gain, the transfer antenna is set as a directional antenna with an
input power of 20 dBm (100 mW), and a half-wave dipole antenna is applied to the receiver.
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In simulation scenarios, the receivers are positioned at intervals of 1.5 m at the height of 2
m, which means that the sampling interval is 1.5 m inside the tunnel.
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Figure 9.10: Simulation model and results
Fig. 9.10 reveals that the attenuation is lower than 100 dB in the curve tunnel line within
550 m. In the straight tunnel line, the path loss is not more than 90 dB when the distance
is 1600 m. As indicated in the path loss simulation results, it is clear that the system can
cover at least 1600 m in a straight line. In curve lines with a radius of 360 m, the signal can
be received at a distance of more than 550 m.
9.5 Actual measurement
9.5.1 Measurement environment and configuration
The TTDMS prototype machine has the same measurement configuration as illustrated in
Table 9.4. As shown in Fig. 9.11 (1), this prototype machine has three main parts: a
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Table 9.4: Simulation parameters settings
Tunnel mode setting
Tunnel size Curve line Tunnel material
Φ(m) L(m) R(m) L(m) Material Permittivity Conductivity
(S.m−1)
5.5 1653 360 550 Concrete 10 0.01
Carrier wave and antennas’ setting
Antenna
Type
f (MHz) Input
power(dBm)
Antenna Type Receiver thresh-
old (dBm)
Gain (dBi) Interval
(m)
Directional 2400 20 Half-wave
dipole
-100 6 1.5
Shooting-and-Bouncing Ray (SBR) setting
Rays inter-
val
number of reflections Number of transmissions Number of diffractions
0.25 10 0 2
host computer, a display monitor, and an antenna. The host computer implements the main
calculation process and provides the input/output interfaces. The antenna is fixed at the top
of the driver’s room. The display monitor, which shows the distance and alarm information,
is installed beside a Closed Circuit Television monitor. The application scenarios of TTDMS
are shown in Fig. 9.11 (4) and (5).
1 2
3 4 5
Figure 9.11: Measurement: (1)TTDMS prototype machine, (2) Shanghai Metro line 7, (3)
TTDMS antenna, (4) application scenario in tunnel, (5) application scenario on
viaduct
The measurements were carried out in two scenarios. One scenario is in a static test line, and
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another is in an actual operation line. The prototype machine outputs an initial distance
result every 50 ms. The measurement data, which is a smoothing result of 10 initial results,
is recorded every 0.5 seconds.
The static measurement is set so that the detected train was at a stop, while the following
train is approaching or departing at a speed of 20 km/h. In this static measurement, the
data recorded in one round trip measurement was obtained both inside the tunnel and on
the viaduct lines.
In order to reflect the actual measurement situation, the actual distance measurements were
implemented in Shanghai Metro line 7, China. As shown in Fig. 9.11 (2), the Metro line
7 is a west-southeast line of the Shanghai Metro network. The line’s length is 44.35 km, it
includes both underground and viaduct lines, and stops at 33 stations. The overview of the
measurement data is shown in Table 9.5.
Table 9.5: Overview of the measurement data of Metro line 7
train-to-train distance numbers of measurements
> 800 m 453
600-800 m 289
300-600 m 123
< 300 m 112
total 977
9.5.2 Measurement results
After these measurements, TTDMS measurement errors are obtained. The error bars repre-
sent the standard deviations of the mean values. As shown in Fig. 9.12, the data measured
by TTDMS is comparable to the actual data, which is measured by the laser range-finder
as the reference data. The measurement errors, which are the deviations between the mea-
surement and actual data, are shown in Fig. 9.13. It is obvious that the scenarios show
little differences in the location deviation for the different measurement environments. Ad-
ditionally, one very interesting result is that the tunnel scenario has a lower measurement
deviation than the viaduct. This is due to the tunnel’s simple electromagnetic environment
and waveguide transmission characteristics.
In the actual scenario, the data was collected in real operation metro trains. The data was
recorded at different times and in different stations. The data from ATS was gathered as
the reference system to draw a comparison as shown in Table 9.6. Given the data format
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of ATS, only distances at time points are available. After the tests were performed and
recorded, the deviation between the true and measured distance was calculated. Fig. 9.14
reveals that there is a steady increase in the measurement errors as the distance gets larger.
The fitting line of the errors mean values is shown in equation 9.18.
Div = α×D + β m (9.18)
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Table 9.6: Distance measurement in Metro line 7 (Partial)
Time ID 1 ID 2 Stations / route TTDMS (m) ATS (m)
09:31:30-09:33:18 711 703 Dong’an Road 818-808 732-698
09:38:47-09:39:37 711 703 Changshu Road-Jing’an Temple 412-722 391-712
09:41:17-09:41:35 711 703 Jing’an Temple-Changping Road 554-486 552-469
09:42:02-09:42:09 711 703 Changping Road 591-654 554-598
09:43:20-09:43:23 711 703 Changping Road-Changshou Road 535-529 498-476
09:45:33-09:46:26 711 703 Changshou Road-Zhenping Road 426-260-413 424-258-412
09:48:34-09:50:03 711 703 Zhenping Road-Langao Road 504-700 451-620
09:50:08-09:50:32 711 703 Langao Road 646-537 570-480
09:50:39-09:50:51 711 703 Langao Road-Xincun Road 525-603 516-598
09:52:39-09:52:41 711 703 Xincun Road-Dahuasan Road 795-796 771-719
09:52:51-09:52:58 711 703 Xincun Road-Dahuasan Road 770-787 733-729
09:55:38-09:56:45 711 703 Dahuasan Road-Zhixing Road 1057-965 1006-933
0 250 500 750 1.000 1250 1.500
−50
0
50
100
150
200
Distance between two trains (m)
Er
ro
r (
m)
 
 Mean values and error bar
Fitting line
Figure 9.14: Measurement errors in Metro line 7
where, Div is the deviation between the true and measurement distance, α is the scope,
α ∈ [0.06032, 0.07521] and β ∈ [−2.935, 7.911]. With the help of measurement inaccuracy
results, an adjustment is available for future applications.
Possible reasons for measurement errors are the accuracy of the hardware, multi-path prop-
agation and non-line-of-sight (NLOS). The hardware error is related to the efficiency and
quality of the processor and chip. In this actual measurement, the deviations caused by
NLOS is the main reason. Because of the reflection of the signal in tunnel space, the mea-
surement distance differs from the actual distance and leads to a larger measured distance
than the real one.
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Figure 9.15: Probability distribution of train to train distance in operating (Metro line 7)
9.6 Summary
As the object of research, TTDMS can calculate the distance between two trains. We
proposed the system architecture, application scenarios and block diagram. Furthermore,
a prototype machine was assembled to obtain the actual measurement data. Numerical
validations of TTDMS were implemented by applying mathematical calculation, software
simulation and actual measurements. The results indicated that TTDMS was feasible in
detecting distance and applicable in actual metro lines.
In this chapter, the amount of real measurement data is rather limited. Hence, the follow-
up research works are foreseeable. To advance the system performance validation process,
more real data should be collected. The benefit of getting a larger set of actual data is that
the system’s statistical characteristics become more apparent. Another research activity is
to enhance the prototype machine. Based on the analysis data, the distance measurement
results can be revised and its accuracy improved.
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As discussed in chapter 3, the movement authority presently applied in the Train Control
System can only be generated by the Radio Block Center, and support one-dimensional
distance information for the onboard equipment. The interlocking information and other
trains’ position are invisible to the individual train. Hence, if the onboard equipment outputs
erroneous commands or abnormal communication between trains and Radio Block Center,
train rear-end collisions are likely to happen. To satisfy the increasing safety demands of
railway transportation especially in these abnormal scenarios,the MA+ is proposed in this
thesis. Except for a wireless communication unit, the new MA+ does not require any other
infrastructure.
With the help of train-centric communication technology, the MA+ can obtain the informa-
tion of switches and trains within a certain scope. In this chapter, the MA+ detection range
is estimated in section 10.1 based on a railway curve line model. Section 10.2 illustrates the
MA+ implementation scenarios. Afterwards, the system logical model and working princi-
ples are introduced. In order to put the system into current ECTS-2, an application demo
on the DMI is presented in section 10.3.
10.1 MA+ detection range estimation
A system has to be evaluated during its life cycle. The evaluation results provide essential
information for the system design and improvement. The system performance represents
the effectiveness of the system. The performance verification helps engineers have a better
understanding of the system before its application in practice. Modeling and simulation can
get the information about how a system reacts, without actually observing the data from
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experiments in practice. With proper parameterization, the model can represent fundamen-
tal aspects of the system, and obtain data that are either difficult or expensive to replicate
in the real world.
Any theoretical proposal should be advanced in engineering implementation, and then the
proposal makes sense. Before the practice using, a suitable simulation based on an exist-
ing technology is essential. For the train-centric communication, different kinds of com-
munication technologies are available, such as Global System for Mobile Communications
(GSM), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), Wideband Code Division Multiple Access
(WCDMA), and so on. In recent years, the evolution of the data communication technology
promotes the application of wireless communication in rail transportations, for the Long-
Term Evolution (LTE) as an example [109] [24]. Based on the high capacity and speed of
LTE and less time delay (as shown in Table 10.1), direct communications among waysides
and onboard equipment are available. It will enhance the safety level of the previous control
method that relied principally on the information delivered from RBC. In this paper, the
distance detection ability of the MA+ is discussed based on path loss.
Table 10.1: The maximum time delays comparison of mobile communication system
Communication system Maximum time delay (10−6s) Maximum range error (m)
GSM 1.805 554
CDMA2000 0.813 344
WCDMA 0.130 39
LTE 0.030 9.7
The coverage of wireless signal limits the distance detection. Different factors have various
influences on the signal quality. One tough transition environment is that in non-line-of-
sight (NLOS) propagation with mountain barrier, for instance in railway curve lines, as
shown in Fig. 10.1. Here, the path loss in curve line is treated as a single round obstacle for
mathematical calculation.
where
h: height of the curve line above the straight line of the following train and detected train.
R: the radius of the curve line.
d1, d2: the tangent lines through the following train and detected train position.
The diffraction loss is influenced by the frequency, curve radius, and distance. The mathe-
matical calculation is based on the ITU recommendation [110]. The diffraction loss A can
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Figure 10.1: The power attenuation simulation in the curve line application scenario
be calculated by equation (10.1), J(v) is the Fresnel-Kirchoff loss caused by equivalent blade
shape barrier [110].
A = J(v) + T (m,n) (10.1)
J (v) = −20 log
Ñ»
[1− C (v)− S (v)]2 + [C (v)− S (v)]2
2
é
(10.2)
C(v) and S(v) are the real and imaginary parts of Fresnel integral as shown in equation
(10.2), respectively. For the transition with a barrier blocking the line-of-sight transmission,
the J(v) can be approximately described by equation (10.4).
Fc (v) =
v∫
0
exp
Ç
j
pis2
2
å
ds = C (v) + jS (v) (10.3)
J (v) = 6.9 + 20 log
Å√
(v − 0.1)2 + 1 + v − 0.1
ã
(10.4)
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where h and λ are in meters, λ is the wavelength, and d1, d2 are in kilometers.
v = 0.0316h
ñ
2 (d1 + d2)
λd1d2
ô1/2
(10.5)
T (m,n) is the additional loss caused by barrier curvature, which is the curve line radius
R. When mn ≤ 4, T (m,n) equals equation (10.8), when mn > 4, T (m,n) equals equation
(10.9).
m = R
ñ
d1 + d2
d1d2
ô
/
ñ
piR
λ
ô1/3
(10.6)
n = h
ñ
piR
λ
ô2/3
/R (10.7)
T (m,n) = 7.2m1/2 − (2− 12.5n)m+ 3.6m3/2 − 0.8m2 (10.8)
T (m,n) = −6− 20 log (mn) + 7.2m1/2 − (2− 17n)m+ 3.6m3/2 − 0.8m2 (10.9)
In Europe, LTE frequencies are band 1/3/7/8/20. Band 8 is currently used mostly by GSM
[111]. The band 8 is attractive from a coverage point of view due to the lower propagation
losses. The band can be reused for LTE or HSPA. Band 8 and 20 hold the uplink frequencies
880-915 MHz and 832-862 MHz. The downlink frequencies are 925-960 MHz and 791-821
MHz [111].
The minimum railway curve radius is different in various railway lines. Several cases are
shown in Table 10.2 [81].
Table 10.2: Comparison among different curve radiuses
Organization JR JR DB DB SNC SNCF CRH
Item Tokaido
Shinkansen
Tokyo-
Joetsu
Hannover-
Würzburg
Köln-
Rhein/Mann
Paris-
Sud-Est
Atlantique Beijing-
Shanghai
Maximum design speed km/h null 280 300 300 350 380 380
Maximum service speed km/h 300 275 250 null 270 300 300
Minimum curve radius m 4000 4000 7000 3350 4000 6250 7000
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Fig. 10.2 shows the calculation results under the frequency of 930 MHz based on the diffrac-
tion loss. The simulation results indicate the interrelationship among the diffraction loss,
detection distance, frequency, and radius. The received signal power should be greater than
the sensitivity of a receiver, as shown in equation (10.10). The simulation results indicate
that under the minimum curve radius 3350 m in Köln-Rhein/Mann line, the signal attenu-
ation is 158.2 dB when the detection distance is 6100 m [94].
Figure 10.2: Wireless power attenuation with distance and radius
Pr (d) [dBm] = Pt [dBm] +G− A− PL∆ (10.10)
G = 10 log (GtGr) (10.11)
where Pr (d) [dBm] is the receive power. Pt [dBm] is the transfer power. G is the gain, Gt and
Gr are the gain of the transfer and receiver antenna, respectively. PL∆ is the attenuation
caused by device and feeder cable.
For the received power, some experimental data are available to reference. In publications
[112], the path loss measurements at the 930 MHz band in the different scenario were done.
The empirical power of received signal models for suburban, open area, mountain area, and
urban were proposed, as shown in equations 10.12, 10.13, 10.14, and 10.15, respectively. The
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simulation result is shown in Fig. 10.3.
Pr (d) = 21.577− 28.001 log (d) (10.12)
Pr (d) = 6.0246− 21.2261 log (d) (10.13)
Pr (d) = 38.432− 35.015 log (d) (10.14)
Pr (d) = 61.337− 40.452 log (d) (10.15)
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Figure 10.3: Receive signal power in different scenarios
In current practice application, the typical maximum path loss of LTE can be 163.5 dB [113].
In order to make the detection range as far as possible, many different methods can be used.
For instance, choosing suitable wireless frequency spectrum according to the simulation
result in Fig. 10.2; increasing transmitter power, enhancing receiver sensitivity, and building
repeater stations. Hence, the detection range is not a limitation of the MA+ practical
application, when compared with the train emergency braking distance (between 2300 and
2800 m depending on the actual speed, ICE-3, Germany).
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Both the simulation result and practical results indicate that the train-centric communication
is available at the technical level. The following part carries out the safety evaluation of the
MA+.
10.2 MA+ implementation scenarios
A switch can lead a train on to a different path. Hence, obtaining the position and situ-
ation of the approaching switch is essential in the MA+ implementation. Train-to-switch
communication provides fundamental vector information. The following steps are involved:
surveillance, detect and appropriate avoidance, and output results.
• First, the following MA+ works in a monitoring mode. The switch announcement
continuously broadcasts its location and position.
• Second, once the connection between the switch announcement and the following train-
centric communication architecture establishes, the following system turns to the ap-
propriate avoidance mode.
• Third, after obtaining the position and situation of the approaching switch, the system
outputs results vary depending on different scenarios.
In the appropriate avoidance mode, the switch conditions are described as shown in Fig.
10.4. Each one switch unit connects two tracks. As shown, four different combinations of
the switch conditions are discussed.
The red line represents the SMA. The blue rectangle indicates the normal switch position.
The yellow one displays the reverse switch position. The switch name turns into green or
yellow depending on the switch position. When the switch is in an uncertain position, it will
be marked with red-dotted lines as shown in Fig. 10.4 (3) and (4).
It is important to note that, situations 3 and 4 do not exist in steady state when the in-
terlocking system is working properly. ETCS is a critical safety system; the MA generation
obeys specific fault-safety strategies. In order to reduce the frequency of false alarms, the
following condition is considered. When the original MA is available and the database shows
there is an approaching switch, but when the train-to-switch connection is not established,
the system ignores the scenario, and no SMA is required. Among these four different sce-
narios, only one can trigger the SMA. As illustrated in Fig. 10.4 (3), under this particular
scenario, switch split is likely to occur, along with derailments and side collisions.
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Figure 10.4: MA+ operates with approaching switch scenarios
If Train A detects another Train B in its detection range, Train A communicates with Train
B, and gains the MA+ detail of Train B. Then, the scenarios can be divided into two main
parts.
• There is no overlap of the two MA, as shown in Fig. 10.5 (1). The green part is the
available extension area for the encountering a trains’ MA. Under this scenario, the
EOA of the MA can be reached without a risk for a hazardous situation5.
• If the routes of Train A and Train B have an overlap, both of them have to activate
the SMA to prevent collisions, as shown in Fig. 10.5 (2) and (3).
The practical scenarios are the combinations of approaching switches and encountering trains
scenarios. When drivers are required to take responsibility, they can have an extended version
of the surrounding switches and trains in a certain distance with the assistance of MA+.
5The train position calculated by D_LRBG is the train’s head position, the absolute real length of the
train should be considered when triggering SMA.
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Figure 10.5: MA+ operates with encountering trains
For drivers, the benefits of MA+ implementation is that it helps them understand better
the surrounding environment of tasks they have to perform, especially in special scenarios
where the drivers have to make sure the situation of train ahead. For instance, the on-board
equipment works in modes as ON SIGHT (OS), ISOLATION (IS), and so on. It is an efficient
way to extend drivers’ ability and improve safety.
The contemporary control system has a high safety level. However, if the former four defense
layers result in failure, in this situation, the "Driver see and avoid" will be activated. The
MA+ can output alarm and shorten the MA automatically, further more, this should be
kept at Radio Silence if there is no potential accident, otherwise, it can also be turned on
manually. Hence, it is clear that, the MA+ will not increase drivers’ responsibility and
workload. Additionally, it can also provide additional communication other than just the
communication between trains and RBC.
10.3 An application demo on the DMI
The MA+ can be merged into the current train control system. In this section, a demo is
proposed on the DMI of ETCS. The MA+ is combined with the planning information on
DMI. Here we add MA+ information in orders and announcements of track conditions area
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and these basic symbols as shown in Table 10.3.
Table 10.3: Symbol form/shape and descriptions
Symbol No. Form/shape Description
SW1 Switch in normal position
SW2 Switch in reverse position
SW3 Switch in reverse and normal position
SW4 Switch in normal and reverse position
TR1 Encountering train without collision risk
TR2 Encounter train with collision risk
TC1 Operation line
TC2 Empty line
TC3 Occupied line
Operation line and empty line are defined in the individual train view. Based on the switch
conditions, different MA operation lines are optional. The driver will know which route is
being implemented. As shown in Fig. 10.6, the LMA is assumed to be 8000 m. It can
be calculated from the variables of L_ENDSECTION and L_SECTION(k), as shown in
the equation 2.1. The train transfers from current operation line to empty line through
SW2, which locates at 2800 m in front, as shown in Fig. 10.6 (2). If SW3 and SW4 are
in hazardous conditions, trailed switch accidents may happen. SW3 will lead the following
train to another track and switch split will occur. Hence, SMA is required and an alert is
triggered. There is no risk of collisions to the following train under SW4, and no SMA action
can be triggered automatically.
Once other trains were detected, and if there were no overlap between operation lines, the
system will show the positions of other trains in a green symbol TR1. The angle shows the
train operation direction. If there were overlaps between operation lines, SMA is immediately
executed. Then, because of different encountering train directions, two different scenarios
should be discussed. Scenario one, if the new EOA updates, there is still an overlap of the
MA of two trains, both of two trains have to shorten their MA again based on their respective
speed, distance, and location, as shown in Fig. 10.7 (1). Scenario two, if encountering trains
and following trains have the same route direction, the new EOA will be updated depending
on the end of the detected train, as shown in Fig. 10.7 (2).
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Figure 10.6: DMI operates with approaching switch scenarios
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Figure 10.7: DMI with detected trains
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10.4 Summary
In this chapter, the practical implementation of the MA+ in the railway was proposed. The
MA+ detection range is estimated based on the mathematical calculation, which indicated
that the LTE can be a possible solution in the railway application. Additionally, some actual
measurements were done by other researchers also supported this conclusion. After discussed
the MA+ implementation scenarios, an application demo on the DMI was proposed.
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11 Conclusions and further work
In this chapter, first a summary of the methods proposed in this thesis is provided. Moreover,
the approaches for the development and analysis of the system is discussed. Finally, the thesis
is concluded by outlining the future work.
This thesis proposed an approach to assist the development and analysis of a distance mea-
surement system. The system structure was presented and its correctness was validated by
the CPN model. Based on the model-checking method, the functional safety validations that
involve state and event were carried out. Further, a methodology for an encoding framework
premised on an occurrence graph was proposed. Additionally, the encoding framework was
applied to perform a static analysis of the execution time estimated in the latter part of this
thesis.
Given that the functional analysis of the system is within the scope of states and functions
validations, which both play important roles in this approach, this universal approach can
also be applied in the development procedures of various systems.
11.1 Conclusions
System development is changing from informal text specifications and manual coding meth-
ods to a model-based and tool-supported system development and code automated gener-
ation process. In the model-based system development procedure, the formal method can
be applied. Formal methods provide a means of developing a description of the system at
some stage in the phases of requirements specification, design, and coding. A formal method
generally offers a notation language, which permits deriving a description in that notation.
Additionally, it is available to carry out the evaluation for different correctness properties by
means of different forms. The modeling language is the foundation of the formal method.
In this thesis, Petri nets are selected as the modeling and verification language for the analysis
of the train distance interval measurement system. For the development and validation of
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the TTDMS, four steps and levels are considered. The thesis is organized as shown in the
Fig. 11.1.
The first and second steps are about the conceptual and construction understanding of the
system. These two steps are treated as the recognition level, which is carried out in the
chapter 4. In this two steps, the system’s requirements and system structure are analyzed,
respectively. As the research target, the railway system safety is discussed in chapter 3.
In this chapter, the essential of involving an additional train distance interval measurement
system is proposed. The overall system safety improvement is calculated based on the
reliability analysis. Additionally, the train collision model is introduced. With applying the
train distance measurement system, some potential collisions can be avoided.
Steps
 Step 1
 Step 2
 Step 3
 Step 4
Levels Chapters Description
 Recognition level
 Modeling Level
 Parameterization
/simulation level
 Physical level
 Chapter 3
 Chapter 4
 Chapter 5
 Chapter 6
 Chapter 7
 Chapter 8
 Chapter 9
 Chapter 10
 System requirements
 System safety improvement
 System principle
 System structure
 Actual TTDMS reliability estimation
 Performance improvement
 Formal modeling process
 Model validation and functional safety verification
 Performance evaluation
 Model based code generation and time estimation
 Overlay system performance
 Metro
 Railway
Figure 11.1: Thesis structure
Chapter 4 detailed the system principle of an enhanced movement authority system (MA+),
which combines advantages of the train-centric communication with current movement au-
thority mechanisms. The system structure, application scenarios, and algorithm flow chart
of the MA+ are presented in the following. The MA+ provides two different methods of
the train distance interval data acquisition: the normal one, which is based on the onboard
equipment; the backup one, which is the main component of MA+ and based on the TOA
distance estimation, is named as train to train distance measurement system (TTDMS). The
performance improvement of the MA+ is evaluated by comparing the train safe distance in-
terval protected by different solutions. The results indicate that the safe distance interval in
MA+ is much less than it in ETCS-2 and ETCS-3 at any speed.
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Step 3 is carried out in chapters 5 to 8. In chapter 5, the system evaluation methodology,
formal methods for system evaluation and verification are discussed; the semantics and
syntax of CPNs are expressed; the relationship between system structure and Petri nets
are described; benefits of various Petri nets tool are compared; the system formalization
and validation procedures, which are the modeling and parameterization/simulation levels,
are implemented. During this step, the system is presented by using the formal method
in the modeling level. In the parameterization and simulation level, the analysis of system
functional safety and performance is carried out. After the model structure is validated, a
universal approach is available to generate code frameworks from the occurrence graph.
With a new system involved, the overlay system performance is modified. As a collision fault
tree model is introduced in chapter 3, the system dependability can be evaluated by applying
CPNs. In chapter 8, a procedure is proposed to evaluate the fault tree by using CPNs, which
combines event maintenance components, model correctness verification, time factors and
mathematical calculation. This procedure breaks the limitations of many commercial tools,
and it is flexible to be modified and free to use.
The last step is the combination of hardware and software, and this step is carried out on the
physical level, which permits an actual system to implement both simulation, mathematical
calculation, and actual testing processes. Hence, the practical implementations in the metro
and railway system are introduced in chapters 9 and 10, respectively. In chapter 9, a speed
based distance warning strategy is proposed for the metro system. The system availability is
evaluated by applying stochastic Petri nets. Detection distance validation in both simulation
and practical scenarios are considered. The results indicate that this system can carry out
daily metro operations. For the implementation in the railway, the system detection range is
estimated based on the mathematical calculation in chapter 10. Additionally, an application
demo based on the DMI is proposed.
11.2 Outlook
For the further work, the deep combination of stochastic and Colored Petri nets should be
taken into consideration. In other words, the stochastic analysis could be added to the
existing model, which results in a various analysis based on the same model. Because the
time parameters are treated differently in stochastic and Colored Petri nets, different models
are required. The Colored stochastic Petri nets could be the possible solution. Here exists
already some solutions, for example, REALIST (Universität Stuttgart), pi−Tool (iVA), and
so on. Additionally, the token on the place could be treated as stochastic, which can only
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be modified through a transition. As a consequence, the system behavior can be more
appropriately described and model could be further simplified.
For the distance distance measure system proposed in chapter 4, additional sensors and GNSS
can be involved to increase the measurement accuracy. The data fusion technology will be
taken into consideration, and the methodology introduced in this thesis is still available to
do the relative analysis.
The discussion of the structural analysis in this thesis is based on the high-level Petri nets.
The prerequisite is a full state space should be calculated, and no parameters are considered.
Since the system with different token value is treated as a different state, which is limited
by the software we applied, the parameterization is carried out after the structural analysis.
The simulation in chapter 5 are implemented through Monte-Carlo-Algorithms testing, which
normally associated with a confidence interval. Hence, the results may not be the same with
mathematical calculations. This could be solved when the deep combination of stochastic
and Colored Petri nets is available. At that time, the Markovian Analysis could provide
more precise results. The model based code generation and time estimation are introduced
principally, and an actual procedure will be the further work, which can implement the
transition from safe model to safe code.
More examples should be involved in further research work. In doing so, a more organized
and constructive validation procedure will be developed to evaluate and validate the system
structure. Although the approach does have its limitations, a more efficient CPN-based
development procedure can be expected.
For the overlay system performance evaluation in chapter 3, only fault tree analysis is applied.
Since the causal relationship between events that lead to train collisions is represented by a
fault tree, the limitation is that the model could be different from the realistic model. What
is more, the parameterization procedure is limited by the data resources.
Due to business and policy restrictions, the practical prototype machine is implemented in
the metro only. Hence, there is no actual measurement data in the railway application. In
chapter 10, the application demo on the DMI is a hypothesis. Since the current DMI has
been developed with a view to optimizing information provision and providing drivers with
the information they need, and no more than that. Any changes to the DMI and information
provided would, therefore, need careful consideration. Additionally, the MA+ will provide
drivers with additional information, which may increase the drivers’ workload. These issues
can be figured out by consulting the train drivers for more information.
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Overall, however, the approach proposed in this thesis holds great promise for the develop-
ment and verification of the train-to-train distance measurement system, which will enhance
the safety of metro transportation systems as well as railway systems.
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